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I. INTRODUCTION *
The late Huey Long, contending for the enactment of a statute
levying an occupation or license tax upon chain stores doing business
in Louisiana, exclaimed in a speech: "I would rather have thieves and
gangsters than chain stores inLouisiana." 1 In 1935, a few years later,
the director of the National Association of Retail Grocers submitted a
statement to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives,
I Associate Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law. J.U.D., 1931,
Univ. of Freiburg, Germany; LL. B., 1938, Yale Univ. Member of the New York
Bar, 1941.
This study was originally prepared under the auspices of the Association of
American Law Schools as one of a series of industry studies which the Association
is sponsoring through its Committee on Auxiliary Business and Social Materials for
use in courses on the antitrust laws. It has been separately published and copyrighted
by the Association and is printed here by permission with some slight modifications.
The study was undertaken at the suggestion of Professor Ralph F. Fuchs of
Indiana University School of Law, chairman of the editorial group for the industry
studies, to whom the writer is deeply indebted. His advice during the preparation
of the study and his many suggestions for changes in the manuscript contributed
greatly to the improvement of the text. Acknowledgments are also due to other
members of the committee, particularly Professors Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Yale Law
School, Ward S. Bowman, Jr., and Norman Bursler, University of Chicago Law
School, for helpful criticism, and to Victor H. Kramer, Esq., of the Department of
Justice, and Breck P. McAllister, Esq., of the New York Bar, for making available the
briefs and the transcript of the trial in the A & P case.
* Throughout these pages frequent reference will be made to the case of United
States v. N.Y. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D. I1. 1946),
aff'd, 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949), and to the record and some of the briefs. Here-
after these will be cited as follows:
District Court report-A & P case, 67 F. Supp.;
Court of Appeals report-A & P case, 173 F. 2d;
Transcript of record-A & P Tr.;
Government Brief in the District Court-Govt. Br. (D.C.);
Government Brief in the Court of Appeals-Govt. Br. (C.A.);
Defendant's Brief on Appeal-A & P Br.;
Appendix A to Defendant's Brief on Appeal-A & P Br. App.;
Defendant's Reply Brief on Appeal-A & P Reply Br.
Appendix B to the defendant's brief on appeal and the defendant's brief in the
District Court, which was not available to the writer, are not cited.
1. Quoted in BECKMAN AND NOLEN, THE CHAIN SToRE PROBLEM, 228-229
(1938).
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then engaged in considering various proposals for the amendment of
the Clayton Act,2 in which, asking for a curb on "the food monopolies,"
he said: "The present condition of affairs in the food industry has put
thousands of salesmen out of work. It has driven many brokers out
of business. It has closed the doors of many wholesale grocers and
has shut up thousands of retail grocers all over the country. All of
these men were engaged in useful and gainful occupations. Many of
them now are on the relief roll. And this was done, not to bring
goods to the consumer cheaper, but in order to fatten the income of
a few chosen people who invested their money in chain stores." 3
The devil whose ugly features were thus conjured up was, how-
ever, not without advocates. Significantly, an Illinois housewife, ap-
pearing in 1936 before a Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary, de-
livered an almost impassioned plea in favor of the food chains and in
opposition to proposed legislation which, in her opinion, would destroy
their usefulness. Referring to President Wilson's request to the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to find the reasons for the high cost of food
during the period following the First World War, and to the Com-
mission's findings as to excessive distribution costs caused by too many
middlemen, she implored the Senators not to destroy "the progress
which has been made toward getting necessities of life to the public not
only at lower prices but improved in quality and with sanitary and
hygienic methods of handling foodstuffs." '
These quotations epitomize "one of the great economic contro-
versies of our time," ' the conflict between independent food distributors
and large corporate chains, or, to speak in concrete examples, between
the corner grocer and the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
with its 6000 food stores 0 scattered through 40 states.and the District
of Columbia.7 Why and how did this conflict arise? What weapons-
2. 38 STAT. 730, 15 U.S.C. § 12 et seq.
3. Statement of John M. Pohlhaus, Hearings before the Committee on the
Judiciary on H.R. 4995 and H.R. 5062, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1935).
4. Testimony of Mrs. Virginia H. Morrison of Chicago, Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on Seg.. 4171 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 91-92 (1936).
5. Edwards: The Place of Economics in, the Course on Trade Regulation, 1
J. LEGAL EDUc. 1, 6 (1948).
6. MooDy's INDUSTRIALS, 1548 (1949), attributes to A & P "about 6000 food
stores" in 39 states.
7. In 1943 the number of stores was 5,751, A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 633. The
company operated in 40 states, Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 7.
It should, of course, be noted that chains exist not only in the food industry, but
in many other industries, such as drug stores, department stores, variety stores, and
clothing, shoe, furniture, hardware, and cigar stores. However, the food chains ac-
count for the largest single part of total chain store sales (32.67% in 1935) and,
consequently, have been the targets of most legislative and other attacks which will be
considered in this study. See BECKMAN AND NoLEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 34;
Winston and Osborne, The Pattern of Chain Store Sales in Retail Distribution,
Survey of Current Business, June 1947, p. 12.
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political, economic and legal-were used by those who advocated re-
strictions against chains? How effective were these weapons? And
what is the significance of this struggle from the point of view of the
public interest in the preservation of a free, competitive society?
The following is an attempt to find some answers to these ques-
tions. Obviously, we must begin by looking at the business of food
distribution in the United States. How is it done, who does it, and
what are the respective functions of the various groups which partici-
pate in it ?
II. THE CHANNELS OF FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
According to the classical pattern of distribution, the producer or
manufacturer sells to the wholesaler, the wholesaler sells to the re-
tailer, and the retailer sells to the consumer. In the food industry
the process of distribution begins when food grown on the soil or
processed from raw materials furnished by the grower (e.g., slaughter-
ing of cattle and dressing of meat or the canning of fruits, vegetables
and other foodstuffs) is ready for sale. The system of food distribu-
tion from this point on, prior to the advent of the corporate chains,
which is still being practiced among large numbers of independents,
has been characterized as "the multiple middleman system." In fact,
most small and medium-sized manufacturers do not sell directly to the
wholesaler but use the services of an additional middleman who is
generally called a broker. The constitution of the National Food
Brokers' Association, which counts among its members a majority of
the brokers, defines a food broker as "an independent sales agent who
performs the services of negotiating the sale of food and/or grocery
products for and on account of the seller as principal, and who is not
employed or established by, nor an affiliate or subsidiary of, any trade
buyer, and whose compensation is a commission or brokerage paid by
the seller." I
In a statement submitted in 1935 to the House Judiciary Com-
mittee, the National Food Brokers Association, explaining in great de-
tail the function of the food broker, said that "the small manufacturer
is helpless without the food broker" because "his volume will not permit
him to employ sufficient salesmen to cover the potential market of some
several thousand wholesale grocers.' He must depend upon the food
8. Hearings, supra note 3, at 66. A statement submitted by the National League
of Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Distributors defined a broker as a middle-
man who represents either seller or buyer and brings them together to complete the
transaction. Id. at 77.
9. See FTC, REPORT ON DISTmIBUTION MTODS AND COSTS, pt. I, 120 (1944):
"By selling so largely through brokers, canners are able to reduce their own sales
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broker as his sales organization, one which serves him fully without
cost until a sale has been made, and which is compensated with a small,
fractional percentage of the actual returns from the sale." 1o "The
manufacturer with 40 brokers has 40 offices upon which to depend
for sales service. . . . In some of these offices there may be 5 or 6
salesmen, but the broker represents not only this particular manufac-
turer, but probably 20 or 30 other manufacturers who produce other
items used in the food trade. The broker competes with other brokers
in his market, and these other brokers represent, in a similar manner,
competitors of this particular manufacturer." -"
Manufacturers thus are using brokers for the purpose of securing
contact with wholesalers. The wholesaler purchases foods in large
volume for distribution in smaller quantities to retailers. He must'
maintain adequate stocks in warehouses strategically located in the ter-
ritory he serves and he frequently extends credit or furnishes busi-
ness guidance and merchandising advice to independent retailers. He
serves as "liaison agent between the producer or manufacturer, on the
one hand, and the retail grocer on the other, advising on trade condi-
tions and current and potential supply and consumer demand factors." 2
Wholesalers operating on this basis are often called "old-line" whole-
salers 11 to distinguish their operation from the more recent business
methods which will be discussed later. There are about 5000 wholesale
grocery concerns now operating in the United States, some of which
have resulted from mergers and consolidations of small companies into
large wholesale enterprises with branch houses in many cities. 4
forces to a minimum. Many small, and even some fairly large companies had only
a sales manager who visited brokers and sold by mail or wire from the plant office."
The Commission quotes from Business Week for Aug. 10, 1940 to the effect that
of the 3,500 fruit and vegetables canners in the country only 50 sell direct without
brokers.
10. Hearings, sitpra note 3, at 65.
11. Id. at 66. The statement continues: "There are some 1400 food brokers
located in various markets . . . Approximately 1,000 belong to the National Food
Brokers' Association. The annual volume of business done by these members of this
association is estimated at about 4 billion dollars. The general public hears little or
nothing about the food broker, because his work is primarily that of personal service
to the particular manufacturers he represents, and he does no advertising, as he
depends upon his personal relationship with the manufacturer, and the personal
contact that he makes with the buyer to whom he sells the products of these manu-
facturers . . . Sometimes he represents large manufacturers, whose product is par-
ticularly seasonable, and who, as a consequence, finds it much more economical . . .
to use a broker than . . . a salaried representative, but to a large extent he repre-
sents the medium-sized or smaller manufacturer."
12. MOCKLER: Tim WHOLESALE GROCERY INDUSTRY (American Industries Series,
No. 16) 9-10 (1947).
13. FTC, op. cit. supra note 9, at 205.
14. MocKER, op. cit. supra note 12, at 16. Particular attention is invited to the
table of wholesale food and grocery sales (by types of operation) therein set forth.
Id. at 14.
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Several types of "old-line" wholesalers deserve brief reference.
The "full-line" service wholesaler renders limited credit and delivery
service, maintains salesmen, and distributes a "full-line" of food prod-
ucts. The largest number of concerns is in this classification. 5  By
contrast, the "cash-and-carry" wholesaler, who developed in the years
preceding World War II, extends no service or credit; here the re-
tailers pick up the merchandise with their own trucks or cars at the
wholesaler's warehouse. Some service wholesalers maintain cash-and-
carry departments or branch depots. This type of wholesaler is com-
parable to the self-service retail store, which also developed in the
thirties. There is also the "institutional wholesaler" who specializes
in the sale of food to hotels, restaurants, public institutions, steamship
lines and industrial users, and the so-called "wagon jobber" who main-
tains a fleet of trucks servicing regular "routes," taking the retailer's
order and often making immediate delivery from stocks carried on the
truck. There are many individuals who operate only one truck."'
In general, the methods of wholesalers have tended to change in
recent years. Whereas wholesale grocers formerly concentrated on
"dry groceries," consumer preference for "one-stop-shopping" which led
to complete retail food markets has been reflected on the wholesale
level in the addition of new departments such as frozen food, fresh
fruit and produce, dairy, and even meat and bakery. At the same
time, wholesalers have become increasingly "brand conscious" and have
established many "house brands," some of which have achieved na-
tional distribution.
1 7
After leaving the wholesaler, the groceries and foodstuffs finally
reach the retail store, where they are sold to consumers. At this stage
the classical system of distribution in the United States depends upon
some 370,000 separately-owned or small-group stores. The so-called
"chains" which compete with them, each owning from four to 6,000
stores,' embrace a national total of 26,500 stores. 9 Approximately
15. Mocizx-, op. cit. =upra note 12, at 17.
16. Id. at 17-19.
17. Id. at 21-22.
18. The 1939 Census of Distribution contains the following table:
Distribution of Food Chain Store Business, by Size of Chain (1939)
Size of Chains No. of Organizations % of Chain Store Sales
4-10 Units 1,127 13.5
11-25 Units 293 97
26-100 Units 144 10.0
Over 100 Units 40 66.8
The FTC in contrast to the Bureau of the Census, has included organizations of
two or more units in its definition of "chain." SEN. Doc. No. 31, 72d Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1929).
19. Store figures from THaE PRoGREssivE GROCER, FActs IN FOOD AND GROCERY
DIsTRIUTION 5 (1950).
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two-thirds of all dollar sales by food chains are made by organizations
controlling more than 100 stores.2" The most important of these, with
numbers of stores and latest sales figures, are enumerated below. 2
How does the chain method of doing business differ from the
"old-line" system of distribution? Perhaps the most fundamental char-
acteristic of the corporate chains is the economy achieved (a) through
mass volume and centralized management at the retail level and (b)
through integration of wholesaling, retailing, and, in many cases, manu-
facturing operations.
As to operations at the retail level, it is, generally, "more eco-
nomical to run two stores than it is to run one, . . . more economical
to operate 100 stores than 10, . . more economical to operate 1000
stores than 100, and so on." 22 Although a point of diminishing re-
turns may be reached somewhere, it is, nevertheless, a fact that the
percentage of net profits on sales in grocery and meat stores has been
highest in chains operating more than 1000 stores.' Centralized man-
agement under headquarters' control, which supervises all buying, ad-
vertising, and merchandising with careful attention to cost factors on
a standardized basis, is an essential element in the reduction of ex-
penses and overhead. 4
Centralization further enables the chain buyer to secure a better
knowledge of market conditions. For instance, the Atlantic Commis-
20. See note 18 snpra.
21. Only three operate on a national basis. They are: The Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., operating about 6000 food stores in 39 states and Dist. of Col., sales
in fiscal year ending Feb. 28, 1949: $2,837,291,185 (MooDY'S INDUSTRIALS 2753
(1949)); Safeway Stores, operating 2,103 stores in 23 states and the Dist. of Col.
during 1948, sales in 1948 $1,276,792,822 (MOODY's INDUSTRIALS, 2584 et seq. (1949)) ;
The Kroger Co. (until 1946 known as the Kroger Grocery & Baking Co.), operating
on Jan. 1, 1949, 2,349 stores in 19 states, sales in 1948 $825,668,000 (MooDY'S IN-
DUSTRIALS 2361 (1949)). All others are more or less regional.
22. BLOOMFIELD, TRENDS IN RETAIL DIsnuBuTIoN 256 (1930).
23. FTC, CHAIN STORES-SALES, COSTS AND PROFITS OF RETAIL CHAINS 54, 55
(1933) found the following percentages of net profit to sales, by size of grocery and
meat chains:
No. of stores Percentages No. of Stores Percentages
2-5 1.98 51-100 2.04
6-10 1.91 101-500 1.86
11-25 1.68 501-1000 2.42
26-50 2.22 1000 & above 2.98
See also BECKMAN AND NOLEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 58.
24. HOFFMAN, LARGE-SCALE ORGANIZATION IN THE FOOD INDUSTRIES 65, 66
(TNEC Monograph No. 35, 1940). "The purchase of all goods is attended to by
buyers located either at the chain headquarters or at the district warehouse. Window
displays, advertising copy, store arrangements, etc., are designed by specialists in these
matters, their ideas being transmitted to the store managers via the store superin-
tendent. All the larger chains instruct their employees in selling techniques and give
their store managers rigid training in store operation. Most important of all, the
systems of records and cost accounts kept by the chains enable them to detect and
rectify the sources of loss and inefficency." Ibid. See also Costvet, Inadequate Book-
keeping as a factor in Business Failure, 45 YALE L.J. 1201 (1936).
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sion Company, a wholly-owned subsidiary of A & P charged with buy-
ing fresh fruits and vegetables for the parent company, operates in all
important producing areas. "Its buyers receive daily and even hourly
instructions relative to general market conditions and prices to be
paid. Against such buyers are pitted sellers whose knowledge of the
market is usually confined to their own situation and locality. In such
circumstances the chain buyer naturally has an advantage in the way
of market information not only over the sellers but probably over most
other local buyers as well." 25 In addition,-and here we come to the
most crucial feature of the chain-store operations which will be exam-
ined in detail in this study--chains necessarily buy the great bulk of
their supplies in very large quantities; therefore they often are able
to secure an advantage over their independent competitors, because
the quantity purchased affects the price paid.
The integration of the chains contrasts with the classical system
of distribution by transforming the traditional series of buying and
selling transactions involving brokers' fees, wholesalers' commissions,
salesmen's salaries and advertising expenses into what are in effect
intra-company operations even when they take the form of sales by
a subsidiary to its parent corporation. 6 The mass distributor thus
moves its products forward according to the requirements of the vari-
ous parts of its far-flung organization. The cost of soliciting patronage
from the retail trade, which has been described as "stupendous," is
replaced by the expense of a managerial organization, which is probably
much less.
27
Integration of successive distribution functions, in the absence of
unfair practices, has advantages for growers and processors, off-
setting to a greater or less extent the augmented bargaining power with
which it confronts them. In the field of fresh fruits and vegetables,
for instance, the Federal Trade Commission observed that "the prin-
cipal problem facing the individual grower is to find the most direct
and economical method of marketing his produce in order to minimize
the transportation and distribution charges assessed against his produce
and thereby maximize the net price received at the point of production.
Reducing the number of middlemen and the number of charges, or
25. HOFF!AN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 104.
26. See infra, c. 5.
27. H-OFFMAN, op. cit. snupra note 24, at 67: "The average independent retailer
is visited daily by at least a half-dozen salesmen, each trying to sell him a small bill
of merchandise which he may or may not need. Those who seek the retailer's busi-
ness cannot permit him simply to order his merchandise as he needs it; the competi-
tion between them is such that they constantly must persuade, cajole, and coax
him. The cost of this sort of thing in time and money is nothing short of stu-
pendous."
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merchandising margins, taken by middlemen is a matter of prime im-
portance to both growers and consumers. Growers often are handi-
capped in their efforts to establish the most direct marketing connec-
tions in terminal markets because groups of assemblers and shippers
and terminal market receivers entrenched in their control of limited
packing, shipping and freight terminal facilities, insist that produce
must go through their hands on its way to and through the terminal
markets." 28 Apparently, this is the reason for the Commission's find-
ings that in many cases growers of fresh fruits and vegetables obtain
higher net returns from sales to chain-stores than from sales to inde-
pendents. 9
To this combination of wholesaling and retailing the food chains
have added considerable manufacturing, thus completing their "ver-
tical" integration. According to Moody's Manual of Industrials for
1949, the A & P operates, directly and through various subsidiaries,
35 bakeries, four salmon canneries in Alaska, six manufacturing plants,
three cheese plants, two milk processing plants, a creamery, and nine
28. FTC, op. cit. mpra note 9, at 136.
29. In FTC, op. cit. supra note 9, at 140, are a series of tables showing com-
parisons of average wholesale prices, average net proceeds, and respective distribu-
tion charges for specified fresh fruits and vegetables sold to chain stores and to inde-
pendent grocers in 1936 in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Chicago,
Atlanta, New Orleans, Dallas, Kansas City and St. Louis. These tables were pre-
pared pursuant to Public Resolution No. 112 74th Cong., 2d Sess., June 30, 1936.
"In a total of 7 out of 16 instances the average wholesale prices per sales unit
paid by chain stores exceeded, and in one instance was the same, as that paid by
independents purchasing the same commodity produced in the same producing region.
In the remaining 8 instances, the prices paid by independents averaged higher than
those paid by chain stores.
"In terms of net proceeds to growers, however, chain store sales yielded the
grower higher prices than sales to independents in 9 of the 16 instances and were
the same in one case, making 10 instances out of 16 in which the grower's proceeds
per unit from sales to chain stores were equal to or greater than those realized from
sales to independent grocers.
"The fact that for each item the higher average wholesale selling price and the
higher net proceeds to grower did not always go in pairs, and even that sometimes
the lower of a pair of wholesale prices shown in the table yielded the higher average
proceeds to grower, indicates that differences in distribution expenses sometimes
affected the grower's proceeds more importantly than the wholesale prices at which
commodities were sold." Lower storage charges in sales to chain stores were found
in almost all cases to be "due to the chains taking delivery at their warehouses in
full carload or truckload lots and providing whatever storage was necessary in re-
distributing to their retail stores." Id. at 142. See also id. at 145, 146, 148, 150, 161,
162. The Commission states that growers of peaches whose sales were traced through
chain stores "fared better on the average, than did those whose peaches reached the
consumers through other channels." The figures are $1.13 against $1.09 per bushel
in Boston, $1.26 against $.99 in New York, $1.12 against $1.01 in Philadelphia, $1.55
against $1.29 in Baltimore. Only in Chicago did the growers receive less from
Chains ($.92) than from independents ($1.13). Id. at 160. See also testimony by
Karl C. King, owner of a vegetable farm in Morrisville Pa.: "Our net from chain
stores has been definitely better than our net from regular sales." Hearings, supra
note 4, at 121. To the same effect see also testimony of G. A. Boger, milk producer
and president, Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers Association, Allentown, Pa..
Hearings, supra note 3, at 124, 125.
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coffee roasting plants.3" Most of the other larger food chains also
engage in manufacturing operations on a comparable scale.31  Manu-
facturing was begun by the food chains, according to an unnamed
A & P official, "for reasons of economy," for the purpose of lowering
prices to the consumer and satisfying the consumers' desires for branded
goods by the adoption of the Company's own brands. 2 Products of
subsidiaries account tor a substantial though not a preponderant, part
of total sales by food chains; 3 but the importance of these activities
from a profit standpoint is apparent from the example of A & P. That
company derived 28% of its profits in 1941 from its manufacturing
subsidiaries and bakeries,3 4 and from 1939 through 1941 its bakery
sales were the second largest in the baking industry.33
An excellent illustration of the economies achieved by chains
through the integration of manufacturing with distribution is to be
found in Part I of the Report of the Federal Trade Commission on
Distribution Methods and Costs, which deals with Important Food
Products. The Commission assembled data showing the cost in
dollars per cwt. to produce and sell bread and rolls for three different
types of bakeries in March and September 1942. The three types
included wholesale bakers who sell to large users and to retail grocery
and delicatessen stores, house-to-house bakers who sell at retail from
their trucks, and chain store bakers. The data were broken down into
two groups of figures: (a) total selling and delivery expenses (route-
men, supervisors, delivery vehicles expense) and (b) administrative
and general expense. The result was as follows: 36
30. MOODY'S INDUSTRALS 1548 (1949). The most important of these subsidiaries,
the Quaker Maid Company, Inc., produces under its own brands baking powder,
beans, peas, barley, bird food, candy, cereal, cocoa, cod liver oil, corn meal, con-
densed milk, currants, extracts, fish, gelatine desserts, puddings, lemon pie filling,
honey, jam, jelly, liquids (ammonia and bluing), ketchup and chili sauce, dry maca-
roni, spaghetti, marmalade, mayonnaise, mustard, olives, peanut butter, pork sausage,
seasoning, preserves, relish, rice, salad dressing, salad oil, sandwich spread, salmon,
spices, syrup, tapioca, tea, vinegar and bakery products. A & P Br. App., v. I, pp.
330-335. Quaker Maid also has a pitinting department for th6 printing of labels.
31. SEN. Doc. No. 13 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 21 (1933).
32. Id. at 51. The official is quoted as saying: "In the operation of our business,
we have found that we could sell merchandise to our customers at a lower price if
we produced or processed certain merchandise or had it processed for us." He added
that the increasing brand-consciousness of the public made it desirable for the company
to sell under its own brands.
33. FTC reported in 1933 that no chain manufactured as much as 25% of its
sales. Id. at 11.
34. A & P Br., p. 20.
35. A & P Br. App., v. I, pp. 408, 409.
36. FTC op. cit. smpra note 9, at 43. See also id. at 34 as to the several classes
of bakeries.
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MARCH 1942 SEPTEMBER 1942
House to Chain House to Chain
Wholesale House Store Wholesale House Store
Bakers Bakers Bakers Bakers Bakers Bakers
a) 1.66 3.17 .76 1.61 3.00 .81
b) .38 .39 .40 .37 .36 .41
2.04 3.56 1.16 TOTALS 1.98 3.36 1.22
The Commission observed that chain store bakeries occupied the
peculiarly favorable position revealed by these figures by reason of the
fact that they served "only their own affiliated grocery chains." Ac-
cording to the Commission, "The chain store bakers transferred their
products to their affiliated stores at prices considerably lower than
those charged by wholesale bakers selling to independent grocers."
Although the production cost of the chain-store bakers did not differ
greatly from that of other bakers, chain-store bakers "due to the cap-
tive nature of their market through affiliated stores . . . were able
to dispense with a large part of the selling expense that wholesale and
house-to-house bakers incur. The savings in distribution costs were
such as to enable the baking operations of the chain-stores to show a
profit in both periods notwithstanding the lower prices at which
products were transferred to their affiliated retail stores." Hence, the
Commission concluded that "if independent stores, chain-stores and
house-to-house bakers all sold bread at the same average retail price
per pound (for instance, 8.5 cents per pound, as shown by house-to-
house bakers for the March, 1942, period), the independent stores
would be operating on a gross margin of 1.43 cents per pound as com-
pared with 2.23 cents per pound for the chain-store retail unit. Herein
lies the ability of chain stores to undersell independent grocers on bread
and rolls."7
The business advantage enjoyed by chain-stores over the old-line
enterprises thus consists in part of economies resulting from large-
scale operations embracing all levels of distribution and, to a consider-
able extent, manufacturing. In addition, it includes the benefit of
lower prices the chains often are able to obtain as buyers. As a result
they have generally been able to sell to the consumer at lower prices
than their independent competitors. The fact that chain stores, on
the average, "can and do sell at prices which are somewhat lower than
37. Id. at 44, 45.
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the prices charged by independent retailers" was well established and
amply proven fifteen years ago and is probably still true."
Inevitably, the phenomenal growth of chain-stores since the begin-
ning of this century 9 has had an almost revolutionary influence on the
merchandising practices of many independent distributors. Coopera-
tive and "voluntary" grocery chains, which have assumed great im-
portance, came into existence for the specific purpose of fighting chains
by giving each independent all the obvious advantages of chain opera-
tions." The so-called "voluntary" chain is a group of retail grocers
in a wholesaler's territory who voluntarily affiliate themselves with him
while preserving their individual ownership. "In this relationship the
38. SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 28, 29 (1935). The FTC presented
on p. 29 the following tabular statement showing the aggregates of the average chain
and independent grocery prices in four cities:
Indep. Index of
No. of Chain Store Selling Prices in
City Items Prices Prices Terms of Chain Prices
as 100%
CHAIN INDEP.
Washington D. C. 274 $54.07 $58.03 100 107.310
Memphis 193 35.95 38.10 100 105.985
Detroit 183 33.25 35.66 100 107.232
Cincinnati
Large Chains 120 21.95 23.34 100 106.35
Small Chains 120 22.07 23.34 100 105.74
The Commission found that "as high as 45% of the difference between chains and
independent selling prices on standard grocery items" in these four cities was attribu-
table to the lower buying prices of the chains. Id. at 53. The example of Detroit
was typical: The 183 grocery items selected for comparison "would have cost a con-
sumer at average prices a total of $35.66 through the independent stores but only
$33.2565 through the chains, a difference of $2.4051 in favor of the latter. These
items, however, cost the chain only $24.5253 at average buying prices, whereas the
wholesaler (where the merchandise moved through the wholesaler) or the retailer
(where the goods were sold directly) paid $25.3532 at average prices, or $0.8279 more
than the chain. This last figure represents between 34 and 35% of the $2.4051 by
which average chain retail selling prices were lower than those of the independents."
A & P Br. App., v. IV, pp. 73-81, contains some comparative sample data as to
A & P retail prices and prices of other chains and independents. For instance, in
October 1934, out of a total of 85 items, A & P's prices in Chicago were lower than
independents' prices on 55 items. In June 1936, out of a total of 122 items, A & P's
prices were lower than independents' prices on 111 items (p. 76). In 1933 an
official of the New England Division of A & P reported that three lists, each con-
taining ten items of nationally advertised commodities, were made up and purchased
in independent stores and in A & P stores. The total price comparisons were as
follows: List 1: Independents--1.98, A & P-$1.76; List 2: Independents-1.77,
A & P-$1.48; List 3: Independents-1.01, A & P-$.81. A & P Br. App., v. IV,
p. 244.
39. For a brief historical survey see BECKMAN AND NOLEN, op. cit. supra note 1, at
14-28.
40. See SEN Doc. No. 12, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932). See also statement by
R. W. Lyons, former executive vice-president of the National Chain Store Associa-
tion, Hearings before Special House Committee to Investigate the American Retail
Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. v. 11, 148 (Rev. Print. 1935) : "I realize . . .that
the voluntary chain may have been something that was forced into existence by rea-
son of the existence of the corporate chain, but I believe that today those merchants
who are members of the voluntary chains perform a service to the consumer which
has no counterpart in the service which independent merchants perform. . . . [There
is] a greater tendency toward merchants banding together to get more efficiency."
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wholesale grocer performs the functions customarily performed by the
corporate chain headquarters and warehouse, and maintains a force
of field men or supervisors who assist the affiliated retail merchants in
solving merchandising, store engineering, operating and other prob-
lems." 41 Some of the effects of the formation of such "voluntary
groups" by wholesalers are described in a typical case history published
by the Department of Commerce in 1941:
"Before becoming a voluntary we had wide distribution. A
housewife could find our coffee in nine out of ten food stores in
the city. We thought that was pretty good, until we had oppor-
tunity to check up with a large chain organization which also
pushes coffee. We found that the chain sold only to their 200
stores, as against our 5,000, but they were doing a better job.
They were selling more coffee than we were, and they were grow-
ing while we were declining. The chain was pushing its brand
of coffee hard in its 200 stores while we spread our selling efforts
among 5,000 outlets, most of which weren't pushing our coffee
at all because they had no incentive. Obviously, the job for us
was to concentrate.
"Another factor that helped us to decide to concentrate our
sales effort was that we noticed it was easier to get successful
merchants to concentrate their purchases with us than it was to
get the less successful ones to do so.
"Look at us now; once we had 5,000 actively solicited ac-
counts, today we have only 700 to 750. The rest were dropped
because they were unprofitable on the order size basis. Our
average order size now is about $100. Sales volume didn't de-
cline as a result of this change, but there has been a sharp reduc-
tion in expenses. These two results were what we sought when
we entered the voluntary field." 42
The second major type of cooperative organization is the "re-
tailer-owned cooperative wholesaler." These organizations are formed
by groups of independent retail grocers who typically purchase their
supplies from their own wholesale warehouses, which are managed by
personnel hired for that purpose." The majority of these cooperatives
are incorporated " and the stockholders receive dividends based upon
their purchase volume.4 5 The scope of cooperative activities varies. In
some groups cooperation is limited to advertising; others engage in
41. MOCKLER, op. Cit. supra note 12, at 17, 18.
42. Id. at 23, 24. Another wholesale grocer reported that he entered the volun-
tary group field in order to be able to "level off the peaks and valleys of sales
volume and to predict what, how much and when customers would purchase." Ibid.
43. See note 41 spra.
44. SEN. Doc. No. 12, op. cit. supra note 40 at 37.
45. See note 41 supra.
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cooperative buying in addition to advertising; a third group engages
in these activities and also operates warehouses; finally, the most cen-
tralized type of cooperative also employs supervisory personnel and
often establishes uniform features such as store signs, store fronts and
layouts.48
The headquarters office of perhaps the oldest and most widely
known cooperative grocery chain, the Red and White Corporation, be-
gan by operating as a selling agent for the manufacturers of branded
goods and receiving commissions from them. The company is a "non-
profit service organization," performing all of the functions enumerated
above and several others in addition.47 Its net income, which originally
was derived almost entirely from commissions on sales to its members,
is expended "for cooperative advertising and sales promotion work for
its independent wholesale and affiliated independent retail members."
The Corporation "was created for the purpose of assisting independent
wholesale and retail grocers to defend themselves against the compe-
tition of the corporate chain-stores, . " 48
The relative importance of voluntary chains at the present time is
not definitely established. According to testimony before the House
Judiciary Committee in 1935 there were then 800 wholesale grocers
operating under voluntary plans and 105,000 retailers affiliated with
them; they did from 35% to 40% of the total grocery business.49  In
1930 the Federal Trade Commission estimated that there were 395
cooperative grocery chains with a membership of 53,400 retail stores
as against 52,514 grocery chain stores owned by 693 corporate chains.
50
In this connection it should be noted that an individual retailer may
belong to four or five voluntary chains.51
The advantages of membership in a voluntary group are illustrated
by comparative cost data assembled by the Federal Trade Commission.
46. SEN. Doc. No. 12, op. cit mtpra note 40 at 11. See also id. at 49.
47. Id. at 22.
48. Letters from Red & White Corporation, Chicago, Feb. 8, 1936, Hearings,
supra note 40, v. IV, 213. See also Red & White Corp. v. FTC, 149 F.2d 970 (7th
Cir. 1945), infra note 216 and text, which held the Corporation's receipt of commis-
sions from sellers to be illegal under the Robinson-Patman Act of 1936.
49. Testimony by G. M. Ungaro, Secretary, National Voluntary Groups Institute,
and Vice-President, Independent Grocers Alliance Distrbuting Co., Hearings op. cit.
mipra note 3, at 116. He described the voluntary movement, stressing the autonomy
of the individual group members. THE PRoaEssivE GROCER, op. cit. szapra note 19,
at 9: "Voluntary and cooperative group stores gave a good account of themselves
in 1948. The groups continued to enroll more large volume stores in their member-
ship, hence increased their portion of the independent business. Not only did the num-
ber of affiliated stores increase, but they enjoyed a slightly larger sales gain per
store than unaffiliated stores." See also id. (1950) at 6.
50. SEN. Doc. No. 4, op. cit. supra note 38, at 7.
51. Testimony of Traver Smith, vice-president in charge of grocery operations,
Standard Brands, Inc., Hearings, sipra note 40, v. IV, 31.
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A sample study based on reports received from 150 old-line wholesalers
and 21 cooperative wholesalers showed that the cooperative wholesaler
operated in 1939 with distribution expenses of 5.87 cents for each dollar
of sales as compared with 9.65 cents per sales dollar for the conven-
tional wholesaler.52 The Commission commented that "the possibility
of such savings by groups of independent retailers cooperatively under-
taking the wholesale distribution of grocery products, and the necessity
that independent retailers take advantage of every possible saving in
their struggle to maintain their position in competition with chain
stores and supermarkets, are the two principal bases underlying the
growth both of the retailer-owned cooperative wholesaler and of volun-
tary chains of individually owned retail stores affiliated by purchase-
and-service-contracts with independent wholesalers." "
That the members of voluntary grocery chains have been able not
only to hold their own against the corporate chains, but sometimes even
to surpass them in economic efficiency is shown by another cost com-
parison presented by the Commission: A sample study of 156 indi-
vidual retail grocers, 43 grocery chains, and 13 cooperative chains
showed 22.80 per sales dollar of distribution expenses and bad debts
in 1939 for the independents as against 20.680 for the corporate chains
and only 19.560 for the cooperatives. The advantage of the latter was
attributed to the fact that the cooperatives had a ready-made clientele
in their owners, that the majority of them operated in smaller towns,
that they did not find it necessary to operate from expensive business
locations, and that they were not heavy advertisers. However, even
the largest cooperative had smaller net sales per store than either the
corporate chains or the independents.54
Independent food stores were responsible for a change of over-
riding importance which began in the late 1920's and spread to all
groups participating in food distribution. That change was the in-
vention of the so-called self-service supermarket. The supermarket, as
its name implies, is a very large food store having weekly sales in
excess of the yearly average of traditional food store sales, which in
1935 was $15,719. "It represents the broad application of mass selling
technique within the store; i.e., instead of applying this technique to a
large number of relatively small stores in widely scattered locations
(the orthodox grocery chain store idea), the supermarket seeks to
52. FTC, op. cit. .supra note 9, at 207.
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 214. In his testimony before a Senate Committee in 1936, the then
treasurer of First National Stores, Inc. referred to the cooperative chains which
consolidate their purchasing power as "the most strenuous competition" the corporate
chains have to face. See Hearings, .rupra note 4, at 45.
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apply it to each separate store." " It is a large departmentized food
store operated on a self-service and cash-and-carry basis. Its operating
costs are necessarily lower than those of the conventional food store
because it renders no credit or delivery service and employs fewer
people; in addition, its overhead is reduced and its buying power in-
creased by reason of its huge volume. Parking facilities, the wide
variety of merchandise sold under one roof, carriages to carry merchan-
dise around in the store and bus boys aiding customers in carrying
packages to their cars have contributed to its popularity.56 Apparently
large markets of this type appeared first in the Los Angeles area in
the late twenties, where they cut heavily into the business of the cor-
porate chains during the depression. In the East, independent super-
markets were started in New Jersey, New York, and the Boston area
by wholesalers in an effort to check chain store competition. Many of
these supermarkets begun by independents on a one-store basis grew
in the early thirties into small chains.
57
The reaction of the corporate chains to this revolutionary innova-
tion has been best described by Mr. John A. Hartford, president of
the A & P, as follows: "Well, the first supermarket that came to my
attention was in the Eastern Division. We did not take it very seri-
ously at first, but the competition was pretty aggressive, independents
got into it very fast, and I went out to Detroit and I saw this old
freight house converted into a supermarket. I talked to the personnel
and I made up my mind it was necessary for us to adopt that type
of operation. Later, we had a demonstration in Brooklyn . . . We
had a competitor there by the name of King Kullen, and a great many
independents, who opened these stores very fast and very rapidly. We
had had a very profitable operation in Brooklyn. In a very short
space of time, they forced that Brooklyn into deep red figures. I was
very much concerned about it . . because we had had a conflict at
Headquarters whether we should adopt that type. Some said it won't
last-you can't operate without selling under cost, and that we won't
55. 1 CENSUS oF BUSINESS 1-18 (1935), quoted in Phillips, The Supermarket,
16 HARv. Bus. REv. 188 (1938).
56. Id. at 191, 198, 199. Carl W. Dipman, editor of The Progressive Grocer,
stated in 1936 that the "trend is toward larger complete food markets" and in the
direction of more self-service stores selling on a cash basis. Fruit, vegetable and
meat departments in addition to "dry" groceries were said to be the most important
factors in competitive success. Dry groceries made up only 30 to 40% of the market
owner's operation. Broadening of lines in fresh baked goods, dairy products, delica-
tessen and ready to serve foods as well as store modernization were also deemed
essential. See Hearings before the Subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee
on H.R. 4995, 8442 and 10486, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 362, 365, 366. Expense rates of
self-service stores were given as 4 or 5% lower on each sales dollar than the expenses
of well operated service stores. Id. at 364.
57. Phillips, supra note 55, at 192-195.
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do. . . . We finally tried out a store to see whether this operation
could be run without under-cost selling. It confirmed it could and we
went in very aggressively to supermarket operation." "8 As a result of
this decision, A & P began with 20 supermarkets in 1936 and from
then on heavily stressed a supermarket development program.59 Other
chains soon adopted the same policy of "less stores rather than more"
in order "to get larger units in the more central locations." 1o Indeed,
the tendency toward "more cash and controlled-credit 61 stores, more
self-service stores, more large-volume stores" 2 which had been in-
itiated by independents was soon adopted by the chains as their guiding
principle. Contemporaneously, the adoption by some states of taxes
graduated according to the number of stores under one ownership
stimulated the policy of the chains to concentrate upon fewer but
larger stores.63
Here again, A & P exemplifies the general development. In 1927
that Company operated 15,566 retail stores in the United States.
There was a slight decrease during the depression, but in 1936, when
the decision to go into supermarkets was finally adopted, there were
still 14,446 stores. From then on the drop in number of stores was
precipitous until 1943 when it reached 5,751; of these 1,646 were of
the supermarket type.64 The total dollar volume of sales, on the other
hand, increased from $757,900,000 in 1927 to $1,258,600,000 in 1943;
of this 1943 total, the supermarkets alone accounted for $760,800,000,
or more than 60%, and other self-service stores of smaller size added
an additional $205,200,000, so that total sales in self-service stores
amounted to more than 76% of total sales. The experience of the
other leading food chains has been similar, showing a precipitate drop
in the number of stores operated, accompanied by an increase in busi-
ness. 6 The unabated vigor of this movement is demonstrated by the
58. A & P Tr., pp. 20, 438-39. The events described by Mr. Hartford took
place in 1935. See also Phillips, supra note 55, at 195.
59. A & P Br., p. 45.
60. Testimony on behalf of First National Stores, Hearings, supra note 40 v.
IV, p. 137.
61. Meaning weekly payments of bills by customers.
62. Carl W. Dipman, editor of The Progressive Grocer, Hearings, snpra note
56, at 367. See also Winston and Osborne, supra note 7.
63. Id. at 12, 13; see part IV infra.
64. A & P Br., p. 58.
65. Ibid.
66. Testimony by Mr. Charles F. Adams, then treasurer of First National Stores,
Hearings, supra note 4, at 45; MOODY'S INDUSTRIALS 10 (1949) (dollar sales of
First National) ; Testimony by A. H. Morrill, President of the Kroger Company,
Hearings before the Special House Committee to Investigate the American Retail
Federation, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 39 Comm. Print, (1935); MooDy's INDUSTRIALS,
2361 (1949) (dollar sales of Krozer); id. at 2585 (Safewav).
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fact that the number of chain units continued to decrease from 28,500
in 1947 to 26,500 in 1949.6" During the same period the total dollar
volume of independent grocery and combination (grocery and meat)
stores increased from $13,950,000,000 in 1947 to $15,150,000,000 in
1949, while sales of chains increased from $8,440,000,000 in 1947 to
$9,600,000,000 in 1949.68
Generally, among the independents, "small stores on the average
did not do as well as large and medium-sized stores regardless of
whether located in cities or country districts," and "full-line market or
combination stores outdistanced their single-line competitors in sales
gains." 69 In 1944 independent grocery, combination, and delicatessen
stores with an annual sales volume per store of less than $100,000
accounted for 68.5% of all sales by such independents; in 1948 the
share of these stores had dropped to 52.5%o." According to The
Progressive Grocer, independents and chains alike now recognize that
the majority of shoppers prefer self-service in stores which must carry
"as complete a variety of merchandise as possible, including groceries,
produce, meat, dairy products, frozen foods, ice cream, selected drug
products, and household supplies." "1 In 1948 almost 88% of all
dollar sales by chains were made in self-service stores,72 while 80%
of all sales by independent grocery and combination stores occurred
in self-service or semi-self-service " establishments.74
Among independents 48% of the number of stores offered delivery
service in 1949, but over 7% of these stores made a specific extra-
charge for delivery; however, only 16% of total sales by independents
67. THE PRoGREssIvE GRocER (1949), op. cit. supra note 19, at 5; see also id.
(1950) at 5.
68. Id. (1949) at 3, id. (1950) at 3.
69. Id. (1949) at 7. "Grocery Stores without meat barely held their own." Among
independent stores two-thirds reported gains and one-third reported losses in volume
during 1948. "Most of the gains were among the larger stores." Id. at 4, 7. In
1948, 89% of the larger independents handled meats and 73% handled frozen fruits,
as against 76% and 26% respectively in 1939. Id. at 5. See also id. (1950) at 4-5.
70. Id. (1949) at 8. A comparison of 1948 versus 1947 sales shows that shoppers
favored medium and large independent stores; sales in stores with annual volume
ranging from $250,000 to $300,000 increased 18.1% and sales in stores exceeding
$300,000 per annum increased 15.7%, while stores doing an annual business between
$50,000 and $75,000 increased 1.7%. Id. at 11.
71. Id. at 10.
72. Estimated 1948 sales by chains: $8,180,000,000 in 16,300 self-service stores,
$1,330,000,000 in 11,400 counter-service stores. Id. at 6, 8.
73. Semi-self-service stores are those which offer self service only with respect
to certain products.
74. Id. at note 72. 1948 sales of $7,550,000,000 in 73,000 self-service stores;
$4,550,000,000 in 125 semi-self-service stores; $3,000,000,000 in 177,500 counter-service
stores. As compared to 1947, self-service stores had average gains of 11.6%, semi-
self-service stores had gains of 5%, and counter-service stores 3.7%. See also id.
(1950) at 4-5. Gains by the larger independents were greater percentage-wise in
1949 than those of the chains. Ibid.
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was delivered. Similarly 70% of the independent stores offered some
credit service, which accounted for 27% of all independent sales;
consumer credit purchases, which gained noticeably in 1948 over the
previous year, did not increase further in 1949. Apparently delivery
and, particularly, credit services remain as the chief attraction of inde-
pendent stores."°
Reflecting these developments, the Department of Commerce sum-
marized the relative position of the chains with respect to total food
sales during the 17 years before 1947 as follows:
"In the period 1929 to 1938 chain store sales declined slightly
relative to the total. Thus, comparing the years 1929 and 1938,
while sales of all grocery stores had decreased from 7,353 million
dollars to 7,187 or only 2%, chain sales had dropped from 2,833
million dollars to 2,618, or about 8%. This downward trend
tended to be progressively true over the entire period. After 1938,
however this trend was sharply reversed. Chain store sales in
1939 and 1940 increased at a greater rate than the total * * *.
The upward trend in the sales of chain grocery stores con-
tinued until the middle of 1942. Thereafter the situation was
reversed. In 1943 sales of chain groceries actually declined while
those of independents rose.
After 1943 the downward trend in sales of chain grocery
stores continued, but at a considerably smaller rate until the
middle of 1945. After V-J day, as restrictions began to be re-
moved and supplies increased the upward trend in sales of chains
relative to independents was once more resumed. Some indica-
tion of these gains in chain store sales may be seen from the fact
that in the prewar period 1929-1940 a 6% gain in chain store
sales was associated on the average with a 10% change in total
grocery store sales; on the other hand, in the period since mid-
1945 a change of 15% in chain store sales has tended to correspond
to a 10% change in the total." 7'
The Progressive Grocer gives the following percentage figures
indicating the part of the chains in relation to total food store sales: 78
1929 32% 1943 32%
1931 34% 1945 32%
1933 37% 1947 38%
1937 32% 1948 39%
1941 37% 1949 39%
75. Id. (1949) at 12; id. (1950) at 12-14.
76. Id. (1949) at 8.
77. Winston and Osborne, supra note 7, at 12, 13.
78. THE PRoGREssIVE GROCER (1950), op. cil. supra note 19, at 6.
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About 69%o of all food chain-store sales in 1948 were made by ten
corporate chains-almost 307 by A & P alone, whose total sales
volume exceeded by some 700 million dollars the combined volume of
its two closest rivals, Safeway Stores and Kroger.79 A & P's share in
the total United States food business was 7.1%o in 1943; s0 by 1948 it
had increased to 9%o.8
III. THE PLACE OF THE FOOD CHAINS IN OUR COMPETITIVE
SOCIETY: SOME PROBLEMS OF PUBLIC POLICY
What has been said so far indicates that the food chains present
a problem of unusual complexity. Enterprises striving for maximum
distribution of goods at low prices obviously do not violate the classic
prohibitions against restrictions of output and price gouging of con-
sumers. It is arguable, however, that price-fixing agreements with
competitors or suppliers which, as we shall see later, have cropped up
occasionally, 2 might present a greater danger if the chains were to
become definitely dominant. The inquiry thus narrows down to the
question whether the food chains actually constitute or threaten to
grow into monopolies; in other words, whether the food chains as a
whole, or any one of them, threaten to drive their competitors out of
business and to acquire control of the market. Consequently, the
problem of protecting the consumer is not of immediate, but only of
prospective, importance.
Representative Patman of Texas himself, probably the leading
opponent of the chains in American public life during the last 15 years,
acknowledged in 1935 that "from the short-range point of view" the
consumer would get better prices from the chains "for a very short
79. The following ten chains had 1948 sales exceeding 100 million dollars:
A&P $2,837,291,185
Safeway Stores 1,276,792,822
Kroger 825,668,323
American Stores 417,466,738
First National Stores 354,444,614
National Tea Co. 270,176,795
Colonial Stores 169,202,900
Jewel Tea Co. 153,226,034
Food Fair Stores 142,035,602
Grand Union Co. 116,096,097
TOTAL $6,562,401,110
MooDy's IxwusTRrALs (1949). According to THE PRoGRssrvE GROCER (1949)
op. cit. supra note 19, at 3, total chain grocery and combination store sales in 1948
amounted to $9,510,000,000.
80. A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 633; A & P Br., p. 59.
81. According to THE PRoGREsslW GRoCER, total U. S. food sales in 1948 were
$30,910,000,000; total grocery and combination store sales in 1948 were $24,610,000,000;
A & P's share in this latter total was 11.5%.
82. A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 671-673; see also text at note 274 infra.
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time ;" ' nevertheless, he advocated legislation intended to protect inde-
pendent merchants from being wiped out by the chains-the legislation
enacted in 1936 and known as the Robinson-Patman Act," 4 -on the
theory that
"... we know when a few people get control of the food business,
or any other business, we know what they are going to do-they
are going to tell the producer what he can get for his products,
and are going to tell the consumer what he will pay for what they
sell. So, looking at it from the long-range standpoint . . . this
Congress should determine whether or not they are going to give
the independent merchants in this country an opportunity to live,
or whether or not they are going to let them be frozen and squeezed
out of existence by unfair methods of competition." 85
He added that the chains could "sell all the goods on their shelves this
morning for the same price the independent has to pay for his and
make enormous profits and pay enormous dividends." 8" Perhaps even
more significant was the testimony of the secretary of the National
League of Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Distributors. Conceding
with disarming frankness the benefits to the consumer resulting from
the low retail prices of the chains, he said that permitting chains to
flourish was "generosity with the producer and shipper's money" and
tantamount to "taking it right out of his (the shipper's) pocket and
giving it to the consumer." 8 Hence, in this view, long-range pro-
tection to consumers and immediate protection to the competitors and
suppliers of the corporate chains coincide.
The "old-line" wholesalers have been particularly affected by com-
petition of the chains s and their ability to operate with lower dis-
83. Hearings, supra note 3, at 6.
84. 49 STAT. 1526, c. 592 (June 19, 1936).
85. Hearings, supra note 3, 6. Another advocate of the Robinson-Patman Act ex-
pressed himself as follows: "If it were possible for a single seller of food products
to offer a food supply ample for all consumers at a price so low that all competitors
would promptly be put out of business, the consuming public would blindly and
thoughtlessly buy of that seller, without regard to the certain fact that they would
then be left in absolute and slavish dependence upon that single and monopolistic
source of supply." Hearings, supra note 56, pt. 2, 470.
86. Hearings, supra note 3, at 7
87. Testimony of Horace H. Herr, id. at 74.
88. FTC, op. cit. supra note 9, at 96. One-third of reporting companies manu-
facturing packaged cereals stated "that their sales to independent grocery wholesalers
decreased between 1929 and 1939 due to the growth of chain stores, supermarkets,
retailer-owned wholesale houses, and cooperative purchasing agencies, all of which
had absorbed volume previously handled by independent wholesale grocers." Id.
at 121, 122: "The principal changes in the nature of markets noted by canning com-
panies included an increase in sales to chain stores and supermarkets and a cor-
responding decrease in sales to wholesalers." See also CASSADY AND JONES, THE
CHANGING COMPETITIVE STRUCTURE IN THE WHOLESALE GROCERY TRADE (A case
study of the Los Angeles market) 28 (1949) : "By 1946, almost 30% of the aggre-
gate wholesale grocery volume of the terrirory was reaching chain store units from
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tribution costs by combining retailing with wholesaling. 9 In fact,
elimination of middlemen and of their profits has been from the be-
ginning one of the openly proclaimed operating principles of the chain
stores. Typical in this respect is an advertisement of the Great Amer-
ican Tea Company, which in 1869 adopted its present name the Great
Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and on October 27, 1866 advertised
in Harper's Weekly, as follows:
"The proprietors became fully convinced, several years ago,
that the consumers of tea and coffee were paying too many and too
large profits on these articles of everyday consumption, and there-
fore organized the Great American Tea Co. to do away, as far as
possible, with these enormous drains upon the consumers, and
to supply them with these necessaries at the smallest possible
price.
To give our readers an idea of the profits which have been
made in the tea trade, we will start with the American houses,
leaving out of the account entirely the profits of the Chinese
factors.
1st. The American House in China or Japan makes large
profits on their sales or shipments * * *
3rd. The importer makes a profit of 30 to 50% in many
cases.
4th. On its arrival here it is sold by the cargo, and the Pur-
chaser sells it to the Speculator in invoices of 1,000 to 2,000 pack-
ages, at an average profit of about 10%.
5th. The Speculator sells to the Wholesale Tea Dealer in
lines at a profit of 10% to 15%.
6th. The Wholesale Tea Dealer sells it to the Wholesale
Grocer in lots to suit his trade, at a profit of 10%.
th. The Wholesale Grocer sells it to the Retail Dealer at a
profit of 15 to 25%.
8th. The Retail Dealer sells it to the Consumer for all the
profit he can get.
When you have added to these * * * profits as many broker-
ages, cartages, storages, cooperages, and waste, and add the orig-
their own warehouses, completely by-passing ordinary wholesale channels. More-
over, by 1946, retailer cooperatives had become the most important source of supply
for independent grocery stores, accounting for more than 30% of the aggregate busi-
ness in the Los Angeles market."
89. Throughout the report cited in the preceding note the FTC emphasized that
the largest share of the consumer's price consisted of the margins taken by dis-
tributors. On p. 16 the Commission said: "Inflation of consumer price may occur
either by the interposition of more middlemen than are necessary, each taking his
customary margin, or by the necessary number of middlemen, each taking a specified
or customary percentage margin based either on the cost or selling price of the
commodity * * *."
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inal cost of the tea, it will be perceived what the consumer has to
pay. And now we propose to show why we can sell so very much
lower than other dealers.
We propose to do away with all these various profits and
brokerages, cartages, storages, cooperages, and waste, with the
exception of a small commission paid for purchasing to our corre-
spondents in China or Japan, one cartage, and a small profit to
ourselves which, on our large sales, will amply pay us.
Parties getting their teas from us may confidently rely upon
getting them pure and fresh, as they come direct from the custom
house stores to our warehouses." 0
The entire case for the chain stores was skillfully presented in this
advertisement; by the same token, it is hardly surprising that a com-
pany announcing such policies would arouse bitter opposition. As early
as 1870, the magazine "The American Grocer," founded in 1869, be-
gan attacks against the Great American Tea Company by publishing
one hostile article every week. In 1871 a crusade against "monster
tea establishments" was conducted in the country newspapers. 9 '
In judging the controversy thus begun, a distinction must of course
be made between the essential costs of conducting distributive opera-
tions, including a profit to the entrepreneur, and economically unjusti-
fied charges. The former cannot be avoided by any form of private
enterprise; the latter are subject to reduction.
At the retail level, the large and medium sized independent stores
seem to have no difficulty in meeting chain competition. According
to the latest available estimate, there are 4,700 large independent super-
markets with annual sales of over $300,000 per market; they made
15.3% of all independent sales in 1949. Moreover, the number and
sales volume of independent stores in the middle brackets, often called
"superettes," is steadily increasing, perhaps aided by a rising level of
prices. In 1944 there were 16,500 independent food stores with annual
sales between 100,000 and 300,000 dollars per store which accounted
for 25.7% of all sales by independent food stores during that year; in
90. Bullock, The Early History of the Great A & P Tea Company, 11 HARv.
Bus. REv. 289, 293 (1933). See also HOFFMAN, op. cit. supra note 24, at 70: "The
most notable example of transportational waste and inefficiency in food distribution
is to be found in the intracity cartage of perishable food products. The wholesale
produce markets of most large cities are antiquated. * * * Buyers and sellers * * *
are subject to costly delays and inconvenience. Many of the markets do not have
direct rail connections, which adds to the cost of terminal cartage. The situation
has been such as to provide an opportunity for associations of truck owners and
drivers to impose costly regulations and restrictions upon the free movement of prod-
uce within large cities."
91. Bullock, supra note 90, at 293, 298. It should be noted that until the early
nineties A & P sold only tea and coffee; see Bullock, A History of the Great A & P
Tea Company since 1878, 12 HARv. Bus. REv. 59, 62 (1933).
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1949 the number of stores in the same sales bracket had risen to 32,250
and their share of total independent sales to 34.0%. On the other
hand, the number of independent stores with an annual sales volume
below $20,000 per store dropped from 229,500 or 22.6% of total inde-
pendent dollar sales in 1944 to 194,550 or 11.1%, respectively, in
1948.92 Even stores with annual sales between $20,000 and $100,000
are encountering difficulties in keeping their share of the total available
business, although, due to growth of the population, their actual sales
continue to increase. 3 Here again, however, the results reflect changes
in the classification of successful stores, caused by the rising price level,
as well as loss of business by the smaller stores.
In this connection it is essential to point out also that mortality
among retailers has always been high and that business failure may be
attributable to causes other than competition. According to a survey
conducted in the 1930's jointly by the United States Department of
Commerce and the Yale Law School, well over one-half of all retailer
bankruptcies were due to "inadequate capital, going into business on a
shoestring," or "inadequate experience, such as retiring as a street car
conductor and branching out as a grocery storekeeper * * * not realiz-
ing that it takes more than just the capacity to wrap up a neat package
to run a store." " The Progressive Grocer reports that in 1948 there
was a considerable turnover of owners among small stores and that
some of the military veterans who acquired stores at the close of the
war passed out of the picture.95 It would certainly be unrealistic to
overlook the fact that not every failure is caused by the chains and that
many failures are definitely due to inefficiency. Indeed, the editor of
The Progressive Grocer, a well-known friend of the independents, long
ago conceded that tens of thousands of grocers who could or would
not adjust themselves to modern business methods would constantly
sink into oblivion and that "no amount of legislation can stop the
carnage." "6
92. THE PRaoGRFssIvE GROCER (1950), op. cit. supra note 19, at 4, 5, 8, 14.
93. Independent stores with annual sales from $20,000 up to $99,999 accounted
for 45.9% of total independent sales in 1944 and for 39.6% in 1949. Actual sales have
increased for all stores from 1944 to 1949 except for the stores doing an annual busi-
ness below $20,000. Id. at 8.
94. Testimony by Dr. Julius Klein, Hearings, supra note 40, v. IV, 260-261.
According to Dun and Bradstreet, percentages of failure due to competition were
3.9 in 1929 and 2.2 in 1930. The Louisville Study by Dr. Paul C. Olsen of the
Wharton School of Commerce showed that "retail mortality rates have been fairly
constant since 1890, and that individual merchants have been going out of business
during the last decade in the same ratio they did 30 years ago, notwithstanding the
growth of chain stores." Testimony by B. D. Silliman, representing the Kroger Co.
and other chains, Hearings, supra note 3, at 186. See also Hutchinson and New-
comer, Study of Busness Mortality, 28 Am. EcoN. REv. 514 (1938).
95. THE PRoGREss=vE GROCER (1949), op. cit. supra note 19, at 5.
96. Hearings supra note 3, at 366. He added that the efficient grocers would
survive and prosper. The president of the National Association of Retail Grocers
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Monopoly or restraint of trade may be achieved on a local or
regional, as well as national, scale; 97 hence, it is important to inquire
into the position of the chains as a group, or any one of them, in par-
ticular areas. In 1928, prior to the first Census of Business, grocery
chains claimed 70% of the total retail volume in New York and Phila-
delphia and over 50% in sixteen other large cities." These figures
may have been overstated, but the record of the recent prosecution of
A & P for violation of the Sherman Act " contains more recent data
of general significance. In the Company's Central Division, which in
1941 operated 647 stores in parts of six states, the 1941 business of
189 stores was compared to the total business in the towns where these
stores were located as given in the 1939 Census of Business. The
result was that eight of these stores in towns with only one store did
more than 50% of the local business, the percentages ranging from
52.35 to 81.3. There were 15 towns (16 stores) where A & P had
from 40% to 50% of the total business, 52 towns (55 stores) where
it had from 30% to 40% of the total business, and 51 towns where
20% to 30% of all retail sales were made in A & P stores.' 1° All of
these towns were small, with populations ranging from 2,505 to
stated recently: "Success in the independent retail food field is a highly individual
matter. It depends upon the retailer's business acumen, his love of his business and
of hard work and his salesmanship. He needs certain protections, it is true, against
unfair and discriminatory trade practices, but we could legislate every one of those
things out of existence and he would still not be successful. Food retailers are their
own secret of success and cannot be legislated to success by controls over their com-
petitors." N.Y. Times, October 3, 1949, p. 27, col. 4. Dr. Julius Klein, Hearings,
.mipra note 40, at 257, said: "I do hope that, in rigging up to protect the weak and
the small, you very carefully eliminate the inefficient, because I think one of the real
dangers is to have an umbrella rigged up to keep alive your small distributor who
is not operating efficiently. In other words, I see no reason for burdening down the
American Consumer for him." Representative Patman agreed with this. In addi-
tion, there is a question as to the need for many distributive establishments. HoFF-
MAN, op. cit. mipra note 24, at 74, 75: "The number of grocery stores in the United
States has increased out of all proportion to the increase in the population. * * * Part
of this increase in store numbers is due to the fact that a larger proportion of the
population now lives in towns and cities, so that consumers require more in the
way of retail services. But it also signifies an uneconomic use of labor and capital
resources, the cost of which will be reflected either in wider marketing spreads than
would otherwise be necessary or in a proportionately lower rate of recompense to those
engaged or employed in distributive enterprises."
97. United States v. Yellow Ca5 Co., 332 U.S. 218, 226 (1947).
98. BAXTER, CHAIN STORE DlSTaIUrlON AND MANAGEMENT 179 (1928). The
cities named were Boston, Baltimore, Washington, Norfolk, Atlanta, Chicago, Seattle,
San Francisco, Des Moines, Kansas City, St. Louis, Memphis, Detroit, Cincinnati,
Dallas, and Los Angeles. The accuracy of this study, written by the Director of
Research of the Chain Store Research Bureau, cannot be verified. BECKMAN AND
NOLEN, op. cit. mtpra note 1, at 12, state that in some of the larger cities chains have
more than 70% of the grocery business.
99. See note 7 mipra.
100. A & P Br. App., v. V, pp. 1, 8. The states are Kentucky, Ohio, New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and West Virginia, id. at 8-10. See A & P case, 67
F. Supp. at 633.
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37,651.1' No similar figures were offered as to the other divisions of
A & P, but tabulations for each division and for the units within each
division,0 2 show the following percentages of available business done
by A & P in 1940: 9.22 in the Middlewestern Division, 13.99 in the
Central Division, 11.87 in the Central Western Division, 11.52 in the
Eastern Division, 9.00 in the New England Division, 8.45 in the
Southern Division, and 9.20 in the Atlantic Division.0 3 A & P claimed
that during the first quarter of 1939 it did 11 % of the available busi-
ness in 67 cities throughout the country with populations from 50,000
to 75,000 inhabitants, and 13% of available business in 22 cities with
75,000 to 100,000 inhabitants. 04 During the same period A & P's
business in Madison, Wis. (population 67,447) was 25.1% of the
total business and in Rockford, Ill. (population 84,637) 29.4%." 5
In most parts of the country, of course, there are several food
chains competing with each other and with the independents; hence
the A & P data summarized above do not reveal fully the potential or
actual threat of the chains to the independents' business in many places.
In measuring this threat, the fact is pertinent that many food chains
have grown to their present size through mergers and consolidations. 106
101. In the largest town on the list (Steubenville, Ohio), A & P did 31.3%
of the business; in the smallest (Chagrin Falls, Ohio) A & P did 40.8%.
102. For a description of the Company's organization in divisions and units see
A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 632. For instance, the Middle Western Division operates
retail stores in parts of Illinois, Michigan, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Ne-
braska, Minnesota and Wisconsin. The units of that division had headquarters in
Chicago, Milwaukee, Des Moines, Kansas City, and St. Louis but covered a terri-
tory much larger than that of the city after which it was named. Thus, the St.
Louis unit included Peoria, Decatur and Sprinfield, Ill.; the Des Moines unit included
Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minn., Omaha, Neb., and Rock Island and Davenport,
Iowa. A & P Br. App., v. IV, 1, 12, 13.
103. Id., v. IV, 11, 478; v. V, 11, 183, 345; v. VI, 150, 392.
104. A & P Br., p. 59.
105. A & P Br. App., v. IV, 12. See also id., v. I, 313-320, containing tabula-
tions of A & P's percentages of available business in each of the seven divisions and
for the company as a whole during the first quarter of 1939. The highest percentage
was obtained in towns with supermarkets having less than 10,000 population: 15%
in New England, 20% in the Eastern Division, 21% in the Atlantic Division, 34%
in the Southern Division, 42% in the Central Division, 33% in the Central Western
Division. See text and note 326 infra.
106. The most important merger was that of Safeway Stores and MacMarr
Stores in 1931 through acquisition of the latter's assets by the former. At the time
of the acquisition the two companies each operated in 10 Rocky Mountain and Pacific
States; in five of those states the two companies together controlled 25% of total
grocery sales. "With this consolidation, the only competition in this territory be-
tween chains with national and sectional distribution was eliminated." SEN. Doc. No.
4, op. cit. supra note 38, at 10, 21. Kroger purchased 38 other chains during the
period 1908 to 1928 with an aggregate number of 2,141 grocery stores. All of these
acquisitions, except two, were accomplished through the purchase of assets, id. at
9. National Tea Company, during the period 1923 to 1928, acquired the capital
stock of 10 grocery chains wvith an aggregate number of 767 stores at the time of the
several acquisitions, id. at 21. First National Stores resulted from the merger of
four New England chains; see testimony by Charles F. Adams, then treasurer of
First National Stores, Hearings, supra note 40 v. IV, 136: "These New England
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Since section 7 of the Clayton Act placed restrictions only upon the
acquisition of capital stock and not upon the purchase of assets, the
question of imposing legislative limitations on the growth of chains
to prevent injury to competition presented itself.'07 Representative
Patman was reported in 1949 to be considering legislation to limit to
500 the number of retail stores which any one company might own or
to freeze existing companies to their current number of stores. 08
The search for an answer to the questions of public policy pre-
sented by the growth of the chains induced the United States Senate
in 1929 to direct the Federal Trade Commission to undertake the com-
prehensive investigation of both corporate and voluntary chains which
has been cited frequently above. The Senate Resolution 'o refers to
all the aspects of the problem previously mentioned. Accordingly, the
Commission issued 33 reports dealing with all phases of chain store
activities," 0 including, of course, chains other than food chains. The
Final Report, issued in 1934, summarized the findings of the entire
investigation and has influenced decisively the course of events since
the early thirties.
These events can best be characterized as a long drawn-out
struggle between the independents and the chains which resulted in a
series of legislative and forensic activities directed against the chains
and in answering moves on their part. This contest is still being waged
in the national arena, and it is impossible to foretell the outcome. At
the time this is written the fifth round is under way. The several
stages of this contest will be reviewed in the chapters that follow.
IV. CHAIN STORE TAXATION
A nation-wide movement to impose special occupation or license
taxes upon chain stores was the first legislative result of the independent
groups operated in competition with each other on the four corners of an intersec-
tion, and interspersed with our stores were stores of outside general chain store
organizations like the Great A & P, and it became very apparent to those who had
studied economics that with the New England group paying 4 rents for 4 stores
at the same location, with operations repeated three or four times to serve each of
the groups, we would be at a disadvantage in comparison with the cost of distribution
with a larger organization." Many of the smaller chain organizations (e.g. P. H.
Butler, Dixie Home Stores, Food Fair Stores, Grand Union, Red Owl Stores) also
resulted from mergers and consolidations; see MooDY's INDUSTRIALS (1949). Only
the A & P grew almost entirely by the opening of new stores; SEN. Doc. No. 4,
op. cit. supra note 38, at 9.
107. The FTC recommended an amendment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act to
include the purchase of assets within the activities which may be prohibited by the
Commission. Id. at 96. This has now been enacted: Pub. L. No. 899, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (Dec. 29, 1950).
108. Wall Street Journal, September 29, 1949, p. 3, col. 4.
109. Sen. Res. No. 224, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927).
110. These reports dealt, inter alia with Scope of the Chain-Store Inquiry,
Sizes of Stores of Retail Chains, Growth and Development of Chain Stores, and
Prices and Margins of Chain and Independent Distributors (selected cities).
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merchants' fear of chain store competition."' The movement gained
relative constitutional security in 1931 when the Supreme Court in
State Board of Tax Commissioners of Indiana v. Jackson12 sustained
the constitutionality of an Indiana statute providing for an annual
license tax graduated from $3 on one store to $25 on each store in
excess of twenty stores. A few years later, in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co. v. Grosjean,"-3 the Court upheld a Louisiana license
tax on stores located in that State; the tax rate was to be measured
by the total number of stores controlled by the chain both within and
outside Louisiana. Similarly, municipal ordinances imposing such
taxes have been upheld in several states."
4
A detailed analysis of these tax measures is not within the scope
of this study; but it is pertinent to note that these tax statutes were
sustained on the ground that chain stores were so different from inde-
pendently owned stores and, as a result, enjoyed such advantages over
the independents, that a law singling them out for special tax treat-
ment did not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amend-
ment. In the Jackson case, Mr. Justice Roberts described these differ-
ences as resting
".. in quantity buying, which involves the application of the
mass process to distribution, comparable to the mass method used
in production; buying for cash and obtaining the advantage of a
cash discount; skill in buying, so as not to overbuy, and at the
same time keep the stores stocked with products suitable in size,
style and quality for the neighborhood customers who patronize
them; warehousing of goods and distributing from a single ware-
house to numerous stores; abundant supply of capital, whereby
advantage may be taken of opportunities for establishment of new
units; a pricing and sales policy different from that of the indi-
vidual stores, involving slightly lower prices; a greater turnover,
and constant analysis of the turnover to ascertain relative profits
on varying items; unified and therefore cheaper and better adver-
tising for the entire chain in a given locality; standard forms of
display for the promotion of sales; superior management and
method; . . . special accounting methods; standardization of
store management, sales policies, and goods sold." "I
111. See, generally, Blakey, Chain Store Taxation, 19 TAxEs 594 (1941)
Feldman, Legislative Opposition to Chain Stores and its Minimization, 8 LAW &
CONTEMP. PRoB. 334 (1941).
112. 283 U.S. 527 (1931). Jackson was engaged in the business of selling
groceries, fresh vegetables, and meats in 225 stores in Indianapolis.
113. 301 U.S. 412 (1937).
114. See Feldman, supra note 111 at 338.
115. 283 U.S. 527, 534, 535 (1931). The Court went on to say that cooperatives
could not keep up with the chains because of the formers' lack of sufficient integra-
tion. Cf. Great A & P Tea Co. v. Board of Comm'rs. of Camden, 122 N.J.L. 47,
4 A.2d 16, 18 (1939), holding invalid a municipal ordinance requiring a $10,000 license
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The history of these tax statutes has further significance here
because it affords a unique illustration of the political and economic
arguments which the independents continued to present to the state
legislatures in their fight against the chains and of the defensive
measures devised by the chains. Thus the preamble to the Kentucky
statute of 1940, after reciting some of the chain store advantages
enumerated in the Jackson case, declared that these advantages and
practices "tend strongly to create monopolies and restrain or limit
trade" and that
". .. the stability of the local communities is important to the
welfare of the state, and small merchants are essential to that
stability in that they necessarily maintain an intimate business
relationship with local bankers, wholesalers, mechanics, artisans
and farmers and take a greater interest in local charitable, re-
ligious, educational, cultural and civic affairs and thereby use
their influences and resources for the purpose of creating a higher
degree of loyalty to their community, state and institutions than
can be expected of chain organizations and transients."
Hence, continues the preamble,
".. . chain organizations should be permitted to continue their
operations in this state only under regulations and conditions that
will not permit them to destroy or unfairly impede the operation
of the business of the independent merchants, and that this act is
intended to offset in a measure the advantages and practices pe-
culiar to the chain organization, so as to make the advantages of
merchandising of chain organizations and independents more nearly
equal in the interest of the general welfare.. . .
The license taxes on chain stores were thus not designed to raise
revenue for the state treasuries, but solely for the purpose of helping
the independents in their fight against the chains. That fight was not
limited to the state legislatures. In 1937 Representative Martin Dies
of Texas introduced in the House of Representatives an amendment
fee of self-service food stores. The Court said: ". . . the payment of the tax in
every instance could be effected only by substantially raising the prices to consumers,
or by an exhaustion of capital. * * * The municipality may not require its residents
to'forego the exercise of an economy in order that a group of merchants, unwilling
to take advantage of economy and management, may prosper."
116. Quoted in Blakey, mtpra note 111, at 594. Cf. the dissenting opinion by Mr.
Justice Douglas in Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 318, 319
(1949): . . . "there is the effect on the community when independents are swal-
lowed up by the trusts and entrepreneurs become employees of absentee owners. Then
there is a serious loss in citizenship. Local leadership is diluted. He who was a
leader in the village becomes dependent on outsiders for his action and policy. Clerks
responsible to a superior in a distant place take the place of resident proprietors
beholden to no one. These are the prices which the nation pays for the almost cease-
less growth in bigness on the part of industry."
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to the District of Columbia appropriation bill providing for a federal
chain store tax based on the number of stores in operation. The
amendment passed the House but was rejected by the Senate. In 1938
Representative Patman introduced another federal chain store tax
measure which died in the Committee on Ways and Means. It was
introduced again in 1940, when extensive public hearings were con-
ducted before a Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee."' At the opening of these hearings Representative Patman
stated that interstate corporate chain stores were objectionable because
they were monopolies, involved unreasonable concentrations of money
and credit, destroyed local communities from which business was taken
by absentee owners; and did not support local charities, churches, and
schools as generously as local businessmen." 8  The bill was again
killed in committee when it was discovered that under its terms A & P
would have been liable to pay a tax of $523,620,000 on an annual net
income of $9,119,114."' No further attempt at imposing a federal
chain store tax has since been made. Significantly, chain store taxes
were opposed by the Federal Trade Commission on the ground that
c*... to tax out of existence the advantages of chain stores over
competitors is to tax out of existence the advantages which the
consuming public have found in patronizing them, with a conse-
quent addition to the cost of living for that section of the pub-
lic." 120
The movement for state license taxes 121 on chain stores created
a tremendous public relations problem for the chains and brought about
widespread lobbying activities on their part to defeat such legislation
wherever possible. The chains found it necessary, for example, to
defend themselves against the charge that their absentee ownership is
"turning us into a nation of clerks by depriving individuals of the
opportunity of establishing their own businesses and, in that way,
impairing individual initiative, since standardized merchandising oper-
117. Hearing oi H. R. 1, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
118. Blakey, supra note 111, at 602, 628.
119. Id. at 670.
120. SEN. Doc. No. 4, op. cit. supra note 38, at 91. The Commission also said:
"That portion of the public which is able to pay cash and is willing to forego de-
livery service in return for the advantage of lower prices will be deprived of that
privilege, generally speaking."
121. In 1938, 20 states had effective chain store tax laws. BECKMAN AND
NOLaN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 72. CCH TAx SYsTEms 182 (11th ed. 1948), lists
19 states with chain store taxes. These are: Alabama, Colorado, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
North and South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia. In
many other states chain store tax bills were introduced but did not pass. In 1939,
99 "punitive" chain store tax bills were introduced in 44 state legislatures; in 1941
there were 64 such bills in 23 states. A & P Br. App., v. I, 609.
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ations tend to make of employees mere routine workers," 122 and that
it has socially undesirable consequences for the communities in which
their stores are located.123  When a witness was told by a member of
the House Committee on the Judiciary that local managers of A & P,
Kroger, and other chains often refused to contribute to community
chests and other civic organizations on the ground of lack of authority
and that this had created resentment in many places, he replied:
"I am not prepared to deny that there are not some companies
who have been niggardly and narrow along that line, entirely too
small on it. But they, too, have come in a large extent to realize
that that is a duty that they owe the community." 124
The efforts of the chains to tell their story to the public and to
create, by their conduct, the greatest possible good will culminated in
a number of developments. In 1937, for example, A & P employed
public relations counsel.1 14 a In 1935 and 1936 public hearings were
held before a special House committee under the chairmanship of Rep-
resentative Patman for the purpose of investigating the organization
122. BE cKxAx AND NolEDT op. cit. supra note 1, at 225. On p. 63 the same
authors observe: "* * * chain stores suffer disadvantages in the lack of personal
contact between their management and the public. * * * Even though those [chain
store] workers, because of a desire for promotion or to retain their jobs, and with a
certain amount of training and supervision, may produce some measure of efficiency,
they, nevertheless, usually function with less effectiveness than do the owners of small
business with their sharpened personal interest in customers. It is the age-old principle
of self-interest stimulating individual initiative to produce effective results."
123. A typical example is the following colloquy in 1935 between the Chairman
of the House Committee on the Judiciary and an official of the National Tea Com-
pany : ": Chairman: Do you not believe that a man who runs his store . . .if he
makes a good buy gets a kick out of it, or if he makes a bad deal, gets a lesson
from it? He risks his own judgment. Do you not think that probably he has a
betfer chance to develop to be a good citizen than a man who merely wraps up or
exchanges merchandise that you put in his store, that you tell him where to put,
and what to sell it for?
Witwss: If you will line up in a classroom 30 average merchants and 30
average chain store managers, you will find that there is a greater amount of
real knowledge of facts pertaining to their business in the minds of those chain
store managers than there is in the minds of those individual operators . . .
nobody progresses as a manager of one of our stores unless he develops a knowl-
edge and an individuality for the busniess in which he is engaged."
Hearings, op. cit. supra note 3, at 136, 137.
124. Id. at 139. An officer of American Stores testified that each store manager
is allowed to contribute to civic affairs up to $25, and that he must get in touch
with headquarters with respect to larger contributions; id. at 158.
124a. Carl Byoir and Associates. In 1938 Mr. Byoir told the Company's Middle
Western Division "that the job a public relations counsel could do was no better
than the performance and policy of the client and that all you could do was to make
known what they did and that would reflect forward looking, liberal, social, re-
sponsible conduct or it would reflect conduct that would not build good reputation
and the opportunities for such reputation building in big corporations was exactly
the same as in the life of an individual * * *." He warned particularly against
discourteous clerks, letting sellers cool their heels in the office, refusing to see
suppliers and labor leaders. A & P Br. App., v. I, pp. 605, 606.
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and lobbying activities of the American Retail Federation and of in-
quiring into the trade practices of big-scale retail and wholesale buying
and selling organizations. The committee was organized as a result
of a report in the New York Times of April 17, 1935, that the Fed-
eration was a "superlobby" formed to promote the business of chain
stores throughout the United States and to influence members of Con-
gress with reference to legislation affecting chain stores; it was also
charged that the Federation was "designed to prevent small business
from securing competitive opportunities equal to those enjoyed by
corporations representing vast aggregations of capital" and that it was
"attempting to force and coerce thousands of small retail merchants,
dealing in the necessities of life, into the ranks of this superlobby, so
that it may thereafter hold out . . . that it represents a completely
centralized and authentic voice for all retailers of the nation." 124b
The evidence produced before the Patman Committee showed
many efforts on the part of the chains to "gain friends and influence
people." Not only did the chains retain attorneys in the various states
to represent their interests in legislative matters, but appeals to the
public were stressed, because "chain store operators only control a few
votes" and legislators "will swing their decision in favor of those who
have the largest voting power." Therefore, it was essential "to educate
all our customers, and all outside our regular trade, as to the valuef of
the chain store; its savings to the people due to the system under which
it operates, its help to the community in the form of the large amount
of taxes which it pays and the amount the chains are giving to local
charities." This was to be done through pamphlets, signs in the
stores, newspaper articles and advertisements, and contact by employees
with the public.'25
"Undue influence and propaganda," however, could have been
found not only on the side of "powerful groups representing vast
aggregations of corporations and capital." 125a For example, in 1934 a
motion picture, Forward America, was produced by anti-chain store
forces which proclaimed that the chains were responsible for the im-
poverishment of America, that restrictions on chains would increase
property values, and that chains brought about social and economic
124b. H.R. REP. No. 2373, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) ; Report by the Special
Committee on that part of House Resolution 203 Relating to the Organization and
Lobbying Activities of the American Retail Federation.
125. Letter to Food and Grocery Chain Stores of America, Inc., from Market
Basket Stores, Olean, N. Y. relating to campaign against anti-chain store bills pending
in New York Legislature. Hearings, op. cit. suzpra note 40, v. II, 10, 11. When the
chain store tax laws were submitted to a referendum of the voters the chains incurred"political expenses" to organize the voters and bring their friends to the polls.
Id., v. IV, 108.
125a. H.R. REP. No. 2373, supra note 124b, at 8.
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ruin.2 b In any event, ten years before the enactment of the Federal
Regulation of Lobbying Act of 1946, the battle between independents
and chain stores provoked a suggestion for such regulation.1 ro c
V. THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936, amended Section 2 of the
Clayton Act of 1914. The original provision forbade economically
unjustified price discrimination which threatened competition.' It
was designed to correct
".. . a common and widespread unfair trade practice whereby
certain great corporations and also certain smaller concerns which
seek to secure a monopoly in trade and commerce by aping the
methods of the great corporations, have heretofore endeavored to
destroy competition and render unprofitable the business of com-
petitors by selling their goods, wares and merchandise at a less
price in the particular communities where their rivals are engaged
in business than at other places throughout the country * * *." 127
The purpose of the amendatory act of 1936, on the other hand, was
quite different. It was stated to the House Judiciary Committee by
Representative Patman, the Act's principal sponsor, to be,
" . . to give all of the independent merchants of this country
the same rights, privileges, benefits, and opportunities as the
larger chains or concerns receive, and no more. In other words,
it is a bill . . . to deny special privileges and benefits to a few,
and to give equal rights to all and special privileges to none." 128
The "privileges" referred to were the benefits derived by the chains
from "special discounts and secret rebates and bonuses that give one
retailer an advantage over the other retailer." 129
Mr. Patman introduced to the Committee the attorney for the
United States Wholesale Grocers' Association who had drafted the
bill 130 and who explained that so long as the chains "have this large-
125b. Hearings, supra note 40, v. II, 133. The picture was described by a chain
store official as being full of misleading statistics and as showing "a general parading
of such people as Barbara Hutton and others." A picture of President Roosevelt
was used in such a way as to create the idea that the Federal Government had em-
barked on an anti-chain store drive. Id. at 132.
125c. See note 124b mpra.
126. 38 STAT. 730 (1914).
127. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1914). See Freer, Introduction
to Section 2, ROBINSON-PATmAN Acr SYMPosium 5 (N.Y. State Bar Assn. 1946).
128. Hearings, mpra note 3, at 4.
129. Id. at 8.
130. Id. at 13. The president of the same Association told the Committee that
the bill was designed "to curb that mighty force of potential monopoly in American
merchandising that is today casting its scourging influence throughout the length and
breadth of the Nation." Id. at 29, 30. The Association was said to represent only
20% of all wholesale grocers. See Hearings, supra note 4, at 139. See also United
States v. Southern Wholesale Grocers Ass'n 207 Fed. 434 (N.D. Ala. 1913).
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quantity purchasing power, they remain free to exercise that buying
power and to abuse it until they are properly restrained." 131 He sub-
mitted a memorandum containing specific questions and answers with
respect to the purposes of the proposed legislation. The crucial parts
of this memorandum were as follows:
"Why is the bill aimed at abuses of buying power rather than
of selling power?
Answer: Because buying power is the source of the evil.
The seller is merely an innocent victim compelled usually in self-
defense to grant the concessions demanded. The greater his sell-
ing power the less is his compulsion to do so, for the less does he
then depend upon the particular business of the buyer demanding
the concession.
"Would the bill destroy the chain stores?
Answer: It would not destroy them unless they depend for
their existence upon these unfair concessions and discriminations.
So far as they are able to perform the sound economic function
of bringing the necessities . . . of life from the producer to the
consumer on a basis of equality with independent merchants, it
leaves them with the same freedom as independent merchants to
pursue that legitimate occupation; but it aims to deprive them of
any advantage of position to which their ability to serve does not
entitle them.
"Why does the bill pick out quantity prices, brokerage and
advertising allowances for suppression?
Answer: Because these are the three favorite disguises under
which large buyers wring their exactions.
"Is it sufficient to prohibit discriminations?
Answer: . . . The evil at which this bill is aimed has arisen
by virtue of concentration of power in the buying field and its
ability to compel the seller to grant a few of his customers profit-
able favors at the cost of the rest. So long as each seller is com-
pelled to treat all customers alike he can safely be left free to adjust
the other details of his business. . . . He must not, however, be
permitted to bleed part of his customers for the benefit of the
others, and if any of his customers have the power to compel him
to do so, that power constitutes the evil against which this bill is
directed.
"Why does the bill visit its prohibitions upon the manufac-
turer or other seller if the evil arises principally on the buying
side?
Answer: Because the law must help the manufacturer to re-
sist the unfair demands of the large buyer. Every price is made
131. Hearings, supra note 3, at 15.
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upon the balancing of the gains against the losses which it entails.
If in weighing such demands the manufacturer must add on to
the loss side his liability for violation of this law, he is so much
the less likely to grant what is unfair and what he could not afford
to grant all of his customers alike." 132
A majority of the witnesses who appeared at the hearings were repre-
sentatives of the food industry. It is clear that the relationship be-
tween the food chains as purchasers and their suppliers and the alleged
unfair advantages obtained by the chains through "the duress of their
buying power" l- are at the heart of this legislation. These "advan-
tages," each dealt with specifically by the Act, 34 must now be con-
sidered.
1. Advertising Allowances
In 1944 the Federal Trade Commission examined in detail the
problem of "Advertising as a Factor in Distribution." The Commis-
sion found that in order "to obtain greater local advertising of their
brands or to control its character, many manufacturers enter into
agreements with their dealers under which they share with the dealer
the cost of approved local advertising." 135 This cooperative arrange-
ment frequently takes the form of a payment by the manufacturer to
the distributor which is known as an "advertising allowance." Such
allowances, together with the selling services sometimes rendered to
buyers for resale by sellers, are dealt with in sections 2(e) and 2(f) of
the Act.
As far as the food industry is concerned, advertising is an im-
portant factor in the distribution expense of both manufacturers and
retailers.' In addition to direct advertising in national magazines,
132. Id. at 30, 31. Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act makes it unlawful
for any person "knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is
prohibited by this section." Obviously, this provision applies to the buyer. See
Howrey, The Buyer and a Prima Facie Case, and Forkner, The Significance of
Section 2(f), ROBINSON-PATAIAN AcT SymposlU (1948) at 87 and 66. Section
2(f) has been criticized on the ground that the buyer has no access to the proof.
Ibid.
133. Hearings, supra note 3, at 71. The quoted phrase was coined by the Secre-
tary of the National League of Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Distributors.
134. 49 STAT. 1526, 15 U.S.C. 13a-13f, 13a-13c.
135. FTC, op. cit. mpra note 9, pt. V, 2.
136. The percentage of advertising to total distribution costs of representative
groups of manufacturers of various food commodities in 1939 was as follows: Cereals
25.98%, coffee 25.44%, biscuits and crackers 15.96%, flour 34.49%, canned fruits and
vegetables 18.53%, meats 8.32%, sugar 5.28%. Id. at 8. The Commission also
found advertising expenditures per dollar of net sales and per dollar of total operating
expenses by 43 grocery chains amounting to 0.66 cents and 3.20 cents, respectively;
the corresponding figures for a group of 156 independent grocery retailers were 0.73
cents and 3.24 cents. Id. at 18.
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on the radio, and in the newspapers, 37 many food manufacturers, such
as canners, flour millers, meat packers, and cereal and cracker manu-
facturers, furnish the retail trade with booklets and leaflets or demon-
strators for their products, aid in the preparation of window and store
displays, and share or assume the cost of dealer advertising.3 " The
business reasons for such assistance were explained by the Federal
Trade Commission in the following terms:
"In dealer advertising, interest in permanently increasing the
sale of a particular manufacturer-owned brand often is secondary
to attracting trade to the advertiser's own place of business.
Therefore, dealer advertising of particular well-known brands
often takes the form of using the brand as a price leader, the
featuring of which will be discontinued as soon as it has served
its leader purpose. Advertising by retailers, especially, which
features any one manufacturer's well-known brand or brands is
likely to be sporadic and determined by the dealer's interest rather
than the manufacturer's interest in a continuous and consistently
followed plan to keep his product before the consuming public.
"To meet this situation, the manufacturers of many nationally
advertised products have developed numerous plans under which
they share the cost of local advertising of their products by dis-
tributors. The purpose of these plans is to obtain closer co-
ordination of the manufacturer's national advertising with that of
distributors, to increase the continuity of dealer advertising, to
influence and control the nature of dealer advertising, to increase
the space devoted to advertising the manufacturer's product di-
rectly to consumers, and to take advantage of the low space rates
offered by advertising media to local merchants. These cooperative
advertising plans are directed particularly to joint or cooperative
advertising with retailers who are in direct contact with con-
sumers." 139
137. The Commission reported that national magazines absorb the largest per-
centage of advertising expenditures of meat packers and canners; manufacturers of
cereal and flour prefer radio advertising; and makers of biscuits, crackers, and coffee
concentrate on newspaper advertising. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 26, 27.
139. Id. at 16. Since these plans are designed to swell the advertising funds of
the retailers, wholesalers usually do not participate. Id. at 17. There are also co-
operative advertising plans among the members of voluntary grocery chains. Id.
at 19. On p. 40 the Commission states: "Consumer advertising at the point of sale,
backed by a close tie-up between the advertising done and the local dealer's effort,
gives the largest results in sales of products. Advertising in cooperation with deal-
ers stocking the goods has the advantage from the manufacturer's viewpoint of giving
a closer tie-up than is attainable by national advertising by the manufacturer alone.
It also has the furtlier advantage of obtaining greater space and more frequent featur-
ing of the manufacturer's brands at minimum cost, because in any newspaper local
space rates offered to retailers are lower than space rates for national * * * ad-
vertising which include provision for the advertising agency's commission. News-
papers also give local advertisers preference over national advertisers in the location
of space in their pages. Thus, by augmenting the dealer's advertising fund the manu-
facturer benefits through obtaining closer dealer relations, better location and visibility
for his advertising retailer's good will."
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The practice of paying such "advertising allowances" to retailers
raises at least two difficult problems. First, there is the problem of
checking whether the manufacturer actually receives value for the
money expended; 140 without actual performance of specific services by
the retailer the allowance would be an indirect secret rebate. Second,
there is the likelihood that manufacturers may discriminate in granting
such allowances in favor of large buyers, either voluntarily or because
of the power of these buyers.1 4 1  Complaints of unfair discrimination
have been voiced persistently by smaller retailers who claim to be
unable to obtain such allowances,'2 and, by reason of such inability,
to suffer in the competitive struggle. Significantly, the Code of Fair
Competition for the Retail Food and Grocery Trade, which was adopted
by the industry pursuant to the National Industrial Recovery Act of
1933, contained, in addition to a general prohibition of discrimination
in selling price,1 43 a provision designed to prevent acceptance of unfair
advertising allowances, as follows:
"[N] o food and grocery retailers shall accept payment from a
wholesaler or manufacturer for a special advertising or other dis-
tribution service (a) except in pursuance of a written contract
explicitly defining the service to be rendered and payment for it;
and (b) unless such service is rendered and such payment is
reasonable and not excessive in amount; and (c) unless such con-
tract is separate and distinct from any sales price and is not de-
signed to or used to reduce a sales price; and (d) unless such
payment is equally available for the same service to all competitive
retailers in the same competitive market; and (e) unless a copy
of each such contract is retained on file for a period of one year.
In order to investigate alleged violations of this Code the Ad-
ministrator may require a food and grocery retailer to report such
contracts made by him and/or to produce a copy thereof for in-
spection." 144
140. Id. at 38.
141. Id. at 19, 20, 39.
142. FTC, op. cit. supra note 9, pt. V, 41: The Commission found that com-
plaints of unfair discrimination "are based on the claim that any gain in volume of
business accomplished through the advertising cooperatively done by manufacturers
and large stores consists of two parts; namely, sales to new users of the cooperating
manufacturer's product and sales to old users whose purchases are shifted from
stores with which users customarily had dealt, to stores which are able to carry on
more extensive display advertising because of allowances granted by manufacturers."
143. NRA CODES OF FAIR COmPETITION, v. IV, 457 et seq. (1934). A similar
provision was contained in art. VII, § 2 of the Code of Fair Competition for .the Whole-
sale Food and Grocery Trade, approved January 4, 1934 (NRA CODES OF FAIR
COMPEnTIION, v. V, 1, 10) : "Discrimination in prices or terms of sale against pur-
chasers of the same quantity under the same conditions of delivery and credit serv-
ices for the same class of buyers * * * is prohibited. Locality or sectional price
discrimination which is designed or effective to unduly injure competitors is further
prohibited."
144. Id., art. IX, § 1(f) (1934). Emphasis added.
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This provision did not satisfy those who charged that chains
received enormous sums of money as advertising allowances, while
similar benefits were denied to the competitors of the chains. The
business considerations which induce manufacturers to make such pay-
ments to the chains were explained to the Patman Committee by Mr.
Traver Smith, then vice-president in charge of grocery operations of
Standard Brands, Inc. That company does business in every state of
the Union; it manufactures such well-known brands as Fleischmann's
Yeast, Chase & Sanborn Coffee, Royal Baking Powder, and others.
The company has bought "cooperation service" from those customers
whom it considered capable of rendering a worthwhile promotional
service.' In 1935 it had such cooperation contracts with A & P,
Kroger, First National, American Stores, and National Tea Company,
covering several of its products. Payments made to A & P under
these contracts amounted to $299,892, while Kroger received $44,468;
payments to the other three chains were considerably smaller.'46 The
Company also made such contracts with independent stores, t but
these seem to have been of decidedly minor significance. With respect
to one of the Company's principal products, Fleischmann's yeast, sold
then at 2.5 cents per cake, the Company paid advertising allowances
only to A & P and Kroger. The testimony explaining the reasons for
limiting allowances on this product to those two out of a total of
250,000 customers is so enlightening with respect to the problem of
discrimination between large and small buyers as to require close
scrutiny.
Mr. Smith stated that with a 2.5-cent item advertising allowances
could not be given throughout the trade and that such allowances could
be considered only "on a large-scale operation." Since A & P and
Kroger commanded the largest market in promoting the sale of yeast,
$12,000 was paid monthly to A & P and $6,000 per year to Kroger
145. Hearings, supra note 40, v. IV, 7, 10. Mr. Smith insisted that this was not
discrimination but payment for a service. He described the usual practice as fol-
lows: "Our agent would go to a certain customer that is selling our coffee, for ex-
ample, and he does not believe that that customer is selling as much coffee as he
should. . . . He will say to that customer: Why don't you give us a little fea-
ture here? We might mean mention in the newspaper advertising, mention in his hand-
bills, a poster on his window . . . a counter display; an island, possibly mention in
his store, or some other cooperation. . . . The customer says, Well, I will do that,
but it will cost you $5.00 or whatever the case may be. If our agent thinks it is
worth $5.00, he will write out a contract and agree to pay $5.00 for that serv-
ice. . . . If that service is not given-you see we have our own men going into
these stores every four days, and if that service is not given, no payment is made.
If the service is given, then the payment is made on the basis of this contract." Id.
at 11.
146. Id. at 34. First National Stores received $3,400, American Stores $11,600,
and National Tea Co. $9,135.
147. Id. at 24. No figures were given.
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for advertising, in addition to quantity discounts. No other chain or
independent received similar treatment. 4 Mr. Smith denied that this
was discriminatory,
".. . because if there were any other account that could give us
the same sort of service, we would do the same thing for them.
They [A & P and Kroger] give us distribution in 14,000 or more
stores; they allow us to put up package displays, as we call them,
with little signs; because yeast is usually tucked away in a re-
frigerator where nobody can see it. I have seen large posters that
they have gotten out, about . . . 6 feet by 2 to 3. They have
mentioned it at frequent intervals in their newspaper advertising,
and they have really given us a very comprehensive service to try
to promote the sale of our yeast.
""Mr. Patman: . . .Now if it is worth a dollar a month from
A & P, why is it not worth a dollar a month a store to the inde-
pendent merchant; and if it is worth that to A & P to render that
service, why is it not worth that to any other chain, and why do
you not offer them the same contract?
"Mr. Smith: I do not know what account other than those
two could advertise our yeast in the newspapers. I do not know
any other account in the United States, or any other two accounts
in the United States, that could give us the distribution that we
get from them. . . . I do not think there is another account in the
country that could give us the service that A & P gives us ...
We could not afford to make any payment to the individual grocer
for cooperation on yeast, because the payment would probably be
more than we got for the entire transaction on the yeast." 149
The witness then explained that on deliveries to A & P stores "our
man picks up a ticket . . . and the tickets are all sent to the central
office and turned over to A & P and they give us the money for it."
Thus Standard Brands does not have to issue statements to each store,
but collects its accounts from one place only, the headquarters office.
This results in a "tremendous" saving in the cost of doing business
with A & P,150 as compared to the cost of doing business with inde-
pendents; such savings represent an additional inducement toward the
buying of cooperation services from mass volume distributors.
The testimony quoted above shows clearly that, at least from the
point of view of the large manufacturer, payment of advertising allow-
ances is considered worthwhile only when made to a buyer who con-
trols very large markets. 5 ' Smaller buyers could not give to the manu-
148. Id. at 15.
149. Id. at 16, 17
150. Id. at 30.
151. See Hearings before Subcommittee of House Judiciary Committee on H.R.
4995, 74th Cong., 2d sess. pt. 2, 322 (1936) : "There are some organizations that believe
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facturers the "same service" in advertising. Hence, it is obvious why
the Code provision insisting only on equal availability of advertising
payments "for the same service" to be rendered by distributors was
attacked as ambiguous and unsatisfactory. Was a display or promo-
tion service in 10 stores the "same service" as a display in 1,000 stores?
If not, a manufacturer might be permitted to share the advertising
costs of his large chain buyers, and leave his independent customers
to pay theirs out of their own pockets without assistance.'52 Inevitably,
those independent retailers who could not obtain advertising allowances
considered themselves as victims of unfair discrimination. 53 This
feeling was shared by old-line wholesalers, who were generally con-
sidered ineligible to receive advertising allowances because they did not
control retail distribution outlets. 5 ' Consequently, they insisted on the
requirement now to be found in Sections 2 (d) and (e) of the Robinson-
Patman Act that such payments must be made available "on propor-
tionately equal terms" to all customers. Thus, "if one man buys
$100,000 in goods and should be allowed $1,000 for advertising pur-
poses, and another buys $10,000 in goods, he ought to be allowed $100
for advertising." '5
Grocery manufacturers were opposed to this provision. Their
representative contended that some reasonable advertising relationship
with his retailer customers was vital for the small manufacturer and
that the provisions of the NRA Code were sufficient to prevent subter-
fuge; he argued that, "from a practical business aspect," it was "crazy"
to compel a small manufacturer who makes an advertising payment to
A & P to make proportionate payments to all his other customers, be-
cause he may go bankrupt in the process.'56 Moreover, many retailers
are not able to contribute enough to the promotion of the manufac-
turer's product to qualify for advertising allowances; 1-7 giving them a
that a counter display in every one of the A & P stores * * * maintained for one week
at a certain spot near the cash register is worth so much money to them." Chairman
Summers commented: "A man goes into a store and sees an attractive soap display and
he thinks he has to buy a cake and take a bath."
152. Memorandum submitted by the attorney for the U.S. Wholesale Grocers
Association, Hearings, supra note 3, at 226, 227. See also Hearings, supra note 151
at 464.
153. See Hearings, supra note 40, v. IV, 36, 37: In reply to a questionnaire sent
by the Jellico Grocery Company of Jellico, Tenn., to 200 independent retailers in Ken-
tucky, Tennessee, and Florida listing the advertising allowances paid to A & P, each
addressee answered that he had received no allowance.
154. Hearings, supra note 40, v. 3, no. 1, pp. 73, 74 (Testimony by A.S. Iglehart,
vice-president of General Foods, president of General Foods Sales Co.).
155. Senator Logan, 80 CONG. REc. 3231 (1936).
156. Hearings, supra note 151, at 442.
157. Dr. Nathan Isaacs, Professor of Business Law, Harvard Graduate School of
Business Administration, commented: "The rule assumes that all advertising allow-
ances are subterfuges. Some of them may be. But may not a company that spends
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claim to "proportionate" payments might thus, in effect, induce manu-
facturers to discontinue the practice of cooperative advertising or to
try to keep such agreements secret.1 58
Evidently the authors of the Robinson-Patman Act intended a
solution which should reflect the "central purpose" of the Act, "to
preserve equality of opportunity." ' The solution, however, does not
in terms reach the problem of actual performance of advertising serv-
ices by merchants who receive allowances for them. Prior to the Act
neither those who paid nor those who received advertising allowances
attempted, for example, to check as to whether or not the newspaper
space paid for by the distributor was equivalent to the allowance paid
to the distributor. 60 Since this is a "quick moving, high-pressure busi-
ness," such checking is often impracticable. 6 ' Hence some chains
expended more for advertising than they received by way of allowances
from their manufacturers 162 and others spent less, leaving a substantial
surplus resulting from such advertising contracts.'
At this point, the problem is affected by the basis upon which pay-
ments for advertising are calculated. Counsel for A & P prepared in
1940 a "Manual on the Robinson-Patman Act" which was intended
"to provide Company officials throughout the country with general
information" about the Act; 164 in that Manual they took the seem-
ingly correct position that it would be proper for a manufacturer to
millions for advertising its products enter in good faith into an agreement for window
space for its display in a store? Window space costs money and has a rental value.
Not all windows are equally well placed for advertising. Some may be worthless and
others worse-in other words actually detrimental to the goodwill of the product
occupying a "proportional" space in them. By no means all the persons who become
interested in a product through an advertisement conspicuously placed buy the product
where they first see it. Now it may be that the danger of subterfuge is so great that
advertising in which the manufacturer and retailer cooperate should be abolished, but
the proportioning scheme, unless it works as a prohibition, is a compromise that has
no merits at all." Hearings, mtpra note 4, at 31.
158. Mr. Smith of Standard Brands, Inc. told the Patman Committee: "We try
to plug every single hole in our office so that information regarding one customer will
not . . .be passed to some other customer." Hearings, supra note 40, v. IV, 22.
See also Govt. Br. (D.C.), 340-343, as to A & P's policy of keeping advertising allow-
ances confidential. On pp. 232, 233 of the same brief is set forth a letter from A & P
headquarters describing the effect of the public disclosure of advertising allowances
granted to A & P before the Patman Committee. Several companies called A & P
and stated that they had "some tall explaining to do in trying to pacify their other
customers because of giving us so much."
159. Hearings, .npra note 151, at 454.
160. Testimony of A.S. Iglehart, General Foods Co., Hearings, supra note 40,
v. III, no. 1, p. 59.
161. Testimony of the president of Kroger Co., id., at 13.
162. Testimony of Charles F. Adams, Treasurer, First National Stores, id., v. IV,
133: "In 1934 we received $342,000 from manufacturers for advertising services, but
we spent $797,683 for advertising."
163. Id., v. III, 59. A & P received $2,000,000 more for advertising than it paid
for advertising.
164. A & P Tr., v. 79, following p. 18,065.
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pay $100 for advertising services which are worth that much to him,
even though it would cost the retailer only $75.00 to perform such
services, provided only that the same arrangement was available to all
customers of the manufacturer.' Certainly, the fact that advertising
rates to local stores are generally lower than to outside advertisers is a
powerful incentive for manufacturers to buy promotional services from
A & P and other retailers whose services are considered advan-
tageous.1 66 A & P considers any profits accruing to it from advertising
allowances as "a part of the net profit from store operations" which it
allocates to its units and individual stores.16 7 Such profits, however,
are not available exclusively to the chains; even before the Robinson-
Patman Act was passed, many voluntary chains received advertising
allowances and there were at least some manufacturers who had sales
promotion contracts with independents. 68
The theory of "equality of opportunity" for large and small buyers
expressed in sections 2(d) and (e) of the Act does not touch directly
the problem of vague, indefinite and ambiguous advertising contracts;
in this respect the provision of the NRA Code which required an ex-
plicit definition of the service to be rendered was much more realistic.
Actually some of the "sales promotion service plan contracts" exam-
ined by the Patman Committee omitted specific statements defining the
duties of the advertiser."0 9 Similarly the A & P standard advertising
165. Id., at EEE (question No. 90 of the Manual).
166. Hearings, supra note 40, v. III, 73.
167. A & P Br. App., v. I, 96, 97: "Advertising allowances are payment for the
point of sale services" and as such are "merchandising profits attributable to the opera-
tion of the Units and the individual stores."
168. Mr. Iglehart told the Patman Committee that, in 1935, General Foods had
1714 sales promotion service contracts in effect; of these 324 were with corporate
chains, 547 were with cooperative chains, and 843 were with independents. Hearings,
supra note 40, v. III, 71. See also id., v. IV, 207-211, 299-302.
169. The contract used by General Foods stated: "The distributor agrees to promote
and give full support to the above listed features by the specific use of prominent
newspaper space in papers regularly used, prominent handbill space, floor displays,
window displays, counter displays, window posters. Distributor shall provide pre-
ferred merchandise listing in all stores, adequate shelf stocks, and prominent shelf
display at all times of all products named above; and shall prohibit store personnel
from placing obstacles in the way of the purchase of any of said products which a cus-
tomer orders by brand name by substituting, or urging the acceptance of, any other
brand. The distributor agrees to perform the foregoing advertising and merchandising
program, and the advertiser agrees to pay the distributor therefor the sum of $-
." Id., v. III, 68. The vice-president of General Foods testified that his company
had a record of the services rendered by every distributor, including A & P, with
whom such a contract had been entered into. Id. at 83, 84. But when asked why no
specific obligation of the customer was put into the contract, he answered: "I could not
answer why we do not do that." Id. at 79.
The contract between General Foods and Kroger, dated Jan. 15, 1935, was, by
contrast, much more specific:
Kroger agrees to give the following advertising service to the company: Eight
advertising services as follows in 4300 stores: One 2-column inch newspaper ad-
vertisement, one window sign, one counter or table display and sign. (1) Each of
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allowance form which was used for several years after the Robinson-
Patman Act became law reads as follows:
"The Distributor obliges itself to render certain Special Ad-
vertising and Special Distribution Service supplementing the Na-
tional, Sectional and Local Advertising of the Advertiser, which
special service includes periodic newspaper advertising, handbill
advertising, periodic store displays with Advertiser's merchandise
in a prominent position readily accessible to consumers, and
periodic notifications to branches of support to be rendered Ad-
vertiser's products at point of sale, for which the Advertiser agrees
to pay the following advertising allowance for such service between
the period commencing on 19 and expiring on
19 "2 170
A & P consistently refused to "be pinned down to any specific sized
ad," or to permit its suppliers to "dictate the details of our merchandis-
ing job." 171 There were, however, certain rare contracts marked
"special" which carried a definite and exact performance on the part of
A & P,1 2 but the great majority of all contracts were not so marked
and were "drawn broadly, with no definite performance required,"
although "some general support is a legal requisite to justify our accept-
ance of the allowances." 173
At the trial of A & P for violation of the Sherman Act, defendant
Bofinger, a vice-president, expressed his personal opposition to adver-
tising allowances in the following terms, "Well, personally, I never
felt they were offered on an equitable basis. I don't think we have yet
devised a yardstick by which you can measure advertising allowances.
It is almost impossible." He contended, however, that A & P "cannot
give up these advertising allowances, or promotional allowances, if the
the 8 advertising services to include 2 products at feature prices. (2) Products
to be featured to be mutually agreed upon 60 days in advance of the particular
advertising service in which they are to be featured; 4300 stores to receive neces-
sary instructions for complete store and advertising tie-up. * * * It is understood
by Kroger that the above consideration ($34,400) is equally available for same
service to all competitive retailers in the same competitive market." Id. at 88.
Safeway Stores used a form which in terms gave it wide discretion as to the
advertising services it was to perform and provided that, "Safeway agrees that
it . . .will treat the consideration paid to it by virtue of this agreement as in-
come from advertising and not as a reduction in the cost of said merchandise and
that it will not permit its retail or wholesale organizations . . . to reflect said
consideration in. their retail or wholesale price structures." Id., v. IV, 346, 347.
(Emphasis added)
170. Quoted in Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 344, and in A & P Br. App., v. II, pp. 167,
168.
171. A & P Br., pp. 96, 97.
172. Id. at 97. Such contracts were concluded only after A & P had "exhausted
all possibilities of effecting a deal otherwise." See Govt. Br. (D.C), p. 352.
173. Ibid. In a circular letter in 1937 the Company said: "We are primarily
concerned with showing where, when and that a performance was given, rather than
the extent of such services. . . ." A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 163.
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trade doesn't do the same thing," because A & P must maintain its
"competitive position." "I In the meantime, the Company tried to get
its suppliers "to raise the ante" '71 for advertising, while reserving to
itself the right to determine how much advertising it would do.'78
The Robinson-Patman Act thus did not come clearly to grips with
certain of the practical problems presented by advertising allowancesY.
77
It has been said that the Act impliedly requires that the services to
be rendered should be defined and agreed upon rather than left to the
unfettered discretion of the advertising agent . 7  In so far as the
value of advertising services under varying circumstances cannot be
measured accurately in money, as Mr. Bofinger of A & P thought, it
is possible to conclude that all payments of advertising allowances are
inherently inequitable and should be prohibited.17 9  Other forms of
174. A & P Tr., v. 88, pp. 20,335-6, 20,342. Judge Lindley added that he felt the
same way and that this was "a practice which is full of temptations, full of snares and
traps.
175. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 351.
176. It should be noted that A & P's advertising allowances were negotiated
through headquarters and through local units. The latter arrangement was apparently
considered less favorable to A & P; in 1937 the Director of Central Purchases issued
the following instructions to buyers:
"Advertising arrangements, especially with the larger companies when accom-
plished by Headquarters, result in the local representative visiting the units, and
exhibiting advertising forms on which detail of advertising is published, such as
window displays, store displays, advertising, etc., and it appears that the local
representatives take it upon themselves to get as much advertising as they can.
"The point that I want to bring out is, that unless you have something definite
from this office, in the way of prescribed advertising, displays, etc. you are to use
your own judgment, based on the popularity of the product in your territory, as
to just how much advertising you will do. Let it be understood that making an
advertising arrangement ieans that we will advertise the product in keeping with
the support we feel it is entitled to, in the interest of our business, but under no
circumstances are we to be misled by what may be presented to you by local repre-
sentatives." Emphasis added. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 207.
Some of the contract forms used for local advertising arrangements were more
specific than the standard form quoted in the text. Id. at 199-206, particularly the
"Floor Space" and "Sign Space Rental" agreements.
177. One question, whether income from advertising allowances is treated as in-
come from retail store operations (A & P method, see note 167 supra), or as separate
income from advertising (Safeway method, see note 169 supra) would seem to matter
little. Safeway, however, asserted a self-imposed obligation not to use its advertising
revenues for the purpose of price cutting. A & P expected "a reasonable profit from
advertising over and above the cost of printing and distribution of materials." A & P
Br. App., v. II, p. 211.
178. Dunn, Sections 2(d) and (e), RoaItsoN-PATmAN AcT SYmPosium, op. cit.
supra note 127, at 65.
179. Apparently the draftsman of the Robinson-Patman Act (see text at note 130
supra) contemplated such an outcome under some circumstances. He said: "Now, if
he (the seller) wants to pick out particular customers, which he may legitimately
want to do sometimes-he may have an advertising appropriation limited in size, not
large enough to spread among all his customers, yet which he wants to spread among
selected communities over the country for the purchase of newspaper advertising, bill
board posters, or any other form of local advertising-what are his alternatives? He
must either hire someone locally to do that, or pay a salaried representative and send
him into the community from without." Hearings, supra note 3, at 218.
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cooperative advertising such as the furnishing of leaflets and of as-
sistance in the preparation of window displays unaccompanied by any
payments of money may not give rise to the same objections; where
the manufacturer renders the service, instead of paying money, the
principle of proportionate equality may be more practicable.80 More-
over, the rendering of specific services instead of the payment of money
by manufacturers would not allow large buyers to exact payments for
promises of undefined "general support." Presumably, the buyer's
purpose of giving "general support" is implicit in any purchase of
merchandise for resale.
2. Brokerage
Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act,' 8 ' prohibiting the
payment of brokerage by a seller or buyer in interstate commerce to
the other party or his representative, is again directed against large
buyers of merchandise. Its purpose was described by the House Com-
mittee report in the following terms:
"The true broker serves either as representative of the seller
to find him market outlets, or as representative of the buyer to
find him sources of supply. In either case he discharges func-
tions which must otherwise be performed by the parties them-
selves through their own selling or buying departments, with their
respective attendant costs. . . . Whichever method is chosen, its
cost is the necessary and natural cost of a business function which
cannot be escaped. It is for this reason that, when free of the
coercive influence of mass buying power, discounts in lieu of
brokerage are not usually accorded to buyers who deal with the
seller direct since such sales must bear instead their appropriate
share of the seller's own selling cost.
"Among the prevalent modes of discrimination at which this
bill is directed is the practice of certain large buyers to demand
the allowance of brokerage direct to them upon their purchases,
or its payment to an employee, agent, or corporate subsidiary
whom they set up in the guise of a broker, and through whom
they demand that sales to them be made. But the positions of
buyer and seller are by nature adverse. . . . The relation of
the broker to his client is a fiduciary one. To collect from a
client for services rendered in the interest of a party adverse to
him, is a violation of that relationship; and to protect those who
deal in the streams of commerce against breaches of faith in its
relations of trust, is to foster confidence in its processes and pro-
mote its wholesomeness and volume." 182
180. Expensive services or those requiring a large store, such as the furnishing of
a demonstrator, present problems, however.
181. 15 U.S.C. § 13c (1946).
182. H.R. REP. No. 2287 (1936) 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15. SEN. REP. No.
1502, 74th Cong., 2d. Sess. 7 (1936) stated that a brokerage payment would lead
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Here again the Robinson-Patman Act continued what the NRA
Codes had started. The Code of Fair Competition for the Wholesale
Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Distribution Industry " provided that "no
person shall accept compensation from both buyer and seller nor repre-
sent buyer and seller in the same transaction . . . without the knowl-
edge and consent of both buyer and seller"; the Code also prohibited
the payment of brokerage by the seller to an agent of the buyer. The
Secretary of the National League of Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vege-
table Distributors urged the House Committee which considered the
Robinson-Patman Act to revive and perpetuate this Code provision.
Said he:
"During the present depression by virtue of the large volume
required for chain outlets, it has been an easy matter to get hard-
pressed shippers and producers to acquiesce in an arrangement
which imposed on them a brokerage fee on cars bought for the
chain retail stores. This has been an exploitation of the shippers'
and producers' necessities, the more insidious because, on the face
of the transaction, it carries the consent of the seller. This is,
as we see it, exactly the type of unfair trade practice which.,..
ought to be eliminated. It presents a case wherein an agency pri-
marily interested in retail selling exacts tribute from producers
in the first instance, and by virtue of the revenues obtained through
these exactions is, in the second instance, able to reduce retail
prices when and where such a reduction gives it a competitive
advantage.
"To carry the chain of effects a step further, the low retail
price of the chain store must be met by the independent com-
petitor. The competitor puts pressure on the wholesaler and
insists on buying at a wholesale price that will enable him td sell
at retail prices as low as his chain competitor. The result is a
depression of wholesale prices, with the tendency of all whole-
sale prices in the competitive market to drop at least the margin
of the tribute exacted by the chain-interest buyer in the first in-
stance when he required the shipper or producer to pay a selling
brokerage." 184
to corruption of the brokers' function and should not be permitted "where in fact, if
a 'broker', so labeled, enters the picture at all, it is one whom the buyer points out to
the seller, rather than one who brings the buyer to the seller." As to the section and
its operation see Austern, Section 2(c), ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYmPosIUm, op. cit.
supra note 127, at 37, 38. See also 54 HARV. L. REv. 670, 673 (1941) ; 47 YALE L.J.
1207 (1938).
183. NRA CoDES OF FAIR COMPETITION, art. VII, § 2 (1934).
184. Hearings, supra note 3, at 77, 78. The same witness also explained the
problems of the fresh frtit and vegetable field as follows: "(a) Wholesale handlers
in a given market, either individually or collectively, may set up a brokerage agency
through which they do their buying. The shipper or producer finds that in order to
sell in this market or to these wholesalers they must deal through the brokerage
agency and pay a selling brokerage fee. (b) Wholesale handlers, having an interest
in retail outlets for which they in fact buy, interpose a brokerage agency between the
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For obvious reasons, the National Food Brokers' Association was
even more emphatic in its demand for what is now Section 2(c). Its
members feared that if manufacturers were permitted to continue their
practice of paying brokerage to buyers or to agents of buyers, the
independent food broker would be "starved out of existence" and with
him would go thousands of small manufacturers who depend on the
independent broker as their only sales organization.'8 5 The Association
specifically opposed the suggestion that brokerage should be defined on
a "functional basis." Such a treatment of the problem would pre-
sumably sanction the payment of brokerage to wholly owned subsidi-
aries of corporate chain buyers. Since the parent would get the benefit
of the brokerage payment, the functional approach would defeat the
very purpose of prohibiting the payment of brokerage to the buyer,
directly or indirectly.8'8 The Association argued that
". .. when a creature of the buyer disguised in a broker's
clothing approaches the seller, the seller knows who he is. This
creature has back of him the coercive power of mass buying.
The rebate, called brokerage, is merely a poor attempt to make it
look legitimate because it is called by a legitimate name. A de-
ceptive practice such as this should be stamped out whether prac-
ticed by the small or the large. It is our conviction that this
form of unfair discrimination lends itself more than any other to
rackets . . . and any law which does not prohibit it . . .
would be the loophole through which all price discrimination could
pass." 187
shipper or seller and the wholesale agency. The brokerage agency collects from the
shipper or seller a selling brokerage fee. (c) Large retail interests organize a sub-
sidiary brokerage agency, which in fact buys for the parent retail interest but charges
the shipper or seller a brokerage fee.-Each of these arrangements is calculated to
exploit the producer and shipper by exacting tribute under the guise of a selling
brokerage and to give the beneficiaries of this revenue a competitive price advantage
by the amount of the brokerage fee." Id. at 76.
185. Id. at 65. The Association declared that the payment of brokerage to the
buyer is "particularly vicious and insidious" because the concession to the buyer is
usually given secretly; ostensibly the buyer pays the full list price.
186. Hearings, supra note 151, at 511, 512.
187. Id. at 513. The draftsman of the Act, Mr. Teegarden, emphasized that the
bill leaves anyone free to select his broker or to dispense with his services, but that
"it would meet the evil were large buyers to let it be known to manufacturers that
they will not purchase except through their own subsidiary brokerage concerns.
Brokerage . . . is a distinct economic function in itself. Every seller faces the
problem of finding a market. Every buyer faces the problem of finding a source of
supply. Either of them can do it by maintaining their own selling or their own buying
departments with a consequent cost; or, if they find it more economical, they can
engage a private independent contractor who makes it a business to keep his con-
tracts with various sources of supply in various markets. And where that function is
performed, brokerage is proper. But where A & P or another firm comes up to a
manufacturer's door and says, 'Here I am, a large buyer,' that manufacturer does not
need to engage a broker to find him a market. The brokerage function is not present
there. And when A & P says 'I will buy from you if you sell me through my
brokerage concern and pay the brokerage which I will drain off in dividends,' the
brokerage function is being prostituted for the reaping of an unfair price conces-
sion. . . . That is the evil which this brokerage clause would prohibit." Hearings,
supra note 3, at 217, 218.
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The legislative history clearly indicates that A & P was deemed to
be the principal target of the brokerage provision. A & P had since
1923 operated brokerage offices through salaried purchasing agents
who, prior to 1936, were often called "brokers"; these offices were
located "in the center of the sources of supply of processed foods-
mostly canned goods that were customarily sold through brokers." 188
They collected large brokerage fees from their suppliers on articles
not sold on a list price basis, that is, merchandise which does not bear
some nationally known and advertised brand.8 9  These brokerage fees,
which in the year preceding the enactment of the Robinson-Patman Act
amounted to $2,500,000,'0 were collected by A & P on the theory
that its agents rendered substantial services to the sellers-such as ex-
change of information as to market conditions, advice as to improve-
ment of quality and sizes of containers, furnishing of traffic informa-
tion as to the routing of commodities, and assistance in relieving threat-
ened gluts of commodities, which were similar to the services cus-
tomarily rendered by brokers."9 '
A & P encountered its first difficulty in 1932 when the Institute
of American Meat Packers objected to the collection of 1%o brokerage
on meat products by an A & P buyer. The Institute's Committee on
Interpretation and Appeal declared in an opinion that this practice was
a violation of the Code of Trade Practices of the American Meat Pack-
ing Industry '92 and the Secretary of Agriculture, pursuant to the
Packers and Stockyards Act, 93 issued a cease and desist order against
the seller who had paid the brokerage to A & P's agent.
94
188. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 38.
189. Id. at 38, 39.
190. Id. at 38.
191. Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667, 670 (3rd Cir. 1939).
192. The Committee said: "The payment of an allowance by a packer to a buyer,
either secretly or without making the same payment to all other buyers of similar
quantities under similar conditions is a violation of Rules A and C of the Code. The
calling of such special allowance a 'brokerage' would not prevent the special allowance
from being a violation of the Code, but on the contrary where the subterfuge of
'brokerage' was used as a means of obscuring the price, the payment may also be
brought under Rule B of the Code. . . . The real test of whether a special allow-
ance is in fact a brokerage or is a disguised form of rebate and concession to the
buyer depends upon the fact of whether the payment is retained by an independent
broker or directly or indirectly reaches the buyer himself. The creation of any
agency to receive the so-called 'brokerage', or even the organization of an inde-
pendent company for that purpose, would not alter the situation if the agent actually
received the money for the buyer as his principal, or if the corporation were owned
and controlled by the buyer." A & P Br. App., v. II, pp. 42, 43.
193. 7 U.S.C. § 181 et seq. (1946). Section 192 makes it unlawful for any packer
or live poultry dealer to "engage in or use any unfair, unjustly discriminatory, or de-
ceptive practice or device in commerce." Section 193 establishes the procedure before
the Secretary of Agriculture for suppressing violations of the Act.
194. The order was upheld in Trunz Pork Stores, Inc. v. Wallace, 70 F.2d 688
(2d Cir. 1934).
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
With respect to all products other than meat A & P continued its
practice of collecting brokerage until the enactment of the Robinson-
Patman Act in June 1936. At that time the Company's brokerage
offices were notified by Headquarters "in an informal sort of way"
that "hereafter they would remain in operation, but they would be
known as the company's field buying offices. They would remain as
buyer, but not as broker." ' Simultaneously, the Company decided
to switch to what it called "net buying." Mr. Charles W. Parr, in
charge of all field buying offices, explained that
4(.. . when the Robinson-Patman Act became effective,
we discontinued the entire brokerage set-up and changed our whole
system of bookkeeping, but we told the field buyers, who had
been operating on the brokerage basis that it would be satisfactory
for them to buy merchandise at the lowest possible price; that
they must not accept any brokerage. As far as we know, they
have dealt with the suppliers on that basis. We had no access
to the suppliers' books, so we don't know what they sold others-
we didn't know what they were paying; . . ." 6
In a letter to the field personnel dated July 7, 1936 Mr. Parr advised:
"Pending a more definite interpretation of the brokerage
clause . . . it has been felt advisable on purchases where it has
been customary for us to receive brokerage, to put these on a net
basis. . . . We find in practically all cases . . . that the seller
is willing to reflect the amount of brokerage in the price. There-
fore, it becomes important to notify the Sales Department in each
unit to take this into consideration in making retail prices and
arriving at gross profit rates, and point out that instead of the
usual brokerage credits which are distributed from Headquarters
it will be necessary to maintain a correspondingly higher gross
profit rate. . . . Take Feed for instance. Assume that we have
been buying this at $40.00 per ton on which we receive 5%
brokerage. The new price will come through at $38.00 per ton,
but the warehouse will not get a brokerage credit. , "197
One of the Field Office heads replied:
"This is going to be quite a problem as many of the canners
are of the opinion that they cannot quote us a price taking into
consideration the brokerage. However, a great many of the ac-
counts . . . agreed upon this method, while others were of the
opposite opinion.. Where canners or processors refuse to
195. A & P Tr., v. 2, p. 270. Strict instructions were given not to use the term
"broker" under any circumstances. A & P Br. App., v. II, p 66..
196. A & P Tr., v. 3, pp. 285, 286; A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 62. Emphasis
added.
197. A & P Tr., v. 3, pp. 288, 289; A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 63.
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deduct the amount of the brokerage from his unit price we will
just have to pay the market until such time as we can get around
this phase of the bill in some other method.'98
The Defendant Vogt, in charge of the Milwaukee buying office, re-
ported to Headquarters on August 21, 1936:
"Now taking the canned goods line, there are no small num-
ber of sellers doing business with us on a net basis and not a few
times this net basis is even lower than the brokerage where the
order has favorable terms and a fair sized quantity. Most impor-
tant, they are not making the sales to other people and as you
might surmise in not a few cases they are not inclined and often
do not have the time to offer the same proposition to our com-
petitors. However, they do feel if ever they are called upon to
substantiate their position they will have no trouble in doing it by
using the excuse of market fluctuations and difference in quality
and on both these points quite sure you will concur with us it is
going to take half the population of the United States to police
anything of this kind." '
Apparently in accordance with this suggestion, all orders to sup-
pliers were to be stamped with the following notation:
"This order is given and to be accepted with the understand-
ing that the prices herein named, having in mind market fluctua-
tions and conditions, will be accorded to all purchasers on propor-
tionately equal terms." 2'
This notation was recommended by counsel as assuring "prima facie
protection . . . in the event of an unwitting violation of the Robin-
son-Patman Act." 201 Some sellers who refused the discount in lieu of
brokerage were subjected to considerable pressure. For instance, in
September, 1936, Vogt instructed his staff in the Milwaukee Field
Buying Office that suppliers who refused to sell on a net basis should
not be given any business except with his approval; 202 when Phillips
198. A & P Tr., v. 11, p. 2053; Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 236. Emphasis added.
Some suppliers agreed to hold the brokerage for A & P "until our Headquarters
officials figure out a practical method for, this to be paid legally." A & P Br. App.,
v. II, p. 69.
199. A & P Tr., v. 11, pp. 2096, 2097; Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 236, 237. Emphasis
added. In another letter Defendant Vogt stated: "The list price and trade discounts
[on powdered summer drinks] are well established, therefore, these manufacturers
are unwilling to change this. Therefore, we are issuing contracts and sellers in turn
billing at the list price less the trade discount and then less 5% without saying what
it is, although seller, buyer, and ourselves kitow it is the foriner brokerage." Emphasis
supplied. A & P Tr., v. 11, pp. 2070, 2071; Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 238.
200. A & P Br. App., v II, p 76; Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 242.
201. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 76.
202. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 69.
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Packing Company agreed to net pricing after refusing any allowances
for several weeks, Headquarters commented that this change of mind
was due to the fact that Phillips Packing had been cut out entirely and
that "there is nothing which brings the manufacturer around like
putting him on the bench." " When Stokely Brothers, a prominent
canner, announced that it would cease paying any brokerage, Parr
wrote to Vogt that any canner who declines either to work on a net
basis or to pay brokerage in escrow into a neutral depository pending
clarification of the brokerage provision should "be placed on the Un-
satisfactory List." 204
Several important economic arguments were asserted in justifica-
tion of A & P's position. Perhaps the strongest of these is well ex-
pressed in a letter written from Headquarters in September, 1936, to
the Rochester buying office regarding the relationship with a supplier
of oysters; in that letter Mr. Parr stated that, until clarification of the
brokerage clause, brokerage could not be accepted even though the
seller might agree to allow it, but
"... it does seem to us . . . that since they are in a posi-
tion to sell these oysters direct to you without having to employ
an outside broker, they actually save the amount of brokerage
in their selling expense, and they should be willing to reflect this
brokerage rate in the billing price of the merchandise." 205
In other words, the Company contended that since sellers who use
brokers must pay them commissions, the seller saves the cost of broker-
age when dealing with A & P after its agents have sought him out;
and this saving should properly be reflected in the price charged to
A & P. The proviso in Section 2(a) specifically allowing price dif-
ferentials making due allowance for differences in selling cost should
thus be read into Section 2(c). The same argument was vigorously
presented in the House hearings on the Robinson-Patman bill by a
representative of American Stores, fourth largest food chain on the
basis of its 1948 sales, who opposed the bill on the ground that it
would interfere with the policy of purchasing directly from the producer
and of "eliminating all possible and unnecessary intermediate ex-
203. A & P Tr., v. 11, pp. 2123, 2124; Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 244.
204. A & P Tr., v. 12, p. 2159; Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 245. Defendant Bofinger
denied on the witness stand that any supplier ever was put on an unsatisfactory list
for refusing to grant allowances, discounts, or preferences of any kind. A & P
Tr., v. 88, p. 20335; A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 70. A considerable amount of broker-
age was actually deposited in escrow accounts and refunded to the suppliers after a
cease-and-desist order by the Federal Trade Commission had been sustained by the
Courts note 209 infra). Id., v. II, pp. 76, 77.
205. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 75.
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pense." 11 To the same effect was the testimony of a vegetable grower
in Pennsylvania whose direct sales to chains amounted to 2/5 of his
total sales. He said that the chains performed exactly the same service
for him as independent brokers, and that even with the deduction of
brokerage the net prices paid to him by the chains were higher than
his net returns obtained from sales to independents.
20 7
A & P's interpretation of the brokerage clause was rejected by
the Federal Trade Commission, which issued in January, 1938, a cease
and desist order requiring the Company to cease making purchases
of commodities "at a so-called net price, and every other price, which
. . . is arrived at . . by deducting from the prices at which
sellers are selling said commodities to other purchasers thereof any
amount representing . . brokerage currently being paid by sellers
to their brokers on sales of said commodities made for said sellers by
. . their said brokers." 2oI On appeal the courts sustained the Com-
mission's interpretation that Section 2(c) was intended as a separate
and absolute prohibition of an inherently unfair practice and that the
other provisions of the Act were not applicable to the situation covered
by that Section. 09 As a result of this holding, not only are brokerage
allowances intended as camouflage for rebates prohibited, but all such
allowances are illegal per se, regardless of the rendition of services to
the seller equivalent to those customarily performed by brokers and
regardless of the saving of the customary compensation to independent
brokers. In this respect the Act designed to eliminate discrimination
in favor of chain buyers forces them to pay prices which often include
an element of selling costs not in fact incurred by their suppliers. By
the same token, the provision secures a higher net return to sellers on
direct sales to chains than on sales to other customers where the
seller must rely on brokers.2 10 While the provision affords some pro-
tection to the business of the independent broker and the merchant who
buys through him by prohibiting the collection of brokerage by chain
buyers and the consequent lowering of their costs,211 it also tends to
impose on the consumer the cost of marketing through brokers even
when brokers are not needed and to make more difficult the lowering
206. Hearings, stpra note 3, at 148, 149, 152.
207. Id. at 123.
208. Great A & P Tea Co., 26 FTC 486, 513 (1938).
209. Great A & P Tea Co. v. FTC, 106 F.2d 667 (3rd Cir. 1939), cert. denied,
,,8 U.S. 525 (1. 0).
210. See McNair, Marketing Functions and Costs under the Robinson-Patinan
Act, 4 LAW & CONMIP. PROB. 334, 344, 345, (1937).
211. According to Business Week, August 10, 1940, p. 36, col. 1, enforcement of
the Robinson-Patman Act has improved the position of brokers; the National Food
Brokers Association estimated an increase in gross earnings of members in 1939
ranging from 2% to 25%o over 1938.
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of consumer prices."' It would seem that this was precisely what
its sponsors desired. 13
Although the brokerage provision was intended as a weapon
against corporate chains, its terms are, of course, not limited to such
chains. 1 ' It has, in fact, been repeatedly invoked against voluntary
and cooperative chains which, as we have seen, were organized by
independents for the purpose of meeting the competition of the cor-
porate chains.2 15  One of the leaders among these cooperatives, the
Red & White Corporation, described in some detail in Chapter II of
this study, formerly furnished advertising and promotional services to
its stockholders and their affiliated retail stores; the cost of such serv-
ices was defrayed from funds derived from brokerage fees paid by
sellers upon purchases made by Red & White for the account of its
stockholders. These funds helped to increase consumer demand for
products sold under the Red & White label and, to that extent, benefited
the manufacturers who regularly supplied the Red & White Corpora-
tion. Red & White was directed by the Federal Trade Commission to
cease and desist from accepting brokerage fees from its suppliers.
216
Thus the Act's protection to the food broker as an independent business-
212. Austern, supra note 182, at 46, comments: "One may wonder whether the
ultimate economic results will be sound; whether the forced election between being a
broker or a buyer was necessary; whether driving sellers to elect entirely to use
brokers or entirely to sell direct promotes competition; whether the ultimate effect
may not be to divert large buyers into their own manufacturing operations; and
whether, since any discount is an element in price, the consumer is not bearing the
cost of protecting one type of distribution." See also Oppenheim, Administration of
the Brokerage Provision of the Robinson-Patman Act, 8 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 511,
536-538 (1940).
213. See text at notes 184-187 .upra.
214. Although the Robinson-Patman Act was enacted for the sole purpose of curb-
ing the abuses of buying power by the chains, the term "chain" does not appear in the
Act which is so framed as to apply to all business in interstate commerce.
215. Section 4 of the Robinson-Patman Act provides that "nothing in this Act
shall prevent a cooperative association from returning to its members, producers or
consumers the whole, or in any part of, the net earnings or surplus resulting from
its trading operations, in proportion to their purchases or sales from, to, or through
the Association." It was held in Quality Bakers of America v. FTC, 114 F.2d 393,
400 (1st Cir. 1940) that § 4 does not authorize a cooperative association of 70 whole-
sale bakers to accept for the benefit of its members brokerage fees and allowances
from sellers of flour; §2(c) was said to be "a distinct and complete provision in
itself making illegal the giving or taking of commissions or their equivalent."
216. Red & White Corp. v. FTC, Modern Marketing Service v. FTC, 149 F.2d
970 (7th Cir. 1945). For criticism of Section 2(c) of the Act see Oppenheim,
Should the Robinson-Pat-man Act be Amended? ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT SYM-
PosIUM op. cit. sopra note 132, at 141, 145-147. Professor Oppenheim says on p. 145:
"In retrospect, it seems clear that Congress intended to strike at the evils of rebates
in prices through bogus brokerage, special discounts disguised as advertising allow-
ances, and fictitious services and facilities. Congress should have drafted subsections
(c), (d) and (e) in terms of clear-cut negative prohibitions of these specific abuses
which all sides agreed should be eliminated. Instead, Congress ineptly used language
of such scope and vague tenor as to create the danger that the baby will be thrown
out with the bathwater."
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man and as an integral part of the old-line "multiple middlemen sys-
tem" was emphasized. 17
After A & P had lost its legal battle against the Federal Trade
Commission concerning Section 2(c),218 it devised a new scheme to
assure for itself the lowest possible buying prices from its suppliers.
It decided "to move in an orderly fashion toward procuring our sup-
plies of merchandise through sellers who do not employ brokers. This
would remove the hazards of the Federal Trade Commission, or any
other body, interpreting a lower legal price which we might pay for
an article as one in which was reflected the customary brokerage
,, 219 Accordingly, each field buyer and purchasing director was
required to send to his suppliers a letter outlining the Company's pro-
gram of compliance with the decree enforcing the cease and desist order
in the following terms:
"The decree provides, in substance, that the Company may
not purchase at any price, nor receive any discount or allowance,
which reflects in whole or in part brokerage concurrently being
paid by sellers on their sales to other buyers through brokers.
It does not prohibit the Company from receiving from sellers
prices, discounts or allowances reflecting savings OTHER THAN
BROKERAGE. Thus, savings resulting from the large quantities
which this Company purchases may still legitimately be passed
along by sellers to the Company, as may also savings in the cost
of handling, billing, labelling, shipping, credit, rejections, delivery,
manufacture, telephone, telegraph, salesmen's commissions, salaries
and travel, samples, and similar items..
"Because the . . . decree applies solely to brokerage sav-
ings, it does not affect the Company's dealings with exclusively
direct sellers who use no brokers. A number of sellers, for exam-
217. Business Week, Aug. 10, 1940, p. 34, col. 2, said with respect to § 2(c)
that "food brokers thought that provision of the law would be the salvation of their
business, and they hailed with particular satisfaction the . .. ruling which finally
compelled the A & P to forego brokerage kickbacks."
218. See note 209 supra; the cease and desist order became effective in January,
1940, when the Supreme Court denied A & P's petition for certiorari.
219. From memorandum of staff conference in New York, Jan. 31 and Feb.
1, 1940, A & P Br. App., v. II, pp. 81, 82. A & P's "Manual on the Robinson-
Patman Act" stated that "in order to minimize the possibility of violating the decree
the Company will endeavor to purchase as much as possible from sellers who use no
brokers at all in preference to sellers who use brokers." Id. at 85. The Manual
also stated that savings in salesmen's commissions, unlike savings in brokers' com-
missions, may still be passed along to the buyer; the difference between a broker
and a salesman was defined as follows: "The chief difference is that a salesman
is an employee of the seller while a broker is an independent businessman. The de-
tails of a salesman's activities would be subject to the control of the seller while
those of a broker would not. Social security and applicable unemployment compensa-
tion taxes would be paid by the seller on the income of a salesman but not on that of
a broker. A salesman would share in any sickness, accident or retirement benefits
offered generally by the seller to his employees, while a broker would not . .
A & P Tr., v. 79, pp. N and 0 following p. 18,065.
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ple, sell to their small accounts entirely through their own staffs of
salesmen. On sales to this company through its field buying offices
where no salesmen are needed, such sellers realize substantial sav-
ings in cost which they are free to pass along to the Company.
Sellers who handle their small accounts through brokers, however,
are prevented from giving the Company one of the most impor-
tant savings in cost which they experience in using the Company's
field offices, namely, the saving in brokerage..
"Since this Company's interest is to purchase its goods at the
lowest price permitted by law, so that it may in turn sell at rea-
sonable prices to the consumer, it will purchase as much as possible
from sellers who use no brokers in preference to sellers who use
them. The Company will not, however, enter into any express
or implied contract with any seller binding the seller directly or
indirectly to cease dealing through brokers, or agreeing to deal
or refrain from dealing with any seller depending upon whether
or not he uses brokers. The Company simply takes this occa-
sion to announce its purchasing preference, leaving each seller
free to conduct his business as he pleases." 220
The last paragraph of this circular letter was designed to avoid "trouble
with the Department of Justice" and "triple damage suits by brokers"'22 '
under the Sherman Act.
We shall see later that, in spite of the advice of caution from its
lawyers, A & P was not successful in avoiding the charge of boycott,
coercion, and restraint of trade in connection with its policy of switch-
ing to direct-selling suppliers. In any event, A & P was aware that,
by embarking on that policy, it moved away from the Scylla of the
Robinson-Patman Act only to approach the Charybdis of the Sherman
Act. Regardless of its legality under the circumstances, the Company's
course of action suggests weaknesses in the Robinson-Patman Act as
an instrument for the protection of small business. Foreseeing the
precise tendencies thus evidenced, a minority of the House Judiciary
Committee had opposed adoption of the Act on the ground that the
result "would absolutely be a development of a few manufacturers
specializing in quantity orders and thereby growing into a position to
220. A & P Br. App., v. II, pp. 91, 92. The Company's legal department laid
down the following rules: "(1) Under no circumstances enter into any agreement
or contract, either oral or in writing, with any seller whereby he agrees to eliminate
brokers from his distributing set-up. (2) Send immediately to Headquarters
any letter received from a seller relating to the question of eliminating brokers, so that
the same can be checked by the Legal Department. If the seller makes any statements
such as 'I promise to eliminate brokers, provided the A & P will assure me of its
business' or statements of similar import, we must take immediate steps to tell
him that we are not entering into contracts on this subject with anyone. (3) In talking
to sellers about going on an exclusively direct-selling basis, confine your statements
to a simple explanation of the Company's policy ... " Id. at 104.
221. Id. at 105.
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be able to deliver to mass distributors their products constantly more
cheaply. Not only would their competitors fall by the wayside by the
score, but the small merchant would be faced by stiffer and stiffer com-
petition until he too might be driven out of business, because he would
have to place his orders with those manufacturers who had elected to
handle small-lot business, and who would accordingly have higher
operating costs. . " 222 Four years later, after its defeat in its legal
battle with the Federal Trade Commission, A & P voiced the similar
expectation that "with exclusively direct selling and selling through
brokers, two price levels will develop of which the direct will average
lower. . . Therefore, apart from any interest our company may
have, it seems obvious that all capable buyers will seek the lower
level." 22 Another Company official predicted that "the difference be-
tween the two [price levels] will be considerably more than the
brokerage rate itself, because the direct sellers are going to save and
be able to pass on to their customers a great deal more than mere
brokerage. In addition to the brokerage differential, exclusively direct
sellers will have for their customers only large concerns who buy in
quantity lots, pay promptly, and immediately put the merchandise
into consumption." 224 ,Although the accuracy of this prediction is
doubtful, 2 5 it would seem that Section 2(c) could not eliminate all
bargaining advantages of large buyers, especially their ability to enter
into processing for themselves.
3. Price Discrimination Generally
As noted above, the general prohibition in Section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act against price discrimination which threatens
competition was deemed necessary by the sponsors of the Act to enable
independent buyers to compete with large chain buyers on a basis of
equal opportunities. At the beginning of the hearings before the House
Judiciary Committee Representative Patman stated that, while he was
in favor of competition "on services and prices," the manufacturer
should not be allowed "to sell to the corporate chain at a loss and make
the independent pay such a price that he has to pay that loss and at
the same time meet the competition with the chain." 226 This has
222. H.R. RE. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, 17 (1936).
223. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 261; A & P Tr., v. 28, pp. 5848, 5849.
224. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 261; A & P Tr., v. 28, p. 5850.
225. See Business Week, supra note 211. At that time the National Food Brokers
Association reported that less than 50 of the 3,500 fruit and vegetable canners of the
country had shifted to some form of direct selling as a result of A & P's policy.
226. Hearings, supra note 3, at 11. Mr. Patman also stated that manufacturers
are "coerced, intimidated" into giving special prices to A & P and Kroger and "in-
dependents have got to make it up by paying higher prices." Id. at 194.
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been called the theory of "necessary recoupment"; in brief, that selling
to Buyer A at a lower price than to Buyer B requires the seller to
raise the price to the latter in order to recoup the loss or the reduction
in profits which is incurred in selling to the former unless the differ-
ence in price reflects only actual cost savings. Although the theory
is questionable, 2 7 the Government's successful prosecution of A & P
for violation of the Sherman Act and its pending civil suit against that
company are, in part, based on this very same charge of recoupment; 228
in launching the civil suit aimed at the break-up of A & P the Attorney-
General stated that such a break-up would benefit the public by lowering
prices because A & P's practices "increase the cost of groceries in com-
peting stores and in other areas, since such grocers must pay a higher
price than would be the case if A & P did not buy on discriminatory
terms." 229
By permitting price differentials based on actual cost savings Sec-
tion 2(a) makes cost one of the standards by which the legality of
prices is to be determined." 0 The tremendous difficulties of determin-
ing "cost" for any given transaction will be discussed later in Chapter
VI of this study."' It should be noted, moreover, that, especially over
short periods, prices are determined by factors of supply and demand
which have little relation to cost. It has been said that in a buyer's
market, for instance, prevention of discriminatory price reductions
may impair "the entire process of price competition." 232 Hence, en-
227. For criticism of the theory see Adelman, Effective Competition and the
Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARv. L. Rv. 1289, 1331 (1948). The basic question is whether
a supplier of a chain at reduced prices can actually raise prices to other buyers in
a competitive market.
228. "A & P not only benefits by discriminatory lower purchase price, but the
supplier giving the preference must charge A & P's retail competitor a price
sufficiently higher than would otherwise be the case to absorb the loss or reduction
in profit incident to his sales to A & P." Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 1075. See Adelman,
"The A & P Case, A Study in Applied Economic Theory," 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238, 251,
252 (1949). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in affirming the convic-
tion of A & P said: ". . . [T]he supplier had to make his profit out of his other
customers at higher prices, which were passed on to the competition A & P met in
the retail field." A & P case, 173 F.2d at 83.
229. Department of Justice Press Release, September 15, 1949.
230. See Hamilton, Cost as a Standard for Price, 4 LAW & CONTEMAL. PROB. 321
(1937). The provisions against price discrimination which cannot be justified by
cost differences first appeared in the NRA Codes for the wholesale and retail grocery
trades. See note 143 mtpra.
231. See Hamilton, supra note 230; Camman, Relation of Costs to the Deternzina-
tion of Selling Prices, 66 J. ACCOUNTANCY 7, 14 (1938): "The cost of a specific
transaction involving a particular lot of a certain manufactured product cannot be
computed with precision, because too many elements of cost remain fixed and do not
vary with volume. Even assuming a reasonable presumption as to volume, there would
remain debatable questions about the allocation of indirect costs as between different
products or different ventures."
232. EDWARDS, MAINTAINING COmm'ETITIOx, REQUISITES OF A GOVERNMENTAL
POLICY 162 (1949).
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
actment of the Robinson-Patman law was opposed by many who feared
that it would lead to rigid and higher, instead of lower, prices; 23
indeed, Representative Celler of New York, in the minority Commit-
tee report, objected to the bill on the ground that "it would try to
make equals of unequals" and that it was "as natural as the setting
sun . . to sell more cheaply to the large buyer than to the smaller
one." He contended that this saving, commonly called "quantity dis-
count," would be so restricted as to become valueless and favored legis-
lation directed only at unfair or predatory practices "so long as the
consumer is not made the victim." "
The business advantage of selling to large-scale buyers was said,
from the seller's point of view, to be obvious even without regard to
specific cost savings, because "a steady, large order, particularly an
advance order, often pays the freight for thousands of small orders." 235
For instance, the president of a Pennsylvania farmers' cooperative serv-
ing both chains and independents told the House Committee during
the Hearings on the Robinson-Patman bill:
"I might say that of the two systems of marketing, the inde-
pendent stores and the chain stores . . . there is no question but
what the chain-store system . . . is the best for us. We sell
through one organization. We send our bill in there for all of
their stores, into one office, and we get a check from them six days
after we send the bill in there. It is a cash business. And it is a
real market for our milk products." 236
When asked whether he was not interested in preserving the inde-
pendent dealer, the same witness replied that he was interested in "the
system that will provide the lowest cost of distribution and move the
most farm products." 23
Another advantage of supplying large-scale buyers which is par-
ticularly pertinent to the food chain store problem was described by
233. See, for instance, testimony by Professor McNair of the Harvard Business
School, Hearings, sqpra note 4, at 2-15, and Charles G. Daughters, Institute of Dis-
tribution, id. at 75-84. Professor Isaacs of the same School observed that "this is
an act to check competition-the competition of the stronger buyer. . . ." Id. at 29.
Mr. Wheeler Sammons, Institute of Distribution, declared that "the tremendous
,ground swell of animosity toward large business regardless of whether or not it was
serving by supplying sadly needed price economies," originated in the depression;
when the NRA "suggested that by law something could be done to put up prices, in-
stead of letting the free flow of competition fix them, the seed was sown from which
has germinated the pressure" for this law. Id. at 23. As to the NRA Codes see
note 143 supra. Professor Nystrom of Columbia University testified that "the purpose
of the lobby behind this bill is . . . to subsidize a small group of middlemen at
the expense of the consumer." Id. at 139.
234. H.R. RF,. No. 2287, 74th Cong. 2d Sess. 5, 12 (1936).
235. Hearings, supra note 3, pt. 2, 408 (testimony by a representative of the In-
stitute of Distribution).
236. Hearings, supra note 3, at 126.
237. Id. at 127. See also Hearings, supra note 40, v. II, 145.
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Dr. Julius Klein, Business Consultant, in his testimony before the
Patman Committee, as follows:
"One of the important elements from the point of view of the
manufacturer, is not simply that he can make arrangements, for
instance, with his bank for a much larger volume of credit if he
can show an order for a million dollars; but more particularly it
assures him of an evenness of operation over a long period of time,
because he does not have to worry about getting the next order
and the next order from a hundred little stores. He has this one
order, so that he can continue his operations very steadily; and
one of the important things in business is to be relieved of these
violent gyrations . . . that make business seasick." 28
The advantage of this "evenness of operation" can probably not be
translated into dollars and cents with any degree of accuracy; " never-
theless, it is substantial. On the other hand, reliance on a large-scale
customer makes the supplier vulnerable because such a customer may
abuse the exclusive relationship by extorting price concessions under
the threat of withdrawal of patronage.24° This tactic, coupled with the
threat of starting manufacture of the supplier's article, was one of the
charges on iWhich A & P was convicted under the Sherman Act.
24 '
The possibility of such abuse was discussed in the hearings before the
Patman Committee investigating the trade practices of big-scale retail
and wholesale buying and selling organizations in the following colloquy
between the late Representative Bloom and an officer of the National
Chain Store Association:
"Mr. Bloom: Suppose you have this . . . factory where
they are producing two-thirds of their capacity and the chain store
comes along and says, 'I will take one-third of your entire output
at a special price,' at which the manufacturer can make some profit.
The next year the chain store says to the manufacturer, 'you have
got to sell to me at a certain price.' The fellow has got the factory
and the overhead, and if he loses that one-third, he cannot then run
his factory.
"'Witness: Mr. Bloom, where the equation is as you have just
stated it, I know nothing in the world that is so despicable
238. Hearings, supra note 40, v. IV, 255. See also a statement by the National
Association of Manufacturers, Hearings, supra note 3, at 236, that "a company with
large orders can better anticipate its own demands and make purchases of its own
raw materials to greater advantage, thus justifying a lower price to its large cus-
tomers."
239. It has been said that under the Robinson-Patman Act "trial is to proceed
by the ordeal of cost accounting." Hamilton, supra note 230, at 323.
240. See testimony by Dr. Klein, Hearings, supra note 40 at 256. See also
Hearings, supra note 3, at 60 (testimony on behalf of National Food Brokers Associa-
tion).
241. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 82.
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as . . . where the . . . large purchaser attempts to drive the
manufacturer to the wall in such a manner." 242
Such actions may be distinguished at least in degree, from or-
dinary higgling and shopping around by sellers and buyers. This proc-
ess was described by a grower of vegetables in the, hearings on the
Robinson-Patman Act; he said that his price "can vary within fifteen
minutes, depending upon the reaction that I get from our responses
from the markets. . . . We may deliberately at the same time quote
an f.o.b. price in selling beans at our place, with a different price to a
Chicago dealer, a Detroit dealer, or a Cincinnati dealer, my price being
governed by my own judgment of how high I think we can sell in
those individual markets." 243 Surely, this is price discrimination which
may not be justifiable in terms of cost savings; but it does not seem
to involve any recoupment of the type described above. Conceivably,
large-scale buyers may proceed similarly.
Perhaps the crucial problem of discrimination under the Robinson-
Patman Act is presented by the provision of Section 2 (a) which makes
discrimination illegal only "where the effect of such discrimination may
be substantially to lessen competition . . . or to injure, destroy or
prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either
of them." The interests supporting the Act wish this to be interpreted
as including injury to a particular competitor,244 and this has evoked
the criticism that the Act safeguards competitors but not competition.245
Under such an interpretation any price variation not based on demon-
strable cost differences may be illegal; and the greatest possible limi-
tation is placed on the bargaining advantages of large buyers.246 Again,
this is precisely the result which the sponsors of the Act intended to
accomplish.
242. Hearings supra note 40, v. II, 145.
243. Hearings, mspra note 3, at 119. Emphasis added. The witness added that
"it would be utterly impossible . . . to handle our negotiations with all of our
various buyers or chain stores, and others, on a regulation which necessitates the same
price to all . . . because we have more to move than the high priced buyer could
possibly take. Yet it is to our interest to get the high price from that particular
buyer and sell the remainder for what we can get."
244. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 232 at 167, 168. See Hearings, supra note 3,
pt. 2, p. 461.
245. Adelman, .supra note 227, at 1334-1337, quoting FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 49 (1948).
246. EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 232, at 167. Edwards suggests (p. 168) that
"injury to competition should be defined as injury to the vitality of competition in the
market, not as injury to . . . a particular competitor, even though the power of large
buyers is somewhat less drastically reduced by such an interpretation." The criticism
of the Act on this score perhaps oversimplifies the issue, since there can be no compe-
tition without competitors.
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VI. STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS OF SALES BELOW COST
Under the Robinson-Patman Act price reductions to some but not
to all buyers must be justified by cost savings; otherwise-so runs the
theory-the loss of income from sales accompanied by price concessions
to favored buyers would have to be recouped from those buyers who
are not favored; or, if not this, the favored buyers would at least enjoy
an unjustified advantage over others.247  The problem of sales below
cost lurks in the background, although it is only an extreme form of
the evil aimed at. The NRA Codes for the retail and wholesale food
and grocery trades attacked it directly by a "loss limitation provision"
which declared the use of the so-called "loss-leader" to be an unfair
trade practice. 241 "Loss-leaders" were defined as "articles often sold
below cost to the merchant for the purpose of attracting trade." The
Retail Code declared specifically that "this practice results .
either in efforts by the merchant to make up the loss by charging more
than a reasonable profit for other articles, or else in driving the small
merchant with little capital out of legitimate business. It works back
against the producer of raw materials on farms and in industry and
against the labor so employed." The Retail Code defined cost as "in-
voice or replacement cost, whichever is lower, after deduction of all
legitimate trade discounts exclusive of cash discount for prompt pay-
ment." It also expressly permitted the retailer to sell an article "with-
out any profit to himself."
The last quoted provision indicates that the "loss-leader" is
merely one of a broader group of goods sold at marked-down prices.
Chain store people sometimes speak simply about "leaders" which are
particularly attractive because of their low price.249 The Federal
Trade Commission had defined "leaders" as "merchandise featured or
sold at reduced prices to attract buyers and thereby stimulate sales not
only of these leaders but also of other goods"; it explains that there are
thus two classes of leaders, those sold at less than the usual price but
still at a profit, and those which are sold at a loss; the "loss-leaders,"
in turn, are to be divided into those sold at less than net purchase cost
247. Professor Adelman has criticized the theory of necessary recoupment as
"illiterate" and pointed out that price reductions may come out of profits. Adelman,
supra note 227. But selling at different net profits would also be discriminatory under
the act.
248. NRA Codes of Fair Competition, v. IV, p. 466 (1934), and id., v. V, p. 11.
249. "The most desirable method of attracting sufficient attention to put the store
on a paying basis quickly is to have constant 'leaders' at savings to the housewife,
that are sure to make the new arrival talked about." BAXTER, CHAIN STOIR DisTRI-
BUTION AND MANAGEMENT 189 (1928). The FTC quoted the president of a grocery
and meat chain as follows "The extent to which prices are cut depends on competi-
tion, the necessity of introducing a commodity, the need for moving a line of goods,
and the desire to bring customers into the store." SEN. Doc. No. 4, 74th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39 (1936).
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
and those sold "below net purchase cost plus average cost of doing
business." 250
The agitation for "loss limitation provisions" which scored its
first victory in the NRA Codes originated with independents who
feared price cutting by the chains. The Federal Trade Commission
had reported "extensive use" by the chains of "loss-leader merchandise
sold at prices which are below the average cost of doing business plus
the cost of the merchandise and which are sometimes below the latter"
and had concluded that the ability of the chains to use loss leaders was
materially aided by their practice of averaging profits from stores in
various localities, "the low prices obtained in one or more areas being
offset by the higher prices obtained at one or more other points." 251
Subsequently, after the demise of the NRA, spokesmen for manu-
facturers and independent distributors discussed the problem of loss
leaders in the hearings on the Robinson-Patman bill. Mr. Charles W.
Dunn, counsel for the Associated Grocery Manufacturers of America,
urging that the death of the Blue Eagle had made a revision of the
Clayton Act imperative, pointed out that "the problem of unfair price
discrimination by sellers and of unfair 'loss-leader' selling by buyers is
a single and related problem in both its practical and legal conception."
He favored "an effective statutory prohibition of the latter unfair
practice along with the prohibition of the former," and he recommended
that the prohibition of loss leaders "should be confined to sales below
cost defined (in a distribution sense) to mean net invoice or replace-
ment cost, whichever is lower." Mr. Dunn felt that such a measure
"will practically enjoin unfair resale price cutting which is most hurt-
ful." 252 The business practices of the chains which provoked these
demands were described by a representative of the National League of
Wholesale Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Distributors, who told the fol-
lowing story:
"They [the chains] come into this market on strawberries,
a highly perishable commodity, and at the beginning of the season
you will understand it starts out with the luxury prices of 25 cents
a box. We will say there are enough consumers willing to pay
25 cents a box that will take fifty cars. When you get above fifty
cars in your supply, the 20 cents people will come in, and the price
will drop to 20 cents, and so on down until you get to the full
movement. Here is what happens: The chain-stores buy a couple
of cars of strawberries-it does not make any difference what they
pay for them-at the beginning of the season, and put them out
as leaders, or loss leaders, whatever you want to call them, we
250. Id. at 38-40.
251. Id. at 85, 86. See also id. at 40.
252. Hearings, supra note 3, at 145.
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will say, just to make the example startling, at two boxes for 25
cents. The independents in Washington have bought for that
day's supply on the wholesale market at a price that will require,
we will say, 20 cents a box to let them out. They go back to the
wholesale market the very next morning . . . it has happened
time and again-and there is a terrible howl. 'We took an awful
licking yesterday on strawberries. The chains sold two boxes for
25 cents; and you folks held up on the price where we had to sell
for 20 cents a box.' . . . The effect is there will immediately
be a telegram sent and that reduction is reflected right back to
the grower. Our interest in this thing is not altogether an un-
selfish one at all; we are in a way, as the middleman, taking the
gaff from both ends." 253
This witness advocated a curb on sales "at or below actual cost
with no consideration for the expense of handling," 254 thus enlarging
the application of the term "loss-leader" beyond that proposed by Mr.
Dunn and even beyond the NRA Code provisions. This, he said, was
necessary to avoid depression of wholesale prices and proportionate
reduction of cash returns to producers. In fact, he charged that the
chains and particularly A & P were deliberately depressing the
market. Apparently referring to the Atlantic Commission Company,
A & P's subsidiary in charge of buying fruits and vegetables, he stated
that "they buy the stuff for the A & P and then, instead of throwing
it to the A & P outlets, they throw it back on the market." 255 How-
ever, the Robinson-Patman Act as adopted did not deal directly with
the "loss-leader" problem except in a vague and practically ineffective
provision.
258
After the NRA was held unconstitutional, the National American
Wholesale Grocers' Association prepared uniform legislation for sub-
mission to the States, which was sponsored by the Food and Grocery
Conference Commission, an organization consisting of six wholesale
and retail groups. 2, 7  The authors of this bill agreed that loss leaders
should be curbed, particularly because they permit "giant" concerns
with "many chain outlets" to "subsidize a price cutting campaign in
one locality or at one time and, after forcing rivals to the wall, recoup
253. Id. at 73.
254. Id. at 76.
255. Id. at 72, 76, 79.
256. Section 3 of the Act (15 U.S.C. § 13a) prohibits the selling of goods "at
unreasonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor." In A. J. Goodman & Son v. United Lacquer Mfg. Corp., 81 F. Supp.
890 (Mass. 1949) the Court found that there was an unreasonably low price but that
there was no showing of injury. The finding as to the price is not substantiated in the
opinion.
257. Comment, The State Unfair Practices Acts, 32 IiL,. L. REv. 816, 846 (1938).
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from another territory or at another time." 258 The bill was enacted
with some variations in thirty-one states. 59
Two aspects of this legislation deserve emphasis: First, the
enormous difficulty in determining cost.260 This problem has been ex-
haustively treated by Professor Tannenbaum in a masterful study on
Costs under the Unfair Practices Acts; he observes that the dictionary
definition of cost as "the amount or equivalent paid . . . for any-
thing" would be comparatively easy to apply "if all costs were direct
costs, i. e., costs which were incurred directly for and chargeable
directly to specific cost units," but that even in the case of direct costs
the question arises as to whether raw materials or merchandise should
be valued "at cost, at market, at the lower of the preceding two, or in
some other manner." The real problem arises with respect to indirect
costs "which are incurred for the productive and for the distributive
processes as a whole, and which must be spread over the cost units in-
volved on some more or less arbitrary basis." 261
The statutes approach these problems in a variety of ways. As to
merchandise costs some specify the manufacturer's wholsale list price
as the cost base; others refer to cost of the commodity bought in the
open market plus freight to point of destination, invoice cost, or re-
placement cost.2 2  As to indirect costs, one statute simply requires
"the overhead expense of the distributor or vendor" to be added to
the cost base; others define "cost of doing business" or "overhead ex-
pense" as "all costs of doing business incurred in the conduct of such
business and must include without limitation the following items of
expense: labor (including salaries of executives and officers), rent,
interest on borrowed capital, depreciation, selling cost, maintenance of
equipment, delivery costs, credit losses, all types of licenses, taxes, in-
surance and advertising." 263 Some statutes add to this catalogue such
further items as maintenance of equipment and light, heat, power and
water.2 64
The job of allocating all these items to every loaf of bread or can
of tomato soup sold in a store appears to be rather gigantic. As to
258. Hearings, supra note 56, at 423. Such price wars were, of course, already
illegal under the Sherman and Federal Trade Commission Acts. Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1, 43 (1911) ; Handler, Unfair Competition and the FTC,
8 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 399, 422 (1940).
259. Lovell, Sales Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing nder State
Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391 (1948); Annotations, 118 A.L.R. 506, 128 A.L.R. 1126.
260. See note 231 supra.
261. 9 Studies in Business Administration No. 2, 12 J. oF Bus. following p. 412,
at 3, 4, 15 (1939).
262. Id. at 19-26.
263. Id. at 30.
264. Id. at 34, 36.
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the chains, it is further complicated by the fact that different types
of stores which they operate have different overhead costs, the overhead
of supermarkets being lower per unit of goods than that of other stores
because of the large volume sold and the lesser service rendered.'" In
order to obviate these difficulties, some statutes provide for specific
mark-ups; for instance, the Oregon law defines overhead as "6% of
replacement cost or . . the average monthly cost incurred in the
conduct of such business during the twelve months immediately pre-
ceding any alleged violation of this Act." 268 Tennessee and Nebraska
also provide for a 6% markup to be added to the cost base unless a
lower cost increment can be proven.2 67  In addition, a considerable
number of the statutes refer to established "cost surveys" of particular
trades or industries "for the locality and vicinity in which the offense
is committed," and provide that such surveys "shall be deemed compe-
tent evidence" in the determination of costs.
268
These vague and indefinite provisions as to cost surveys 269 focus
attention on the second major aspect of these statutes: the opportunity
they provide for private price-fixing. For instance, the Food and
Grocery Bureau of Southern California, a private group which was a
direct successor to the Code Authority that administered the NRA
Codes, 270 from time to time circulated questionnaires among its mem-
bers eliciting cost data and, on the basis of replies received, fixed mark-
ups first at 6% and later at 8%. It accepted complaints, admonished
offenders to refrain from selling below the prices fixed by it, and, pur-
suant to statutory authority for enforcement by injunction, sought in-
junctions against violators.2 7 1  It required proceedings by the Anti-
Trust Division of the Department of Justice to stop these activities.2 72
A similar conflict between the use made of these state laws and
the Sherman Act developed in New England, where private organiza-
tions known as Food Councils undertook to enforce the statutes. The
only difference from the California situation was the absence of statu-
tory provisions authorizing cost surveys; the New England statutes
265. This problem was specifically considered in Great A & P Tea Co. v. Erwin,
23 F. Supp. 70, 77 (Minn. 1938), where the Company obtained a decree restraining
enforcement of the Minnesota statute.
266. Tannenbaum, supra note 261, at 43.
267. Id. at 44, 45.
268. Id. at 48.
269. See Great A & P Tea Co. v. Erwin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 83 (Minn. 1938).
270. Tannenbaum, supra note 261, at 50.
271. Id. at 50, 51.
272. United States v. Food and Grocery Bur. of So. Calif., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 974
(S.D. Cal. 1942), aff'd, 139 F.2d 973 (9th Cir. 1943) ; as to preliminary motions in
the, same case see 41 F. Supp. 884 and 43 F. Supp. 966. See also Cal. Retail Grocers
and Merchants Assn. v. United States, 139 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
322 U.S. 729 (1944), and, generally Lovell, upra note 259, at 418-424.
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required instead a fixed mark-up unless the seller proved a lower
cost.2 7 3  A & P was a member of these Councils. Indeed, one of the
incidental and minor charges against A & P in the Sherman Act prose-
cution was based on price fixing in cooperation with competitors and
suppliers under cover of these state laws.274  Although this charge is
of little importance in that case, the nature of A & P's connection with
these activities reveals awareness of the danger of inconsistency of such
activity with both the Sherman Act and the company's general sales
policy. The following excerpts from a form-report to the president of
the New England Division of A & P on the effects of the Connecticut
law and the Company's activity thereunder tell this story:
"a. The effect of these laws on the Company's pricing policies
in your Division.
The principal effect of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practice
Act is that our grocery price structure in the state must be marked
up the equivalent of 8% over cost; this markup equalling a mini-
mum of 1% higher grocery department gross profit than that
enjoyed in the New York State stores. . 275
"e. The extent, if any, to which your Units have cooperated
with those who are sponsoring and policing these laws.
The extent to which we have cooperated in respecting the
law is principally on adhering to the markup requirement in all
respects. In addition to this, we have contributed financially to
the council on the basis of $10.00 per year per supermarket . . .
and $5.00 per year per straight grocery store . .
"g. What would be the effect in your division from a trade
relation or public relations standpoint, if the company took a pub-
lic decision either for or against any of these laws.
It is felt that from a public relations standpoint that we would
not only be able to gain more good will but likewise additional
business if we took a public position in the direction of selling mer-
chandise under the markup or in other words, based on our New
York price structure. From a trade relations standpoint we
would be fearful that if we reduced our price structure to conform
with New York State that it would undoubtedly brand us as a
voluntary violator of the Act and thereby put us in an unfavorable
light as far as the industry is concerned, not because we were the
originator of such a move 76 but because of our size and business
ethics in the industry." 277
273. Id. at 419, 420, listing the court decrees dissolving the New England Councils.
274. See A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 671-673.
275. No such statute existed in New York.
276. The writer referred in the same letter to consistent violations of the Act
by an independent competitor. Loss-leader selling has been extensively practiced by
some independents since the collapse of the NRA. See testimony by a chain store
representative, Hearings, supra note 3, at 188.
277. A & P Br. App., v. I, pp. 575-577.
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At the same time, the president of the New England Division was ad-
vised that there was "considerable doubt as to whether or not these
laws will stand the test" of compatibility with the Sherman Act .2 7
In fact, the Company's General Counsel wrote to John Hartford in
March, 1941:
"I have always been afraid of these Associations and Councils,
however well intended. We are a member of the New England
Food Council. . . . Some two years ago George Feldman heard
that the Council was fixing prices and that we were adopting them.
He then wrote to the New England Division on the subject and
went so far as to say that if it was doing so and we were adopting
those prices, we had better resign. . . . Naturally I was much
disturbed over the A & P at this particular time being indicted as
a conspirator with others in restraint of trade and for the purpose
of increasing cost of the necessities of life.. I was worried like hell
over the mere fact of an indictment . ," 279
The danger threatening A & P at that time contrasts almost
ironically with the actual indictment and conviction a few years later
when one of the major charges against the company was, not the
raising of prices, but their undue reduction to the point where, the
Court of Appeals found, "sometimes the gross profit rate is fixed so
low that the store runs below the cost of operations." 250 Here the gist
of the Government's contention was that A & P had abused its inte-
grated position through "elimination of competition by sales in selected
areas below cost of doing business." 2"'
VII. RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE
The so-called Fair Trade acts, state laws which permit resale
price maintenance on commodities sold under a trade-mark, trade-
name, or brand, are in some respects closely related to the statutes
prohibiting sales below cost. Both "were urged by those engaged
in various lines of trade as measures needed to safeguard the existence
of the small retailer" and "were described as being directed against
price wars in general and against leader merchandising practices, es-
278. Id. at 578.
279. Id. at 580. Emphasis added. The letter continued in part as follows:
"He . . . told me that the Council would send out a price list on which they
could base the mark-up and that he sold certain articles at the prices fixed by the
Council. . . . A comparison of prices with a circular fixing prices will in every
instance show . . . an advance rather than a reduction . . . if indicted, I would
hate like hell to plead guilty, but on the facts stated to me I have not as yet been
able to figure out a defense. . . ." Id. at 582.
280. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 87.
281. Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 628 et seq. Emphasis added.
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pecially of chain stores." 282 Thus a representative of the National
Association of Retail Grocers urged the enactment of the Miller-
Tydings Amendment to the Sherman Act, which eliminates the ille-
gality under that Act of resale price contracts in interstate commerce
when authorized by statute in the state to which goods are to be shipped
for resale, on the ground that "the retail grocers of this country have
suffered intensely for years on account of these loss leaders." 283
Resale price maintenance is applicable to food products which are
sold in identifiable form under brands or labels; 24 but its success in
the food industry has been limited by "the practical realities of com-
petition as found in the food trade." 285 First, the portion of food
items not covered by the fair trade laws far exceeds those items which
are covered.2 6  Hence the relatively small number of trade-marked
or branded food items under resale price maintenance contracts must
compete with the great mass of food items to which resale price main-
tenance cannot be applied, and this is all the more difficult because the
latter group contains many products available for use as leaders.
2s T
Consequently many independent retail grocers were skeptical as to the
usefulness of the fair trade laws but enthusiastic about the unfair sales
acts prohibiting sales below cost, since the applicability of the latter
in the food industry is unlimited.288
282. FTC, REPoRT oN RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE, 848, 849 (1945). On p. 274
the Commission states: "Examination of a mass of material indicates that one of the
major objectives of retail grocers in supporting resale price maintenance is to
eliminate, or at least curb the loss-leader merchandising of branded or trade-marked
grocery products, and thus improve the profit position of independent retail grocers."
On p. 275 the Commission adds: "Although protection of the consumer, the manu-
facturer, and the farmer is given prominence in the argument justifying resale price
maintenance, it is apparent that one of the prime objectives of the food-trade pro-
ponents of such legislation is self-protection in a many-sided struggle for the consum-
ers' food business in which, by the nature of their complaints, they admit their in-
ability or unwillingness to compete actively." See also Marketing Laws Survey,
State Price Control Legislation xxxvii-lix (U.S. W.P.A. 1940).
283. FTC, op. cit. supra note 282, at 277.
284. Id. at 283. On pp. 291-293 the Commission tabulated the following grocery
products as subject to some resale price maintenance contracts in June 1939: Toilet
soaps, eggs, salad dressings, cheese, beverages (coffee, tea, milk, soft drinks), meat
products, dog foods, crackers and cookies, fruit juices and jellies, canned milk, baby
foods, cereals, soups, vegetable shortening, flour, baking powder, desserts, candy bars,
yeast, honey, potato chips, maccaroni and spaghetti.
285. Id. at 290.
286. In January 1939 the Massachussets Food Council advised retail grocers that
the Massachusetts statute prohibiting sales below cost (Unfair Sales Act) "covers
100% of all retail and wholesale food sales whereas the fair-trade law cannot possibly
control more than 20% of such sales if every manufacturer marketing trademarked
merchandise took advantage of the voluntary provisions of the Fair Trade Act. Eighty
percent of retail food store sales are on meats, poultry, fish, fruits and vegetables
which cannot be placed under fair-trade law price regulation. In this list are most
of the troublesome loss leaders ... " Id. at 283.
287. Id. at 289.
288. Id. at 295. The Commission quoted the secretary of the California Retail
Grocers and Merchants Association as having said in 1939: ". . . while I definitely
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Second, resale price maintenance under the fair trade laws has
not been tried extensively in the food industry, even when applicable,
because of fear of loss of business. 9 For instance, the secretary of the
National Association of Retail Grocers explained that "food is the most
highly competitive of all industries, and profits depend on turn-over
rather than margin. Accordingly, there would be a tendency upon the
part of the distributor to push free items that would insure turn-over
by reason of their cheapness rather than price-fixed items that carried
a good margin." 20 The National Grocers Bulletin reported in May
1938 that "many dealers seemed to welcome establishment of a resale
price, but manufacturers who established these prices found, presently,
that their products were nicely price fixed on the shelf while competi-
tive products were actively price featured." The same writer also ob-
served that "there are many well established brands of almost every
product, all competing with one another, and there are dealers' own
brands"; since the Miller-Tydings Amendment and the state laws do
not permit horizontal price agreements between manufacturers and
dealers, price fixing on one brand alone was not deemed practical. 29'
For this reason many manufacturers and canners were vigorous in their
opposition to the fair trade laws; they feared that resale price main-
tenance under those laws would hamper a system of distribution which
encourages selling to the consumer at low prices and at the same time
"leaves the wholesaler or retailer free to fix his own resale prices ac-
cording to conditions prevailing from time to time in his market
area." 292
Perhaps the most emphatic and determined opposition to resale
price maintenance came from the large chains, particularly A & P. As
early as April 1927, more than six years before the enactment of the
appreciate . . . the value and merits of the Fair Trade Act, we still believe that the
Unfair Practices Act is the finest law ever enacted on the Statute books of any state,
as far as our industry is concerned. . . . [We] tried to operate under the Fair
Trade Act but have found it practicable in certain instances only, but could not extend
it far enough to satisfy ourselves. On the other hand, the Unfair Practices
Act makes a definite and general coverage of the industry ..
289. Id. at 286.
290. Id at 284, 285.
291. Id. at 285.
292. The following comments were received by the Federal Trade Commission,
id. at 286, 287: From a fruit and vegetable canner-"There are so many canned foods
of all kinds on the market that this company could not maintain a price for anything
it packs in competition with a similar product sold at a lower price." From a manu-
facturer of cereals-"If the consumer eats a couple of eggs and some bacon, the chances
are she does not eat . . . cereal. If she eats bran muffins, some toast, and some
orange juice, she doesn't eat cereal. Therefore from our selfish standpoint, we feel
that we would not care to have the grocer maintain a price on . . . cereal . . .
so long as he is not maintaining prices on bacon, oranges, rhubarb, eggs, sausage, etc."
Another canner stated that "different territories vary greatly as to the spread between
operating costs of, and thus resale prices which may profitably be used by, the
different classes of retail distributors therein."
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first fair trade law in California 293 and two and one-half years before
the stock market crash which ushered in the great depression, one of
the Messrs. Hartford of A & P, in an address to the company's pur-
chasing directors expressed his hostility toward price maintenance in
the following terms:
"Our entire plan of doing business is dependent upon our be-
ing able to pass on to the customer a part of the savings we are
able to effect through our large scale purchases, method of ware-
housing, and the cash and carry system in our stores. Contrasted
with our system of distributing food to the consumer is that of
the individual retailer where the goods pass through several addi-
tional hands such as the jobber and wholesaler and where cus-
tomers are extended credit and goods are delivered for them. If
manufacturers are able to enforce their maintenance-of-retail price
policy we will have no advantage over the individually owned
corner grocery store.
"Manufacturers have very little or no sales expense in connec-
tion with our business and we are entitled to some of this saving.
In order to continue expanding our business it is essential that
we be in a position to pass on part of this saving . . . to the
consumer. I feel very strongly that it is necessary for us to do
something to impress upon these manufacturers that they cannot
force their price maintenance policy upon us." 294
Similarly, the minutes of a sales directors' meeting held in March
1927 recorded the following discussion on maintenance of retail prices:
"Mr. Wall stated that he did not believe we had as yet solved
this problem of retail price maintenance. He feared that more
manufacturers would be demanding that we do not sell below a
certain retail all the time and that this would greatly handicap us.
"Mr. Bofinger said that he did not believe it was a case of
more manufacturers taking this attitude but that it was due to our
more drastic price cuts to increase volume. He said that there
were only about a dozen manufacturers who insisted on a certain
retail. He mentioned that the Canada Dry People had just an-
nounced that we had gotten our last car of their products in
Indianapolis because of our cutting the price there to 15g.
293. Cal. Stat. 1931, c. 278, was the first statute permitting resale price mainte-
nance contracts and making such contracts binding between the parties. Cal. Stat. 1933,
c. 260, made all those in the same competitive area, who knowingly sell below the
prices fixed by such contracts between other parties, subject to suit by any person
aggrieved thereby. Subsequently, statutes of this type were enacted by 45 States (all
except Missouri, Texas and Vermont). See WEIGEL, THE FAiR TRADE AcTs 33-44
(1938); OPPENHEIM, CASES ON UNFAm TRADE PRACriCES 900-907 (1950).
294. A & P Br. App. v. II, p. 26. See also Great A & P Tea Co. v. Cream
of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46 (2d Cir. 1915), where the Court refused to restrain
Cream of Wheat from continuing a policy of selling only to wholesalers who agreed
to sell to the retail trade at prices fixed by Cream of Wheat Co. A & P contended
unsuccessfully that refusal to sell to it was a restraint of trade.
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"Mr. Hartford said that this situation is rapidly approaching
the point where something will have to be done about it .
We are too big to be dictated to by any manufacturer to that
extent. . . . Perhaps the solution of this problem will be brought
about by our selecting one of our products, such as White House
Milk, advertising it extensively, and pricing it attractively enough
to induce independent grocers and competing chains to stock it." 295
In short, A & P's hostility to resale price maintenance even prior
to the enactment of the so-called fair trade laws was based on its in-
compatibility with the company's low-price policy and its desire to
enjoy freedom to set such retail prices as it chose 298 and to adapt its
prices to changing conditions. In buying operations, a sharp distinc-
tion was made between "trading items" and "list price items." The
latter term was used to denote nationally advertised merchandise sold
under a trade-mark or brand, while the former term applied to all
other supplies.2 7  With respect to list-price items A & P's hands were
largely tied, both as to purchase price and, where resale price main-
tenance prevailed, as to retail price. Hence there was a strong tend-
ency for A & P to place greater reliance on products bearing its own
trade-marks, frequently known as "house brands" or "private brands."
Some of the reasons for this practice are set forth in the minutes of an
informal board meeting of the Company's middle Western Division
held January, 1939:
295. A & P Br. App., v. I, p. 399. Apparently the suggestion of selling A & P's
own products to competitors has never been carried out. It may be noted, incidentally,
that subsequently A & P restocked Canada Dry Ginger Ale on Canada Dry's own
terms (A & P Br. App., v. I, p. 401).
296. A & P Br., p. 216.
297. Mr. Charles W. Parr, in charge of field buying operations for A & P, testi-
fied as follows (A & P Tr., v. 3, pp. 407, 408) :
"Q. . . . What is meant by trade items in this busniess?
A. Well, they are well known in the food industry and the grocery trade, as
bulk merchandise, and any other merchandise, even though it is in packages, which
does not bear some nationally known or semi-nationally known brand, and which
is sold on an open trading or 'horse trading' basis, rather than on a list price
basis.
Q. . . . What does 'list-price' mean?
A. It means the so-called nationally advertised price of grocery items, such
as Ivory Soap, Crisco, Del Monte goods.
Q. Is there any difference in the conduct of buying . . . food merchandise,
or things that are sold in the A & P stores, between 'trading items' and 'list
price items?'
A. A wide difference .... On dealing in trading items, we want a buyer,-
a real buyer-a fellow who is shrewd-a fellow who can hold his own in dealing
with the shipper. On a list price item, all they need is an order clerk . . .
Q. Is there any market fluctuation in price in the one or the other?
A. Oh, yes. . . . Take a trading item,--like flour, for instance. The price
of flour is based on the wheat market, and might change twenty times a day.
Q. What about the list price?
A. Some of them never change."
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it is obvious that the greater the concentration of the
volume in a few locations, the greater the vulnerability of the
business. A number of reasons have contributed to the fact that
competition on brands which are available to our competitors has
leveled off and in a number of instances it is difficult for A & P
supermarkets to meet many of the prices that the competitors have
established on nationally-known brands. . . . The leveling off
in prices on advertised brands has reduced the profits on these
brands, so that in effect both volume and profit are being reduced
on these recognized brands.
"It becomes apparent that A & P cannot hold customers in
supermarkets by reliance upon brands beyond its control where
such conditions prevail, and therefore A & P brands which we
control loom up as a distinct advantage in obtaining and holding
volume and providing profits for our operations.
"The advantages in this direction are clear. A & P products
are exclusive to A & P stores. Other retailers do not have these
brands. . . . Promoted on a quality and value basis, our brands
are competitive with any similar outside brand sold in our stores
or in any other food stores. That they attract and hold a large
number of customers is evident in our experience with A & P
coffees. We know that we have many customers who deal with
us exclusively for coffee and we enjoy a higher percentage of the
coffee business than we do of the grocery business. We have had
similar experiences on such items as White House Milk and Ann
Page Salad Dressing. The development of sales in these brands
should create a larger consumer following for our stores, and
increased sales of A & P products enables the stores to earn suffi-
cient profits to keep prices on outside brands in a strong com-
petitive position. A & P products are the largest single source
of profit that A & P has.
"The possibilities in profit are clearly seen when an increase
in Quaker Maid distribution from 4% to 5%o would result in an
additional factory profit of nearly $1,000,000 a year." 298
Ironically enough, in consequence, the fair trade laws which were
designed to protect independent distributors from the encroachment of
the chains contributed, at least in the food field, to strengthening the
chains by increasing their tendency to handle goods under their own
brands, including those they manufactured themselves. Providing
large-scale distributors with a strong incentive to expand their vertical
integration was, to put it mildly, not the purpose of the advocates of
the Fair Trade laws.
298. A & P Br. App., v. IV, pp. 37, 38.
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VIII. THE FOOD CHAINS AND THE SHERMAN ACT:
THE A & P CASE
Up to this point four weapons used by the independents in their
struggle against the chains have been discussed: special taxation, the
Robinson-Patman Act, the unfair sales acts, and the fair trade laws.
Practically all of these weapons were forged in the 1930's, although the
anti-chain store movement had begun earlier. 99 During that entire
period the Sherman Anti-Trust Law of 1890 remained unused in the
closet so far as food distributors were concerned; apparently no one
considered using it. However, in the early forties the Department of
Justice took the Sherman Act out of its closet. Thus began the fifth
round of the fight against the food chains or, at least, certain of their
practices.
The Department secured indictments against Safeway and Kroger
in January, 1943, in the United States District Court in Kansas City,
Kansas. 0 0  Both chains were charged with "engaging in various un-
lawful methods of doing business for the purpose of injuring or de-
stroying independent competition. These methods included the ob-
taining of domination in selected areas by subsidized underselling ac-
tivities which were discontinued following the disappearance of inde-
pendent competitors." so' Both companies pleaded nolo contendere
and fines totaling $40,000 in the Safeway case and $20,000 in the Kro-
ger case were imposed by the District Court. At the conclusion of the
case the Government announced that the elimination of the practices
complained of "should be beneficial to the business of the independent
grocers." 302
A similar indictment charging a continuing conspiracy to unrea-
sonably restrain and monopolize trade in food products had been re-
turned in November, 1942, against the New York Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Company and its affiliated corporations in the United
States District Court in Dallas, Texas. That court sustained A & P's
demurrer because of defective pleadings but the judgment was re-
versed on appeal and the case remanded to the District Court.30 3 The
District Court then ordered the Government to strike out certain ob-
299. The Indiana chain store tax which was sustained in State Bd. of Tax
Comm'rs. v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931), was enacted in 1929. The Senate resolu-
tion directing the FTC to investigate the chain stores was adopted in 1927.
300. United States v. Safeway Stores, Cr. No. 7196, and United States v. The
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., Cr. No. 7197, D. Kans., Jan. 1943.
301. Statement by Assistant Attorney-General John Sonnett, CCHI 1948-1951
TRADa REG. RE'. 1 61,113, No. 757 and I1 61,124, No. 758.
302. Ibid.
303. United States v. Great A & P Tea Co., 137 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1943),
cert. denied, 320 U.S. 783 (1943).
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
jectionable allegations of the indictment and to particularize other alle-
gations; 3 04 the case was set for trial May 22, 1944; but on February
26, 1944, the United States attorney filed a nolle prosequi without
prejudice, which, over A & P's objections, was granted by the court. 05
On the same day the Government filed a criminal information against
A & P in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Illinois, at Danville, Illinois."'R The trial on the charges contained in
that information, without a jury, began on April 16, 1945 and was
concluded on April 6, 1946. On September 21, 1946 Judge Lindley
found the defendants guilty as charged in the information.307  The
judgment was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit on February 24, 1949.308 The Company did not appeal to the
Supreme Court of the United States, but paid fines totaling $175,000.
On September 15, 1949, the Attorney General filed in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York a civil suit
against A & P which, among other prayers for relief, asks "the com-
plete and perpetual separation of the business of manufacturing and
processing food and food products now conducted by the defendants
from the business of buying and selling food" and asks the Court to
"order the separation of defendant's retail business into seven separate
parts." This civil complaint is based on the same charges on which
A & P was convicted in the preceding criminal case.3" 9 At the time
of writing the civil trial has not yet begun.
The importance of the decision against A & P in the criminal
case is not limited to A & P alone, since the charges against A & P's
two largest competitors, Safeway and Kroger, who preferred nolo
contendere pleas, were the same as those against A & P.31 In spite of
the Government's and the court's insistence that the action was not an
attack upon the power that accompanies integration or size, but only
upon the abusive exercise of such power,31' the decision has been criti-
cized for penalizing size and competitive efficiency and, above all, for
hampering the successful efforts of the chains to lower consumer
prices.312 After the filing of the civil suit for dissolution A & P un-
304. United States v. Great A & P Tea Co., 52 F. Supp. 681 (N.D. Tex. 1943).
305. United States v. Great A & P Tea Co., 54 F. Supp. 257 (N.D. Tex. 1944).
The advertising campaign unleashed by A & P in the fall of 1949 after the Government
had filed a civil suit against it, see note 336 infra, played up the Dallas case as evi-
dence of persecution by "the anti-trust lawyers."
306. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 1.
307. A & P case, 67 F. Supp.
308. Id., 173 F.2d.
309. CCH 1948-51 TRADE REG. RE'. 161,226, No. 990.
310. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 447
311. See note 309 supra; A & P case 173 F.2d at 87.
312. A principal critic of the case is Professor M. A. Adelman. See his The
A & P Case, 39 Am. EcoN. RFv. Supp. 280 (1949) ; The A &' P Case: A Study in
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leashed a nation-wide press campaign which has no precedent in the
history of Sherman Act enforcement. Posters and advertisements ap-
peared regularly in all A & P stores and in newspapers from coast to
coast, condemning the suit as a threat to the standards of living of the
American people and as punishment for A & P's low prices. 1 ' Many
newspapers throughout the country published editorials in defense of
A & P; relatively little was said in favor of the Government's action.314
The transcript of the criminal trial against A & P, which contains
many of the exhibits introduced by both sides, covers 21,137 pages.
The Government's brief in the District Court, which is primarily a
digest of the evidence, fills 1,100 printed pages. The Company's brief
on appeal, only 351 pages long, was accompanied by six volumes of
elaborate excerpts from the exhibits and testimony totaling 3,600 pages.
An exhaustive analysis of this enormous record would fill several
volumes and would not necessarily help to clarify the issues. In fact,
if the case had been handled in a somewhat more streamlined fashion,
some of the controversy about it might have been avoided. We shall,
therefore, attempt only to lay bare the basic structure of the case and
to place it in its proper setting as the most recent move to aid in solv-
ing the chain store problem in the food industry.
Applied Economic Theory, 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238 (1949); The Great A & P Muddle,
Fortune, Dec. 1949, p. 122. See also Lebhar, What The A & P Case Is All About,
26 J. RETAILING 19 (1950) ; Note, Trouble Begins in the "New" Sherman Act: The
Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 YALE L.J. 969 (1949). For other com-
ments see 44 ILL. L. REv. 252 (1949) ; 95 U. OF PA. L. REv. 306 (1947) ; 15 GEo.
\VAsH. L. REv. 243 (1947) ; 15 U. oF Cm. L. REv. 392 (1948) ; for comments favor-
able to the Government's case see Brecher, Government v. A. & P., Consumer Re-
ports, Jan., 1950, p. 36; Andrews, U.S. v. A & P: Battle of the Titans, Harper's,
Sept., 1950, p. 64.
313. "What shall we do? We admit that the interests of the owners of A & P
are of little importance. Frankly, they could make an enormous amount of money
by breaking up A & P, as the anti-trust lawyers wish, and selling off the parts. But
is this what the American people want? Do they agree with the anti-trust lawyers
that our food prices are too low, and that we should be put out of the picture so other
grocers can charge more? Frankly, if this were the case, we would not want to
continue in business. But we seriously doubt that this is the case . . . we believe
this attack is a threat to millions of consumers who rely on us for quality foods at
low prices; to farmers who rely on us for fast, low-cost distribution of their products;
and to our loyal employees. We feel that it is our responsibility to all these people
to defettd, by every legitimate means, this company and the low-price policy on which
it was built." (Advertisment published on September 20, 1949).
314. See, e.g., Krock, Two Policies in. the Anti-trust Suits, N.Y. Times, Sept.
23, 1949, p. 22, col. 5: "There are said to be instances of companies raising their
prices to the level of less patronized competitors in the hope that anti-trust litigation
might thus be averted." All such articles were reprinted and distributed by A & P
under the heading: What the American Press is Saying about the Suit to Destroy
A & P. The Government's action was defended by the president of the National
Association of Retail Grocers (N.Y. Times, September 23, 1949, p. 40, col. 8) and
by some journals published by organized labor. According to Labor News Digest,
Oct. 13, 1949, p. 2, A & P's advertising campaign was conducted by a highly-paid
public relations executive. See also Brecher, Andrews, both cited supra note 312.
Some newspapers were reported to have refused advertisements by independents in
reply to A & P's advertisements; some independents sponsored advertising in support
of A & P.
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1. General Operating Policies of A & P
It should be emphasized at the outset that prominent in the man-
agement of this enormous integrated system, which has been sufficiently
described elsewhere,8 1 was the fundamental operating principle: de-
crease the gross profit rate in retail stores, along with costs, and thereby
increase the volume of sales. This is a leitmotiv of A & P's manage-
ment which recurs throughout the entire record. For instance, the
minutes of an Advisory Board meeting in March, 1931, stated:
"If we are to reach our goal of $2,000,000,000 business for
the company [a goal which was reached for the first time in the
fiscal year ended February 29, 1948, when, with the aid of a rising
price level, the Company's sales amounted to $2,545,583,840 816],
it is evident that we must work on a lower gross profit rate. The
quickest way to effect a reduction in our expense rate is to obtain
additional volume. With a lower gross profit policy, this would
be accomplished." 317
In 1937 the super-market program, then in its infancy, was considered
essential to bring about a reversal of the downward trend in the volume
of sales. The minutes of a Board meeting held in May, 1937, report
that "the relatively high gross profit in Chicago during several years
has contributed to the loss of volume and net profit in that city" and
that "the plan of the large volume stores with low gross and low ex-
pense is needed and will be effective in restoring this business.
S .318 In September 1937 the board of the Middle Western Divi-
sion observed that "there are territories which need medicine badly
and an aggressive campaign of lowering the prices of our shelf com-
modities should retrieve the volume we have lost." 319 There were
frequent admonitions from headquarters that everyone "must have
the courage to reduce gross profit rates in stores which have not pro-
duced the predicted volume;" 820 indeed, high gross profit rates were
.consistently treated as undesirable and dangerous from the long-range
viewpoint.8 2' Thus, Mr. John Hartford, writing in June, 1940, about
the Middle-Western supermarkets, asked for an investigation of recent
increases in the gross profit rate in Milwaukee. He added:
315. See chapters II and III vtpra, and the opinion of the District Court, A & P
Case, 67 F. Supp. at 629-638.
316. MooDY's MANUAL OF INVESTORS 1548 (1949). Sales for the year ending
February 28, 1947 amounted to $1,908,979,288.
317. A & P Br. App., v. IV, p. 95. See also id., pp. 97, 98, 100.
318. Id. at 131.
319. Id. at 132, 133.
320. Id. at 145.
321. Id. at 151: "We have been inclined to let gross profit in some of these
[regular] stores remain high because we are making a profit, but unless the situation
is remedied we shall find ourselves in trouble later on."
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"For these two weeks we are making a net profit of over 4%
when all distributions are included. I consider this decidedly too
much profit and urge that you adjust your gross downward with
the hope of increasing the supermarket average in the Milwaukee
Territory from its present $7,500 nearer to our ideal figure of
$10,000."1322
In short, according to A & P a high gross profit rate means higher
prices which reduce volume and thereby increase the cost of doing
business with the ultimate result of losses; on the other hand a low
gross profit rate means low prices to the consumer and increased
volume of sales, and this volume drives down the expense rate, thereby
producing permanent and satisfactory net profits. The volume which
produces such results is the all-important goal. That this is the "pat-
tern" of all A & P operations is well illustrated by the following testi-
mony of the Superintendent of the Dallas Unit:
"Question: Was a desired volume set to be attained by a
given super-market when it was opened?
Witness: Well, of course, you set your marks when you take
any store, any super-market, for a certain volume. You plan on
a certain volume and you set your gross accordingly, what you
feel would attract that amount of volume. Of course, you have
to take into concern your expense, too.
Question: . . . Of course, you knew that in the opening of
any new store until you developed a volume you would have no
expense rate whatsoever and it depended upon the volume to
control your gross profit rate, is that right?
Witness: Well, it would be just about the other way around.
It would depend upon the amount of gross developed to produce
your volume that would affect the expense rate that you could
operate under.
Question: Well, it would operate both ways, wouldn't it?
In other words, your control of the gross profit rate would be
determined by your volume to a certain extent, wouldn't it?
Witness: No. The volume would be controlled by your gross
profit if it worked out the way it was planned.
Question: What about the expense rate?
Witness: The expense rate would be controlled by your vol-
ume. With fixed expenses, of course, the greater the volume you
secured the more you would reduce your expense rate." 323
322. Id. at 159. Emphasis added. On p. 175 it is staed that "losing stores
cannot be put in the black by merely increasing the gross profit rate. The reason is
that if the gross profit rate was advanced, business would be lost."
323. A & P Tr., v. 49, pp. 10, 772 and 10,803.
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Standing alone, the essential feature of this plan to sell food in
large volume at low prices and at small gross profits would be suf-
ficient to canonize A & P as a saint in the anti-trust heaven,3 24 since it
seems to banish forever the twin devils of scarcity of output and rais-
ing of prices. The Government's attack, however, was directed against
"the means employed" 325 to achieve the company's purposes.
The crucial problem for A & P was how to secure the desired
volume of business. The Company had fairly definite ideas as to the
percentage of the available business which it sought. For instance,
the directors of the Central Division at a meeting in May 1941 assumed
that A & P was striving for "ultimate enjoyment of 20% of the avail-
able business in each city below 400,000 in population and 15 % in each
city above 400,000 in population, except where our present development
exceeds these ratios." 326 Other planners for the company took the
position "that 25% of the available business is what we are entitled
to." 327
With this claim to a substantial share of the market staked out,
the program required implementation on both the buying and selling
fronts of the business. The core of the entire plan was low selling
prices to the consumer. To maintain them it was essential to cut costs
as well as profits and, therefore, to exert every effort to buy as cheaply
as possible. In doing so, it was desirable to secure a competitive ad-
vantage by obtaining better terms from suppliers than competitors
could secure and to translate these into similar advantages over com-
petitors in sales to the public. Described in these general and abstract
terms, A & P's operations appear to be those of "an outstanding price
324. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 25: "With this particular statement of policy the
Government has no quarrel."
325. Ibid.
326. A & P Tr., v. 68, p. 16,098. The record contains the following figures as
to A & P's percentage of available business during the last quarters of 1937 and
1938, the entire year 1939, and the first quarter of 1940 (A & P Tr., v. 6, pp. 999-A
through-P.) :
Pittsfield, Mass. Population 47,516 A & P's share: 13.2%
Newport, R.I. 27,612 .. . 15.9%
Williamsport, Pa. " 45,729 .. . 22.2%
Columbia, S. C. " 51,581" .. . 11.3%
High Point, N. C. " 36,745 .. . 21.7%
Dallas, Texas " 260,475 .. . 20.8%
Wheeling, W. Va. " 61,659 .. . 22.6%
Columbus, Ohio " 290,584 .. . 13.0%
Zanesville, Ohio " 36,440 .. . 18.5%
Johnstown, Pa. 66,993 .. . 22.7%
Youngstown, Ohio " 22,075 " " 29.2%
Sharon, Pa. " 25,908 " " 33.9%
Warren, Ohio " 41,062 .. . 21.1%
Waukegan, Ill. " 33,499 .. . 28.6%
Lansing, Mich. " 78,397 .. . 19.7%
327. Id., v. 7, p. 1240.
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competitor" whose prosecution and conviction under the Sherman Act
"flouts common-sense economics." 
328
But the Government and the Court of Appeals are agreed that the
question is how A & P used its power in carrying out its policy. Hence
we must inquire into the concrete and specific methods adopted by A &
P in the conduct of its business and estimate their net effect. For the
sake of clarity this inquiry should consider separately the buying and
the selling activities of A & P, although both are part and parcel of
one unified scheme.
2. A & P as a Buyer
The Robinson-Patman Act of 1936 was, as we have seen, designed
to limit the advantages derived from large buying-power in the hands
of such chains as A & P. The phase of the Sherman Act case against
A & P dealing with its role as a buyer suggests a case under the Robin-
son-Patman Act; indeed, certain portions of Judge Lindley's long opin-
ion in the District Court dealing with the subject of discriminatory price
preferences express doubt "whether we ever needed the Robinson-
Patman Act." 329 Section 2(a) of that Act, forbidding sellers to dis-
criminate in price, and Section 2(f) making it unlawful for a buyer
"knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price," were clearly
applicable; but the Government chose simply to contend that A & P's
efforts to procure buying preferences violated the Sherman Act, "even
though such practices also violate the Robinson-Patman Act." 330
The philosophy which guided A & P's approach to its suppliers is
most lucidly explained in a letter from Vice-President Bofinger to the
president of the Central Western Division. The writer reviewed pos-
sibilities of A & P entering the doughnut flour manufacturing field and
concluded that the Company's lowest possible production cost would be
considerably above the price A & P was then (August, 1941) paying
to its two principal suppliers. The writer then continued:
"You might ask why is it that the company cannot do as good
a job as an outside organization? Our answer is just this, the
328. Adelman, The Great A & P Muddle, Fortune, Dec., 1949, p. 122.
329. 67 F. Supp. at 676. Judge Lindley added: "I have thought that the Sherman
Act, properly interpreted and administered, would have remedied all the ills meant
to be cured."
330. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 30. The company said in its brief on appeal (p. 211)
. "If in a few instances it is plain that A & P received a preferential price, wit-
tingly or unwittingly, and if in a few other instances doubt still remains as to whether
in a Robinson-Patman Act proceeding, the proof in this record would suffice as a
defense, we submit that such instances . . . are not proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in support of the charge in the information that A & P sought 'a systematic discrimina-
tory buying preference over competitors.'"
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Joe Lowe and Doughnut Machine Corporations are willing to take
tonnage business at an attractive price, thereby reducing overhead,
and secure a margin of profit on the remainder of the business
done with smaller accounts at a much higher price. This practice
holds true of many other commodities we purchase on the outside.
If I were in the manufacturing business, I would consider it good
principle to take a large attractive volume at cost, thereby reducing
my overhead which is virtually a profit, and depend on the re-
mainder of the accounts for the profit on my investment." 331
This letter indicates an expectation that the suppliers of A & P
will "recoup" from independent competitors some part of the price
concessions granted to A & P. 83 2  The principal critic of the case,
while conceding that "systematic patterns of price discrimination so that
some buyers (usually small) constantly pay more than others may be
a serious monopoly phenomenon," argues that the Anti-trust Division
of the Department of Justice does not understand the difference between
such discrimination and "unsystematic, sporadic discriminations, which
set off and snowball into general price reductions [and] are an essen-
tial ingredient of competition in most markets. . . . 33 He charges
that the Division advocates a "completely inflexible doctrine" which
"condemns without exception any system of trade discounts." 314 The
Government's brief in the District Court, however, under the heading
"Abuse of combined vertical and horizontal integration," devotes more
331. A & P Tr., v. 24, pp. 4830, 4831. The letter also contains this significant
passage: "We are vitally interested in cutting corners wherever possible to bring
about the lowest cost on merchandise whether for our manufacturing purposes or
resale in our stores, and if we thought for a moment it would be advantageous for
us to manufacture, we would be the first to advocate entering the field."
332. The record contains a cost analysis made for Olney & Carpenter, supplier
of potato sticks, who granted quantity discounts to A & P on a sliding scale arrange-
ment. In the test year the firm produced 225,000 cases of potato sticks. Of these,
140,000 (or 62% of the total) were sold to purchasers who bought quantities through-
out the year below the minimum discount contract bracket (5% discount on 25,000
cases or more). Of the remaining 85,000 cases, 60,000 went to A & P (at a discount
of 8%) and 25,000 to another chain at a 5% discount. The accountant proceeded
on the basis of 140,000 cases as the volume which the company would have had "if
no inducements by way of volume discounts would have been offered." A & P Tr.,
v. 26, p. 5288. Then he allocated to each of the 140,000 cases its pro rata share of
totals of factory and general overhead costs. He thus purported to show how per-case
costs are decreased by the addition of the 85,000 cases sold subject to quantity dis-
counts. All of the decrease in cost is credited to the quantity discount purchases of
85,000 cases. See Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 274, 275; A & P Tr., v. 26, pp. 5284-5293.
The accountant stated generally that the advantages flowing from the increased volume
brought about by the 85,000 cases sold subject to quantity discounts were "(1)
Absorption of overhead and saving of sales expense as indicated in the above analyses.
(2) More economical use of direct labor in manufacturing, including less labor turn-
over. (3) Economy through purchase of larger quantities of raw materials." Id. at
5292. The reader might well ask: Why was this study based on the assumption of a
"normal" production of 140,000 cases, with the extra 85,000 thrown in as a cost
reducing windfall?
333. Adelman, The Great A & P Muddle, Fortune, Dec., 1949, p. 125.
334. Ibid.
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than 400 pages to the task of describing what it calls "Coercing syste-
matic discriminatory buying preferences;" "' and the civil complaint
now pending alleges "a continuing agreement and concert of action
. to obtain . . under the dual threat to withdraw their patron-
age or to manufacture for themselves, systematic discriminatory price
preference over . . . retail competitors in the purchase of manufac-
tured and processed foods and food products." "' Whether the efforts
to obtain such preferences can be continuously successful in a competi-
tive industry is, of course, another question.
The systematic nature of A & "P's effort to secure price preferences
for itself is emphasized by the desire, previously discussed, to bring
about two price levels, one for A & P and a higher one for all competi-
tors. 8 7 Two of the means to secure a lower price level for A & P as
a buyer, advertising allowances and brokerage, have already been dis-
cussed. But these were not the only methods. There were, for in-
stance, a great number of "Quantity Discount Agreements" between A
& P and its suppliers. The form of these agreements, which was pre-
pared by A & P, revised as of July, 1940, read as follows:
"THE PURCHASER [A & P] HAS OBLIGATED ITSELF TO Buy
FROM THE SELLER a Large Quantity OF MERCHANDISE AND,
IN VIEW OF THE PURCHASES IN LARGE QUANTITY, PRESENT
AND PROSPECTIVE, THE SELLER AGREES TO ALLOW THE FOLLOW-
ING QUANTITY DISCOUNT ON AMOUNTS BOUGHT BY THE PUR-
CHASER, BETWEEN THE PERIOD COMMENCING ON . . . 19
AND EXPIRING . . . 19
"The seller warrants that the quantity discount specified
herein does not reflect any brokerage or brokerage savings what-
soever and is available on proportionately equal terms to all other
buyers after making due allowance for differences in the seller's
costs (other than brokerage) and for the seller's right to select
his customers and/or to change his prices in response to market
conditions and/or to meet competitors' prices.
"This agreement may be cancelled by either the seller or the
purchaser upon notice." 33s
Attention should be called to the words "a large quantity." Here,
as in its agreements for advertising allowances, A & P's intentional
vagueness was based on the ground that "we cannot commit the com-
pany for any definite quantity nor should we book any firm orders in
335. Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 221-627. Emphasis added.
336. Civil Complaint, United States v. Great A & P Tea Co., 1122. (Emphasis
added.)
337. See text at notes 223 and 224 supra.
338. A & P Br. App., v. II, p. 177. Emphasis added.
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order to obtain a quantity price." 339 Indeed, almost a year before the
revised form set forth above was circulated among field buyers, one of
A & P's attorneys submitted a memorandum to headquarters in which
he said:
"There has been some discussion, as you know, over the
propriety of the Company's present form of so-called 'Quantity
Discount' agreement with manufacturers in which the basis of
the discount is stated to be the purchase by the company of 'a
large quantity' of the manufacturer's goods.
"A number of these agreements were introduced as exhibits
by the F. T. C. in their brokerage case, and, in view of testi-
mony that these contracts did not obligate the company to pur-
chase anything at all, made a somewhat unfavorable impression.
"Of course, the legality of discounts received by the Com-
pany, in the final analysis, depends not upon what is stated in any
contract, but upon the facts. If it can be proved that the manu-
facturer saved as much as or more than the amount of the discount
in selling to the company as compared with other buyers, the dis-
count is legal. Such savings may have been due to the company's
more efficient and direct methods of buying rather than to the
quantity bought. The statement in the present contracts that the
discount is given because of 'large quantities' thus is definitely
misleading." 340
The language objected to was nevertheless retained in subsequent
quantity discount agreements.34 1 However, the memorandum per-
suaded the Company to introduce a new form which was called "Cost
Savings Agreements." Here the seller agreed "to pass along to the
Purchaser the . . . savings in the Seller's costs of manufacture, sale
and delivery, other than brokerage, in the form of a discount or al-
lowance of . . . percent from the . . . regular price . . ." The
discount was to be paid to the purchaser (A & P) quarterly or yearly,
at termination of the contract, or as a 'discount shown on the invoice.
The seller warranted that the same discount was available to all other
buyers on proportionately equal terms and that it did not reflect any
brokerage. The preamble to the agreement recited that "the Pur-
chaser normally buys . . in large volume" and its "methods of
buying . . are more efficient, more direct, and generally different
than the methods employed by other buyers . . ." which results "in
savings in the Seller's costs of manufacturing, selling and delivering
339. Letter from Charles W. Parr, in charge of field buying offices, to Baltimore
buying office, April 3, 1939. Id. at 173.
340. A & P Tr., v. 12, pp. 2265-6.
341. Id., v. 14, p. 2773 (agreement with Consolidated Biscuit Company for the
year 1941).
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the . . commodity to the Purchaser, which said savings, excluding
any and all savings in brokerage, can be proved by the Seller to be equal
to or greater than the amount of the.discount" prescribed in this agree-
ment. 4" This form avoided the objections against the quantity dis-
count agreements by throwing the burden of proof with respect to cost
savings on the seller. In addition, this new contract like the quantity
discount contract also placed the burden on the seller to make the dis-
count available on proportionately equal terms to all other purchasers.
Counsel for A & P insisted on this, because "in the absence of actual
knowledge on the Company's part, this clause would protect it from
liability under Section 2(f) of the Robinson-Patman Act in the event
that the manufacturer failed to accord the discount to some deserving
buyer. A & P would be entitled to presume that the manufacturer
would live up to his contractual obligations, and would not be called
upon to inquire further." "' Counsel's additional recommendation
that A & P itself should establish a small "permanent staff to check
manufacturers' costs" which would be able "to eliminate the guesswork
as to savings in many cases (or at least put it on a sound accounting
basis) and thus eliminate the possibility of excessive discounts which
could cause trouble under the law," 3" was apparently not adopted.
In June, 1940, Headquarters became disturbed by rumors that all
buying agreements were sent out to sellers with the discount figure or
advertising allowance filled in by the A & P buyer, thus creating the
impression that the seller was asked to sign on the dotted line. Ac-
cordingly instructions were issued to buyers "that in the future, the
details of such agreements should be filled in by the seller himself, and
should not be done by buyers' assistants or stenographers." 345
A & P's awareness of the preferences which it sought and re-
ceived and its desire to enjoy them to the exclusion of other buyers
were frequently in evidence. For instance, in May 1939 a deal on
pineapple juice at prices from '15% to 20% off regular lists was an-
nounced to the Units of the Atlantic Division with this comment:
"It is most important that this deal be kept confidential and
we request that you caution your buyers accordingly. You can
well realize the effect this might have on the pineapple juice mar-
ket in general. If the prices got out, undoubtedly other packers
would probably meet them and we would thereby lose all advan-
tage. Furthermore, if such arrangements as this are not kept con-
fidential we will have difficulty in securing such concessions." 346
342. A & P Br. App., v. II, pp. 184, 185.
343. A & P Tr., v. 12, p. 2272.
344. Id. at 2269-70.
345. Id., v. 14, p. 2651.
346. Id., v. 15, p. 2915.
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In May, 1941 the Director of Purchases for the Southern Divi-
sion received the following instructions:
"It has been our definite understanding that the Headquarters
Buying Department has always endeavored to keep our price ar-
rangements with manufacturers strictly confidential. Certainly
this policy is defeated if we supply our store personnel with these
prices. It would be an easy matter for this information to become
general. Inasmuch as in the attached list they are shown the re-
tail prices at which the merchandise is to be sold, we fail to see
why it is necessary for them to know the cost price." "
A few months earlier the same Southern Division Director of
Purchases wrote to one of the units in his division that Headquarters
had received complaints from some of the packers who claimed that
when a price quotation is passed along to the field buying office, the
information "gets out to the concession market managers, who in turn
evidently have a few friends in the trade to whom they evidently have
been advising our paying prices." He added: "This naturally works
to a great disadvantage to the packers and the Company as well, because
it forces the packers to either offer these small independent buyers the
same prices enjoyed by us or become involved in a controversy." 34
The desire for secrecy of price concessions sometimes led to odd
arrangementsY 49 The secrecy indicates awareness of the fact that the
preferences sought by and granted to A & P were often in excess of
cost savings by A & P suppliers. We have already noted A & P's
admission that it was impossible to devise an equitable yardstick by
which the monetary value of advertising allowances could be measured.
Nevertheless, A & P continued to seek and to receive such allowances
without letting itself be pinned down to any specific advertising per-
formance. Similarly, as has been stated, many of the quantity dis-
count or cost savings agreements could not be shown to reflect actual
savings. ° For this reason a supplier of A & P was warned by its
counsel not to sign A & P's "Cost Savings Agreement," because that
contract form "seems on its face to indicate an attempt on the part of
347. Id. at 2957.
348. Id. at 2940.
349. In 1937 Weber Baking Company and Langendorf Bread Company gave A &
P 109 rebates in cash which A & P entered on its books as receipts from John Doe.
In explaining this unorthodox accounting procedure, the Los Angeles Unit advised
Headquarters Treasurer Carlton on June 15, 1937: "Their reason for paying us in
cash and requesting us to make entries as JoHn Doe, is that they are afraid that either
someone in their office or ours might leave and go with a competitor and the informa-
tion would become known." Id., v. 15, p. 2985; Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 161.
350. H. C. Brill Company, 26 F.T.C. 666, 678 (1938), was a proceeding in which
the FTC found no justification for volume discounts allowed to A & P on sales of
ice cream powder.
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the purchaser to secure a discount on commodities sold by the Hills
Brothers Company to it and seeks to justify the discount upon the
basis of cost savings which are probably non-existent." "' Another
supplier, Cranberry Canners, also refused to sign the cost savings form
on the ground that it could not show a manufacturing economy; but
it was willing to continue quantity discounts in the vague hope that if
ever called upon to justify them, it could "just meet the situation when
and if it arises with whatever conditions at that time will prove the
most effective." 852
A & P's ability to buy cheaper than anyone else as a result of
unique price concessions, 53 often apparently without justification of
cost savings,85 was maintained by the use of threats to withdraw
patronage and sometimes to enter into manufacturing.855 A few ex-
amples will illustrate.
In October, 1939, counsel to A & P wrote to the company with
reference to Cost Savings Agreements. Observing that many meat
packers refused to give discounts to A & P on the ground that they
were not giving any to other large buyers, he said:
"If the packers do not give the discount to other buyers who
are also entitled to it, the giving of it to A & P would, of course,
be discriminatory. The only solution is for A & P to rely on its
purchasing power and refuse to deal with packers who are not
willing to give the discount even if it means giving it to other large
buyers. This is a perfectly legitimate use of the company's bar-
351. A & P Tr., v. 12, pp. 2293-4. The letter also stated "that the A & P
is doing its best to find a form of contract which will justify it in accepting discounts
not granted to others, even though unjustifiable, by placing the entire burden of justi-
fication on the seller. . . . Until such time as you can prove to your satisfaction
that cost savings do result from your sales to A & P, we would counsel strongly
against signing any such agreement." Id. at 2299, 2300. As a result of this advice
Hills Brothers refused to sign the "Cost Savings Agreement" but did execute a
"Quantity Discount Agreement" Id., v. 23, pp. 4610-1.
352. A & P Tr., v. 12, p. 2366-2367.
353. The following are additional examples: The representative of a company
manufacturing fruit jar caps answered "yes" to the question whether A & P could
buy its caps "cheaper than any wholesaler in the country." Id., v. 15, p. 2851. The
representative of the Walker-Austex Chile Company answered "No" to the question
whether "any other company or customer [than A & P] ever received that quantity
discount." Id., v. 16, p. 3037. The representative of Hunter Packing Company
answered "No" to the question whether he had "ever entered into a cost savings
agreement or any general discount agreement with any other customer." Id., v. 27,
p. 5591.
354. A particularly illuminating example is Government Exhibit No. 4443, A &
P Tr., v. 60, pp. 14,882-1 through-3, containing a comparison of prices per bale re-
ceived by the Quaker Oats Company of Chicago during the second half of 1943. The
exhibit shows that the bales purchased by A & P always contained 10 five pound
bags, while the majority of purchases by others were in bales containing only 9 such
bags; nevertheless, the prices charged to A & P for 10-bag bales were lower than
those charged to others for 9-bag bales and lower than the prices charged to those
other customers who also purchased 10 bag bales. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 299.
355. Govt. Br. (C.A.), pp. 214-227.
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gaining power. If the threat of loss of sales convinces the packer
that he should sign the agreement, the company can rely on the
seller's statement in the contract that the same discount is given
on proportionately equal terms to other buyers who can qualify
for it. It is impossible for the company to ascertain whether all
buyers are being treated equally. The avowal clause in the con-
tract should protect us." 356
In 1932 Swift & Co. refused to pay brokerage to A & P. The
officer in charge of the national meat department then suggested to
Headquarters that Mr. Swift should be advised that "unless his Eastern
plants were prepared to allow . . . a brokerage . . . we would be
obliged to consider their attitude unsatisfactory, and to place not only
their Eastern plants, but all Swift outlets, on our unsatisfactory list. It
would certainly give the Swift executives plenty to think about in losing
twenty-five million dollars worth of sales, especially at this time." He
added that "Swift & Co. will be the ones to suffer if they refuse to meet
our views." 35' After A & P's defeat in the brokerage case brought
against it by the Federal Trade Commission, the company, as noted
above, attempted to exercise similar pressure to induce its suppliers to
abandon all sales to brokers and to sell exclusively direct. This was
not an easy problem; although many complied with A & P's wishes," '
others proved recalcitrant. Among the latter was a supplier of potato
salad who was told that A & P would not deal with him if he had any
brokers on this product, "regardless of the broker's location." 359
Similarly, successful efforts to overcome the resistance of a packer of
Brandywine mushrooms were described in the following letter to Head-
quarters:
"In Chicago where he has a large business he could sell his
broker without brokerage or put him on a salary. If he does not
elect to come direct with us we should spread our business around
a little more than we have been doing. We are not rubbing it in,
but we made Brandywine." 360
With reference to another company a field buyer reported "that regard-
less of what set-up they have they simply must have our business." 361
356. A & P Tr., v. 12, p. 2309.
357. Id., v. 4, pp. 496, 497.
358. "It is not an easy problem for some of these canners to decide to give up
as high as 50 brokers selling quite a proportion of their products, but they did so
decide. They are inclined to increase equipment to enable them to supply more of the
articles they are packing and to put up products which are now being bought from
indirect sellers in their territory." Letter from Zoller to the Director of Purchases
in Pittsburgh, March 1, 1940. A & P Tr., v. 28, pp. 5883-4.
359. Id., v. 26, p. 5405.
360. Id., v. 28, p. 5861.
361. Id. at 5907.
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A & P thus tried not merely to secure unique price concessions,
but also to restrain the freedom of its suppliers to do business with
others as they pleased with resulting curtailment of the business oppor-
tunities of independent brokers. Interference with the relationship be-
tween suppliers and others was also manifest in a "crusade" by A &
P 862 to move "in a united front against manufacturers offering pre-
mium deals" so that "they would all eventually become discouraged and
refrain from offering premiums to the trade at large." " The "dis-
couragement" was to be accomplished by the threat of refusing to
restock their products.86 Similar threats were used against suppliers
who made store-door deliveries to A & P competitors. 65
With respect to the threat of expanding A & P's manufacturing
activities, Mr. John Hartford in 1927 asked the purchasing directors
how they felt about a plan to advertise extensively the products manu-
factured by A & P and its subsidiaries. They answered that such a
demonstration was needed "in order to safeguard the arrangements
which we now have with national manufacturers. They felt that with
the success of such a plan it would be much easier to get national manu-
facturers to recognize us and that they will be anxious to keep their
arrangements with us attractive so that we would not consider it
necessary to go into their lines." 866
The most effective application of these measures is shown by
A & P's negotiations with the Ralston-Purina Company. A & P took
more than 60% of the cornflakes produced by that company at dis-
counts of 7 /b per case.867 In 1939 A & P informed Ralston that it
could save 21 cents a case by manufacturing flakes itself and that it
would start production accordingly, unless Ralston could change its
ideas on quantity discounts. 66 Six months of negotiations followed
362. Id., v. 24, p. 4943.
363. Id. at 4941, 4992. The language quoted in the text is from an Atlantic
Division circular to its sales managers, dated November 13, 1940. The circular con-
tinues as follows: "there is not to be any agreement entered into by chain competi-
tors and ourselves as to do so might be considered an act of Restraint of Trade.
However, if there is a Food Distributor's Association in your territory such as we
know there is in Philadelphia and Baltimore, the Association's Secretary or Managing
Director might easily upon behalf of all members, lodge his protest against premium
deals."
364. One manufacturer advised the New Orleans purchasing office that "they
would make every effort to change their merchandising ideas as far as premiums are
concerned to agree with ours, as they feel that we are one of their best outlets, and
by our not stocking their products, it would handicap them considerably in their
merchandising efforts." Id. at 4988.
365. See A & P case, 173 F.2d at 83.
366. A & P Tr., v. 16, p. 3164.
367. A & P Tr., v. 28, pp. 5797, 5701. Red and White and National Tea
Company received a discount of 50. Id. at 5702. Ralston-Purina produced one
brand of flakes, Sunnyfield, only for A & P. Id. at 5797.
368. Id. at 5729, 5735-6.
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which resulted in an increase of the discount for the major part of the
cornflakes sold to A & P from 71 to 171 per case.36 9 The granting
of such an increase of 125% in the quantity discount is explained by
testimony on behalf of Ralston-Purina that all the flakes and shredded
Ralston purchased by A & P were manufactured in one plant at Battle
Creek, Michigan, and that they "would have had difficulty operating
it without a loss" if A & P had suddenly removed its volume purchases;
if such withdrawal had occurred, Ralston "might have had to change
the plant over to some other kind of a plant to make use of it." 30
Ralston-Purina suggested the insertion of the following clause in the
new contract with A & P:
"The discounts allowed in this contract are not made in lieu
of brokerage, but represent an arbitrary reduction from our list
prices which it was necessary to make to hold the flake cereal
business of the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company and to
secure from them an agreement not to enter into the business of
manufacturing flakes for five years." 371
A & P refused to accept this clause. 72 The discounts to other cus-
tomers of Ralston-Purina remained five cents per case or less.378
3. The Atlantic Commission Company
The activities of the Atlantic 'Commission Company, A & P's
wholly-owned subsidiary charged with buying fruits, vegetables and
produce, are described at great length in Judge Lindley's opinion in
the District Court 3 7 4 and more briefly in Judge Minton's opinion in
the Court of Appeals. 5 This company, generally known as ACCO,
acted not only as buyer for A & P, but was also engaged in "trade
sales," i.e., buying and selling for others than A & P, which constituted
about 25% of its business.3 6 Judge Lindley indicated that ACCO's
methods tainted the whole fabric of A & P's operations "T and violated
the Sherman Act even if in other respects the practices of A & P could
be assumed to be within the law. 78 This assumption was not shared
by the Court of Appeals, which referred to ACCO's activities as ex-
369. Id. at 5766, 5735.
370. Id. at 5827, 5828.
371. Id. at 5785.
372. Id. at 5786.
373. Id. at 5792.
374. A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 655-664.
375. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 84-86.
376. A & P Br. App., v. III, p. 62; A & P case, 173 F.2d at 84.
377. A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 658.
378. Id. at 678. In an advertisement published by A & P on May 11, 1950 A & P
quoted judge Lindley as having stated in a letter: "I have condemned their practices
through the Atlantic Commission Company."
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amples of a general "conspiracy to establish a two-price level at the
buying level, which enables A & P to meet its competitors with an
enormous advantage at the retail level." 17' Thus, the Court of Appeals
implicitly disapproved Judge Lindley's conclusion that the conviction
for violation of the Sherman Act should rest only on ACCO.8 0
A brief summary of this phase of the case will be sufficient to
show that ACCO was only one of several means used by A & P in its
systematic drive to secure for itself advantages over other buyers.
ACCO was able to do this most effectively because of the dual nature
of its position as buying agent for A & P with respect to 75% of its
business and as a broker for "the trade" with respect to the remaining
25%. The reasons for the establishment and maintenance of ACCO's
"trade sales outlets" were described in the minutes of a meeting of its
merchandising committee on May 4, 1940 as follows:
"First, the necessity of such outlets for shippers who prefer to
do all of their business with AC. Co. at those times when their
supplies exceeded Teaco requirements. Second, to make available
to similar shippers trade outlets for merchandise that might be of
a quality unsuited for Teaco. Third, to provide an outlet for
merchandise purchased by the A. C. Co. which proved on arrival
to be unsatisfactory for the Teaco, minimizing the losses on such
purchases. Fourth, to obtain a lower A. C. Co. operation expense
through the increased volume. Fifth, through the friendly trade
contacts to be better posted on market conditions and prices than
would be possible in purchasing only for the Teaco. Sixth, unless
trade outlets are maintained for shippers, direct contact arrange-
ments with shippers could not be obtained so that when market
conditions made purchase of merchandise at shipping point inad-
visable such purchases on an arrival basis would not be possible
when another intermediate factor was involved." 381
A year before this meeting ACCO's general manager had written to
his staff that "a child can sell merchandise or fill the Teaco require-
ments with good quality, but it takes salesmanship to sell merchandise
of poor quality to regular trade outlets and, of course, a shipper needs
this service under adverse conditions and our organization in order to
be able to develop and maintain constant consignment tonnage under
all conditions needs to exert effort in selling poor merchandise that has
to go through some channel at times. However, of course, not Teaco
quality or the use of their outlet for these offerings." 38 2
379. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 87.
380. The advertisement of May 11, 1950 glosses over this fact. It merely men-
tions that Judge Lindley was upheld on appeal.
381. A & P Br. App., v. III, p. 63.
382. Id. at 62. Emphasis added.
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Quality preference was thus added to price preference through the
duality of ACCO's position which enabled it to carry out directly the
policy of creating two quality levels and two price levels by securing
all the price preferences previously discussed on its purchases for A & P
while at the same time buying at market prices for its trade customers,
from whom it also collected a brokerage as compensation for its serv-
ices. The result is described by Judge Minton: "Suppose an item was
selling in the market at 100. ACCO could buy it for A & P and have
its choice of the quality at 95. The balance of the trade could buy at
100 and pay ACCO a 5% brokerage. Thus the price to A & P was 95
and to A & P's competitors 105." 383
Judge Lindley emphasized the "inconsistent legal positions" which
ACCO occupied "in its predominating position in the produce industry,
acting as a buyers' broker, a sales broker, a direct buyer for A & P." 384
It is true, as A & P contended, that ACCO's information concerning
supply and market conditions everywhere in the country was "unusually
complete" and that shippers employing ACCO as a seller's agent and
jobbers employing it as a buyer's agent received the benefit of such
information."8 5 Nevertheless, many shippers complained vigorously
about ACCO's dual role. For instance, the general manager of the
Yakima Fruit Growers Association of Yakima, Washington, at a
meeting with ACCO officials, summed up his criticism of ACCO and
of the Wesco Foods Company, a subsidiary of Kroger which fulfilled
the same functions as ACCO, in the following terms:
"We welcome the Atlantic Commission Company here, and
the Wesco, as buyers, and buyers for their respective chain or-
ganizations, but I am frank to say that when it comes to the
matter of their acting as our agents as sellers at the same time,
that this is an entirely different matter, because we do not believe
that they can be fish and fowl at the same time. It is our advice
and understanding that the Atlantic Commission Company pur-
chase for the Tea Company approximately . . . 67,000 cars a
year, and that their outside business with independent jobbers,
and buying for them, and acting as agents for shippers, they sell
or purchase for the account of others from 35 to 40,000 cars . . .
I say that they cannot act efficiently, properly, in both of those
capacities, because it is the object of a buyer and properly so, to
buy as cheap as he can, to obtain the best possible and the lowest
383. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 85. A & P, however, maintained the ACCO or-
ganization that served it, in addition to paying for its purchases. In addition, its
competitors who did not engage in direct buying would have had to pay the same
commission to some other broker if not to ACCO.
384. A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 663.
385. A & P Br., p. 320. Possibly these factors account in part for ACCO's
continued employment by the trade in the face of its discriminatory practices. See,
however, text at note 390 infra.
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price which he can secure. That is just common, ordinary busi-
ness. On the other hand, it is the object and purpose of a seller
to sell at as high a price as he can get. Therefore, it seems to me
the position of the Atlantic Commission Company, the two func-
tions are diametrically opposed." 31'
The association represented by this speaker and eighteen other
northwestern apple growers in May, 1939, sent a letter to Mr. John
Hartford, president of A & P, which, in part, read as follows:
"We . . .believe that chain stores have . . . rendered a dis-
tinctly beneficial service to the producers of fruits and vegetables.
The chains have . . ., through modem merchandising practices,
displayed these items so as to attract consumers and increase the
volume of turnover. They have reduced the margin of retailer
profit which prevailed prior to the advent of the chains and,
through their example, independent grocers have been compelled
in many instances to adopt similar practices. Unlike the over-
ambitious politicians, we are not condemning the chain stores as
such ....
"The chains, however, through their purchasing agents or
purchasing subsidiaries are following certain practices which we
believe are definitely harmful . . .
"The Atlantic Commission Company buy at shipping point.
They also buy in terminal markets from various jobbers and re-
ceivers. At the same time they solicit various jobbers and re-
ceivers and other small buyers in terminal markets to secure their
business, buying on a brokerage basis.
"In securing such business, the Atlantic Commission Com-
pany barters with the trade and exchanges Tea Company spot
supplies for trade purchases. The Atlantic Commission Company
terminal market offices then wire their field representatives which,
in turn, work all shippers, giving the business to the lowest bidder.
They have, in effect, a boycott system against shippers who have
declined their demand for a $30.00 brokerage instead of the cus-
tomary $25.00 which prevails in trade circles, and only buy from
them when the few shippers who, through fear of this boycott
have agreed to the increased brokerage are unable to furnish the
necessary supplies.
"These practices . . . have a very depressing effect on the
market . . .
"We believe the Atlantic Commission Company should con-
fine its purchases to supplies needed by the Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Company only and discontinue the practice of serving outside
members of the trade. . . .,
386. A & P Tr., v. 40, pp. 8605-44 and 45. Apparently A & P alleged that the
District Court erred in concluding that ACCO had an obligation, as an agent for
sellers, to sell high. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 249.
387. A & P Tr., v. 40, pp. 8586-8589.
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Another shipper, urging Mr. Hartford to confine the purchases
of ACCO to A & P requirements, made an additional point. He first
pointed out that "the possession of as much power as your volume of
business gives to you is not a good thing for you because it gives you
the responsibility for the unusually low prices which often occur in any
fruit business." 888 Up to this point the plight of this shipper may
evoke only crocodile tears, since a lowering of prices even on farm
products, if passed on to the consumer, may be looked upon as serving
the general welfare.88 However, the letter continued:
"Your purchases for the account of terminal jobbers increases
the volume of business which you do and, both directly and in-
directly, adds to your responsibility in the year's poor prices. The
indirect phase of this responsibility is worse than the direct inas-
much as your purchases give you a club over the terminal jobbers
which potentially could be used to force them to buy only through
your shipping point representatives."' 890
Here is a clear charge of restraint of trade, and there is evidence in
the record to show that ACCO indulged in such restraints. For in-
stance, the Government alleged that when the patronage of certain
jobbers could not be obtained by ACCO "in its role as jobbers' buying
broker [i.e., when jobbers tried to avoid ACCO brokerage fees by
buying direct], ACCO assumed its role as shippers' selling broker and
went over their heads to the shippers from whom they sought to buy.
In these situations ACCO demanded that such shippers sell only
through it on the selling end and thus the jobbers were forced back into
ACCO's arms on the buying end and deprived of the opportunity of
purchasing directly." 8 91 In one case, ACCO discovered that one of
its clients, Growers Marketing Service, had sold tangerines in New
York through an agency other than ACCO; ACCO complained and
secured an apology from Growers' that "this sale is regretted." 89'
Growers' also assured ACCO that it would "have exclusive handling
of any of his fruit which may be shipped to New York City on con-
388. Id. at 8594-5.
389. Adelman, The A & P Case, 63 Q.J. EcoN. 238, 248 (1949). On the con-
troversial question of the exemption of agriculture from the anti-trust laws see ED-
wARDs, op. cit. .rnpra note 232, at 56-66.
390. A & P Tr., v. 40, p. 8595. Emphasis added. ACCO's staff knew that pur-
chasing power may be used as a "club"; the manager of the Houston office referred
to his relationship with jobbers in the following terms: "I am after these fellows every
day for business, and I do realize that we are not getting the business we did a year
ago [1936], but I am afraid we will not get our share this season [1937] as we do
not have the axe on them as we did last year since we are operating our own produce
warehouse and not buying from them." Id., v. 38, pp. 8144-5.
391. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 245.
392. Ibid.; A & P Tr., v. 38, p. 8179.
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signment." 03' In another similar case ACCO learned confidentially
that a Washington jobber had purchased directly from the shipper Max
Cohen a car of cabbage; ACCO's Miami office reported this to its
Southeastern District. Manager with the following comment: "We
know, of course, on direct buying he [the jobber] can always save
brokerage, but it seems with the amount of business we probably do
with Cohen he should quote through us.. . . " "' The District Man-
ager then settled the matter with Cohen; he wrote Cohen that he
"would appreciate you keeping me posted in the event you run across
a similar situation in the future so that we can follow up these cases
and possibly impress upon the shipper [purchaser] the fact that we
know what is going on and expect the proper treatment." 3 95
The Government concluded that "this browbeating of shippers
caught in the act of selling through channels other than ACCO is
based upon ACCO's belief that it has vested rights in the reciprocal
patronage of all shippers and jobbers who themselves obtain any ACCO
patronage in any of its numerous roles." " A & P and ACCO denied
that they had any such philosophy or that they attempted coercion of
any kind; 397 they pointed out that most of the jobbers bought more
than half of their merchandise from the outside trade 8 and explained
the two cases described above as examples of "the common practice
among men throughout the ages of expecting business from those to
whom they give it, and following up to find out what is wrong if they
do not get it." 19 Perhaps it is hard to draw the line between a
philosophy of vested rights and mere expectation of reciprocity; yet,
ACCO felt it was "due a big part" of the outside business of any of its
customers who serve A & p.
400
393. Id. at 8180-1.
394. Id. at 8162.
395. Id. at 8164.
396. Govt. Br. (C.A.), p. 246.
397. A & P Reply Br., pt. II, pp. 237, 238, and pt. I pp. 175, 177.
398. Id., pt. II, p. 237.
399. Id., pt. I, p. 177.
400. A & P Tr., v. 38, p. 8143. Compare the following excerpts from a legal
memorandum issued by counsel on July 17, 1940 to vice-presidents, divisonal managers
and unit sales managers with respect to ACCO's obligations under the Robinson-
Patman Act (A & P Br. App., v. III, pp. 214, 215.):
Third: (a) It is charged that we, in endeavoring to sell merchandise to
trade customers, have threatened to boycott them by not purchasing any of their
merchandise for Teaco requirements unless they bought their fresh fruit and
vegetable requirements through us.
This constitutes coercion and may be a violation of the fair practice provision
of the Federal Trade Commission Act, and, may be a violation of the Clayton
Act. It is however permissible for us in purchasing merchandise for the Teaco
to give preference to such merchandise as we have sold to trade buyers, price and
quality being at least equal to that offered by other dealers.
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In its advertisement published on May 11, 1950, A & P announced
that "the Atlantic Commission Company abandoned the dual role to
which Judge Lindley objected" and "now only buys for A & P." This
action eliminates all of the problems caused by ACCO's inconsistent
dual or even multiple positions, but it does not remove any of the
objections against ACCO's buying practices as A & P's purchasing
agent, with particular reference to price, which were the same as those
described in the preceding section of this chapter. A & P as a buyer
of fruits and vegetables acted in the same manner as in buying all other
supplies, except that the buying of fruits and vegetables was done
through a corporate subsidiary.
One particular device adopted by ACCO as a buyer for A & P
(apparently not used by the parent company) deserves special refer-
ence. This is ACCO's distinction between "cash" and "regular term"
purchases. A lower price was deemed justified for the former because
it involved "definite savings to the seller by reason of the fact that the
buyer (ACCO) will assume responsibility for the merchandise when
it leaves the shipping point." 401 In "regular term" purchases, on the
other hand, the seller "assumes considerable transit risk, also grants the
buyer privilege of inspection of the merchandise at destination and
rejection there if it fails to conform with the terms of purchase . . .
and payment for the merchandise is not obtained until arrival of the
merchandise at destination." 402 Accordingly, ACCO decided in April,
1940, "to operate to the fullest extent on cash commitments and effect
the customary savings in not having the shipper carry the insurance
on delivered prices which in reality is a considerable premium, on the
differentials in cash versus regular terms." 40'
Three days after this announcement ACCO instructed its buyers
that while all merchandise purchased for cash must be inspected by
(b) It is also charged that we use coercion in the following manner: We
represent a shipper in one location; an independent represents him in another
locality and has there built up a good business; it is charged that we go to the
shipper and refuse to handle his account anywhere unless we handle it everywhere.
This may violate the law and it is certainly bad business practice and one not
in accordance with our policies.
(c) It has been charged that in order to coerce shippers to permit us to repre-
sent them in markets where the shipper was already making direct sales, that we
threatened to withdraw our reptesentation of the shipper in other markets (or
a threat of withdrawal of Teaco's business) unless the shipper gave us his ac-
count in the markets where the shipper was already selling direct and needed no
broker. The same comment as in (b) applies.
401. Memorandum from Counsel to Vice-President Bofinger, dated January 22,
1940. A & P Tr., v. 33, p. 6866. The memorandum added that ACCO would buy
on regular terms for its other customers, thus assuring A & P of lower purchase
prices for A & P requirements.
402. Inter-office communication from ACCO to Legal Department, Id. at 6852-3.
403. Id. at 6911.
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ACCO's personnel, "in the absence of such personal inspection merchan-
dise is to be bought for acceptance as to grade and quality upon destina-
tion arrival." 404 These instructions, however, did not authorize pay-
ment of the higher price in such cases; on the contrary, ACCO in-
sisted on the lower "cash" price in spite of the fact that in-transit re-
sponsibility was left with the shipper, which eliminated much of the
justification for the differential. This was accomplished by agreements
with some 237 shippers who were willing to protect ACCO's purchases
as equivalent to U. S. Grade No. 1 upon arrival at destination in those
cases where ACCO could not make inspection at shipping points. These
shippers agreed that if such merchandise purchased by ACCO is not
equivalent to U. S. Grade 1 on arrival they would reimburse ACCO. 0 5
In other words, ACCO paid cash "with a guaranty from the shipper
that he will stand behind the grade." 400 This arrangement would
seem to be similar to advertising allowances carrying no specific obliga-
tion to advertise and cost savings agreements without provable savings.
Although many shippers agreed to this, many others objected on
the ground that "other cash buyers purchase merchandise from them
with no guarantees or strings attached"; these shippers demanded a
premium over and above the cash price in consideration of the requested
guaranty on arrival.
40 7
4. A & P as a Seller
The theory of the case against A & P was "Abuse of combined
vertical and horizontal integration," carried out in two ways: by
"coercing systematic discriminatory buying preferences" and by "elim-
ination of competition by sales in selected areas below cost of doing
business." 40 In relation to the latter, it is fairly clear that the com-
pany followed a general policy of not selling below replacement cost.
The minutes of a board meeting of the Central Western Division in
January, 1933, record that the officials of the company "have very
generously agreed to permit us to operate on an even break" and that
"nothing ruthless will be attempted or countenanced, such as selling
below cost. . . ." The same minutes describe this policy as one to
"swap dollars," 409 which can only mean that all profits should be dis-
404. Id. at 6921.
405. Id. at 6921, 6922, 6930, 6934, 6935, 6941, 6963-6972.
406. Id. at 6955.
407. Id. at 7022. Apparently no business was done by ACCO with this group.
408. These are the two major headings in the Government's brief in the District
Court. The second heading deals with "price wars" in all the Divisions of A & P.
See pp. 628-986 of the same brief.
409. A & P Tr., v. 5, pp. 695, 696, 698.
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pensed with 41 at least until the higher volume expected from sales at
lower prices had sufficiently reduced the expense rate.
At about the same time the Middle Western Executive Com-
mittee reported that "there will be no merchandise sold below cost and
a restriction was placed on each unit as to the limit it may go into red
during any particular week." 411 Since the basic policy of A & P in-
volved a low gross profit rate, that is to say a small excess of the selling
price over the cost of the merchandise, it is clear that the term "cost"
in this pronouncement refers either to replacement cost or actual cost
of the merchandise sold, without reference to general overhead (selling
and administrative expenses) .41' Hence the gross profit could be so
low as not to leave sufficient margin for the overhead. Moreover, in
those cases where the company merely "swapped dollars," goods would
be sold at cost without any gross profit. Thus a low gross profit or
the absence of any gross profit would be the equivalent of a net loss
for each store and this is precisely what was meant by the statement
that each unit could "go into red" only up to a specified limit.
In more recent years there were some deviations from this policy
of not selling below actual or replacement cost. For instance in De-
cember, 1941, the Sales Director for the Southern Division advised
the sales manager of the Charlotte, N. C., unit of a "new super-market
gross profit program" calling for a gross profit rate of .1050; he was
told that this was "very low" and that "we should be careful not to
sell merchandise too much below the replacement cost as to do that
may invite sales to dealers which, of course, is something we do not
want to happen." 413 This is an acknowledgment of the danger that
competitors might buy their supplies in A & P retail stores cheaper
than they could buy from wholesalers ... and that sales somewhat
below replacement costs actually occurred at times.
The fact that there were always numerous stores "in the red"
received much attention during the trial. For instance, the president
410. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 652.
411. A & P Br. App., v. IV, p. 179. Emphasis added. As to the same policy
in all other divisions see id. at 183, 235. In 1935 the Middle Western Executive
Committee, referring to actions of competitors in setting prices below the N.R.A.
mark-up, observed that "we are not to initiate below-code selling and in no event are
we to sell below-cost unless authority is secured from the Division Office, who
in turn must obtain approval of New York Headquarters. In those instances where
prices are set below 3% gross profit and down to cost, it will be necessary for the
units to send the Divisional Office the 3% gross profit forms. . . ." Id. at 179.
412. For instance, in July 1939 two stores in Allentown, Pa., operating on "very
low gross profits" of .0996 and .1037, had expense rates of .1750 and .1480 respectively.
A & P Tr., v. 51, p. 11,461. In Easton, Pa., there was a store operated at a gross
profit rate of .1219 and an expense rate of .1764. Id. at 11,462.
413. A & P Tr., v. 46, pp. 9991, 9992. The same instructions were given to other
Units in the Southern Division. Id., v. 47, p. 10,397.
414. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 749.
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of the Middle Western Division testified that "stores were frequently
operated in the red for a period of as much as four years and Division
Headquarters was receiving the store operating reports during those
four years. Stores in the red were reported on and analyzed and if
there seemed to be a reasonable opportunity for improvement during
the forthcoming quarter they were authorized to continue operations,
sometimes continuing this way for four years. The experience has
been that stores in red frequently represented a large percentage of the
total stores in a unit." "'s The same witness explaiied that a store
is operating "in the red" when its expense rate is above its gross profit
rate, but that there was "never" any purpose or intent to make any
store a losing store.416
This assertion that red figures for individual stores were never
planned is refuted by considerable evidence to the contrary. The
instruction quoted above that there was a limit up to which stores
might go into red ink is a case in point; similarly, on August 30, 1940,
the chairman of the board of the Atlantic Division wrote to the presi-
dent of the Southern Division about a conference with Messrs. John
and George Hartford:
[I]n going over the figures yesterday Mr. John con-
tinually hammered on our high gross profits . . . throughout the
Southern Division. They spent a lot of time on Dallas . . .Mr.
John and Mr. George both expressed themselves as feeling that
if we got our gross profit down where it should be we would get
some business. They would like to see you operating the stores
in the City of Dallas on a 12 percent gross and no matter how
much money you lost there would be no complaint from them. We
went over dozens of stores . . . in other Divisions . . .where
the rents were high, sales small and losing substantially, but the
gross profit was around 12 percent and Headquarters did not
criticize the operation at all-and they so expressed themselves
that they would not care how much money we lost as long as we
kept our gross profit down." 417
The minutes of an Executive Board meeting of the Atlantic Di-
vision on May 23, 1939, review the results of the super-market gross
volume program in that territory in terms of "proposed" profits and
losses in various units and "scheduled weekly losses" for certain
cities; 418 also total operating losses for the Division as a whole during
415. Summary in A & P Br. App., v. IV, p. 174; A & P Tr., v. 63, pp. 15,153,
15,156.
416. A & P Br. App., v. IV, pp. 174, 175; A & P Tr., v. 63, pp. 15,174 and
15,203.
417. A & P Tr., v. 47, pp. 10181-2. Emphasis added.
418. "In operating profit it was pointed out that the Baltimore Unit was running
$400 per week accumulated in excess of its $1000 net profit requirement; Philadelphia
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the first quarter of the year were described as "$500 per week more
than the program which was set up at $5225 per week." "
The planned losses described above reflect, of course, only retail
store operations. They do not take into account profits realized from
other sources. There are the "profits" of the manufacturing sub-
sidiaries of A & P; since 1934 these subsidiaries have billed A & P
warehouses at cost plus a factory profit, and such profits have been paid
as dividends to A & P." 0 A certified public accountant called as a
defense witness testified that "since 1934 the estimated profits of the
manufacturing subsidiaries have been allocated to the units . . . on
the basis of the quantities of the products of each shipped to the retail
warehouse units." " In addition, there are the profits derived from
advertising allowances, quantity discounts, and "cost savings" allow-
ances, which go into a special account at Headquarters where these
sums are collected. From that account "headquarters allowances" are
"allocated monthly or quarterly to the Units to which the merchandise
is delivered on the basis of shipments made, with the fourth quarter
allocation made in such manner that the annual statistical reports agree
substantially with the accounting reports in that respect." ' Similar
allocations were made with respect to allowances paid by suppliers to
A & P's field buying offices rather than to Headquarters. Both such
"headquarters" and "local allowances" were, from an accounting stand-
point, considered as operating profits for the retail stores.423
about $1000 per week more than its proposed loss; Richmond a little less than
$550 per week under proposed profits; . . . Washington just about even with its
$4000 scheduled weekly loss." Id., v. 50, p. 11133.
419. Ibid. See also the minutes of an Executive Board meeting of the Atlantic
Division of April 8, 1940 which approved a policy to exceed the sales of the 1940
program "even though to gain this objective we might experience some little operating
loss." Ibid., v. 51, p. 11181. There was also no objection "to the meat department
being somewhat in red" because "meat is a splendid leader." Ibid., p. 11,416.
420. A & P Br. App., v. I, p. 39.
421. A & P Tr., v. 62, p. 14,982. Defendants summarized the testimony of the
witness, Mr. H. E. Nichols, as follows: "While the annual statistical reports do not
include all of such [manufacturing] profit shown by the accounting records, it is
possible to reconcile them. Nichols thought such an allocation justifiable because
the over-all picture of A & P as a merchandising operation would otherwise not be
complete. In his opinion such an allocation is sound and equitable and does not
favor a Unit cutting prices. These profits, however, are not allocated in the account-
ing records and Nichols did not believe that they were properly attributable to the
retail store operations because he thought that they are manufacturing operations whose
profits are determined in their own accounts." A & P Br. App., v. I, pp. 97, 98. At
a Board meeting of the Central Western Division in July, 1938, Mr. John Hartford
said: "Subsidiary profits play quite an important part in our total earnings and the
point was brought out that it seems unwise to return to the Units too much of the
earnings of these companies, coffee being mentioned in particular, as when such
returns are made the money is dissipated in lower prices in other commodities."
Id. at 98.
422. Summary of Nichol's testimony, A & P Br. App., v. I, p. 96.
423. Id. at 96, 97. See text to note 167 szpra.
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Under these circumstances it is understandable that red figures pro-
duced by the excess of the expense rate over the gross profit rate of
retail stores could easily be turned into black figures for a particular
store, unit of stores, or even a whole division by the addition of allo-
cated profit distributions. For example, the president of the Atlantic
Division advised his first vice-president in April 1939 that a total
weekly loss of $11,000 had been assigned to the Division, which was
to be distributed among the five units in the Division as follows:
Baltimore, Philadelphia, Richmond, and Washington were to take
losses of $500, 6500, 500 and 6000 respectively, and Scranton was to
make a profit of $2500."" Since the volume of sales in the Atlantic
Division had lagged behind sales elsewhere,
it was decided to subsidize our territory as far as a profit
basis is concerned and allow for a loss . . . of $11,000 per
week during the fiscal year 1939 . . . [T]he $11,000 loss does
not include the . . . Headquarters' interest credit or the profit
distribution . . . a final total result for the Division would be
a profit of $1,467,000. The Atlantic Division . . . is expected
to show about a .0046 loss weekly but inclusive of overages and
distributions a profit of .0119 will be realized." 45
This policy of "subsidies" for retail stores or even for particular
departments of retail stores 42 is the basis for the Government's argu-
ment that "the profits from A & P's non-retail operations are credited
to their retail operations, including those profits secured by discrimina-
tory buying preferences. These direct subsidies make it difficult, if
not impossible, for less strongly integrated, or for non-integrated com-
petitors engaged only in retailing, to compete or survive." 17
The Government also contended that "a disproportionate share
of the general profits from retail operations . . . is channeled into
specific retail areas for the purpose of permitting A & P in those areas
to undersell retail competitors" and that "with the help of this credit-
424. A & P Tr., v. 51, pp. 11,412-3.
425. Id. at 11,410-1. Emphasis added.
426. In a memorandum to sales managers with respect to gross profit rates on
produce in supermarkets, dated July 10, 1941, it is stated that a gross profit of less
than 10% would result in "tremendous loss." If the gross on produce should be in-
creased, the gross on "selected grocery items" should be reduced "in order to
keep our total rate in line with the program." Generally, "we believe . . . that there
should be a limit to the extent to which we may go in subsidizing any one department,
although, of course we cannot overlook the sales importance of certain lines of mer-
chandise." A & P Tr., v. 46, p. 9970. In February 1941 the sales director of the
Atlantic Division objected to an immediate increase of the gross profit in self-service
stores because this would slow down the steady increase in volume of sales. He
suggested that Mr. John Hartford should be asked "to continue the subsidy in
Philadelphia so that we can get the weekly volume up to $950,000 and possibly a
million dollars." Id., v. 51, p. 11,391.
427. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 1075.
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ing of profits, selected retail areas are operated below their cost of
doing business for the purpose of injuring or destroying retail com-
petitors. . . ." According to the Government these are "unlawful
practices" which are the heart of the case.42
The critics of the Government's position on this point in the A & P
case assert that the Government and the Courts are entangled in "con-
fusion," 429 and in "a direct attack on the competitive process." 430
The Government's theory that integration as such is not under attack,
but only its abuse, is said to be inconsistent with the Government's
charge of illegality of subsidies, because "subsidies" and "integration"
.re "two names for the same thing;" 43 transfers of earnings from any
stage of the integrated company to another stage are merely bookkeep-
ing entries or accounting fictions, since the manufacturing subsidiaries
do not sell and the warehouses do not buy in any real sense of those
terms.43 2  Hence, it is said, there is no sound basis for the charge of
"below cost" selling, particularly since advertising allowances and
quantity discounts are clearly "reductions in the cost of goods pur-
chased." 48 As far as sales are concerned, "A & P, responding to vary-
ing competitive pressures, sold at varying margins in various
areas;" "I if all competitive price cutting is to be outlawed, competi-
tion itself would have to be "consigned to limbo." 431 Finally, accord-
ing to the critics, there is no evidence that a reduction of prices in one
area was accompanied forthwith by an increase somewhere else; 436
such a thing would be "inherently absurd." 43
This general criticism of the decision convicting A & P of a crim-
inal violation of the Sherman Act reflects sound economic theory.
It is, of course, generally true that transfers between the various units
of an integrated firm are bookkeeping fictions. Furthermore, prices
would usually be raised in any section where the traffic can bear it,
regardless of downward pressures operating elsewhere; hence, the
theory of "recoupment" does not appear to be acceptable as immutable
economic doctrine.
428. Ibid.
429. Adelman, The A & P Case, 63 QJ. EcoN. 238, 246 (1949).
430. Note, The Perplexing Story of the A & P Case, 58 YALE LJ. 969, 977
(1949).
431. Adelman, supra note 429, at 246.
432. Id. at 245. Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 978 (1949).
433. Adelman, .rupra note 429, at 244.
434. Adelman, The Great A & P Muddle, Fortune, Dec., 1949, pp. 122, 178.
435. Note, 58 YALE L.J. 969, 977 (1949).
436. Adelman, Integration and Anti-Trust Policy, 63 HARv. L. REv. 27, 59 (1949)
(the A & P case is discussed in this article on pp. 53-60) ; Note, 58 YAL. LJ. 969,
979 (1949).
437. Adelman, supra note 436, at 59.
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The relevance of this criticism would be undisputable if the case
against A & P were based on the company's size and integrated struc-
ture as such. But, as previously noted, the Government's attack is
directed only against certain abusive practices. The critics of the de-
cision have paid no attention to the evidence pertaining to these spe-
cific practices, apparently in the belief that the real issues relate to what
appear to be dangerous fallacies of economic theory. Perhaps they feel
that if the case were to be understood as condemning merely these abu-
sive practices, it would not be very important from an economic view-
point and certainly not controversial.
Indeed, one of the critics acknowledges that sales at varying mar-
gins in various areas "can . . . be abused for monopolistic pur-
poses" and that "the Government attorneys probably had this point in
mind" but were so "preoccupied" with their theory of below cost selling
"that they neglected to make it." 48 Another commentator concedes
that "predatory" and "competitive" price cutting must be distinguished
and that possibly "in certain instances A & P's price cutting went beyond
what might be considered fair." But he also charges the Government
and the court with failure to make "a careful selection" in proving such
practices.3 9
The evidence in the record, however, shows repeated efforts to
forestall and prevent competition or to put competitors out of business
through price cutting and other predatory practices; in many instances
such price-cutting was accompanied by the raising of prices in other
areas in order to make it easier to put on full pressure in those places
where this was desired. Judge Minton in the Court of Appeals re-
ferred to this,440 but he did not support it with references to the record.
The following instances, among others, bear out his point.
A & P did admonish its staff "not by word or deed [to] let the
impression get abroad that we are at any time attempting to put any-
one out of business," because such practices are "responsible to a great
extent for the efforts of various states and Congress to adopt punitive
chain store legislation." 441 However, this policy was frequently dis-
regarded. For instance, in March, 1940, the sales director of the At-
lantic Division, writing to an official of the Eastern Division about com-
petition with Food Fair Stores, stated that
438. Adelman, The Great A & P Muddle, Fortune, Dec., 1949, p. 178.
439. See note 435 supra.
440. A & P case, 173 F.2d at 87. See also A & P case, 67 F. Supp. 626, 664-671.
441. Minutes of Executive Committee Meeting, Central Western Division, April
9, 1936, A & P Tr., v. 5, pp. 787-8. The minutes also state that "one or two in-
stances" of attempts to put competitors out of business had come to the Committee's
attention.
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"The mistake we made in Philadelphia was to let the Food
Fair get too far ahead of us before we decided to go after them.
In consequence, we had to take the business from them which
was twice as hard as it might have been had we protected our-
selves in the beginning. . . . [N]o doubt, you . . . have
given your supermarkets competitive with those of Food Fair
. . . the kind of price ammunition they needed to keep the com-
petitor from doing any damage. Whenever we get wind of the
opening of one of their stores now we set up a special program
three weeks ahead of time, so that by the time they are ready to
open their doors for business there isn't very much they can do
to entice trade from us. Maybe we are not living up to the letter
of the law with regard to company policy in this respect, but we
would much prefer to be criticized for digressing a little from the
policy than we would about competitors having taken our
business." 442
In its meeting on September 8, 1939, the Executive Board of the
Atlantic Division discussed the conversion of service stores to the self-
service or semi-self-service plan in towns where supermarkets could
not be justified. The minutes state that
c*. . the idea behind this thought would be to operate these
stores on a gross profit that would be lower than the service store,
but not as low as the super-market . . . [W]ith additional
volume we can render the public a greater service, forestall com-
petitive development, and at the same time make money on our
operations." 443
The purpose of forestalling competition was apparently a guiding
principle in many parts of the organization. In February, 1941 there
was a meeting of "key men and superintendents" at the warehouse in
Richmond, Virginia. The discussion
particularly emphasized the importance of laying our
plans for sales promotion in towns where competitors are ex-
pected to open. Nothing should be left undone to defeat compet-
itors' plans to share in our business in these towns . . . Par-
ticular attention should be given to stores in Roanoke and Waynes-
boro where Kroger stores are expected to open. This also holds
true in towns like Clifton Forge where meat managers left us to
go in business for themselves . . . Superintendents are asked to
notify the Sales Department sufficiently in advance of such open-
ings in order that competition may have no opportunity to affect
our business. In the case of Clifton Forge, special meat prices
442. Id., v. 51, pp. 11, 505-6.
443. Id., v. 7, p. 1211.
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have been given and arrangements made to feature these prices
in local newspapers.
Some time before this meeting the manager of the Richmond warehouse
had been told with respect to a c6mpetitor next door to an A & P store
that "the hotter we can make our program the quicker this outfit will
realize that they have no place in the supermarket business in Rich-
mond." 415
On other occasions too there was an intentional and organized
program to prevent competitors from entering the field. It was stated
as a matter of general principle that whenever a competitor wished to
open "alongside of us . . . we should and have been following the
policy here in Philadelphia of reducing our line . . . several weeks
prior to the time the competitor plans to open so that people in the
community will be impressed with our low prices and will continue
to trade with us after the competitor has opened shop." This will
"take the winds out of their [the competitors'] sails" and should, "of
course," be continued for the same number of weeks after the compet-
itor's opening. "Naturally the program [of reducing our line of
prices] would apply only to this store [alongside of which the competitor
opens]-not any other." 446 Accordingly, when independent merchants
planned to open in the vicinity of A & P stores, special retail price
programs were advertised and put into effect "to combat this open-
ing" 447 or "to give them a real welcome." 448
A & P contended in the litigation that its price-cutting was only
designed to meet competition 441 and offered to prove that it is "cus-
tomary in the trade to issue special prices . . . at the time, after,
and sometime immediately before the opening of a nearby competitor's
new store, in order to minimize any sudden drop in volume of business
which would otherwise be anticipated on account of the opening of such
new store," 45o and that it is also customary "to watch closely all ac-
tivities of principal competitors." 451 The court sustained the Govern-
444. Id., pp. 1297-8.
445. Id. v. 51, p. 11322.
446. Letter to the manager of the warehouse in Scranton, Pa., dated January 10,
1939, A & P Tr., v. 51, pp. 11,438-9.
447. Id. at 11442-3.
448. Id. at 11,448. For similar examples see Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 827, 912,
937, 951, 872. When a competitor who had opened in Paris, Texas, planned another
store in Hugo, Okla., the Dallas Superintendent commented: "We have got to work
out something to stop this fellow as he was greatly elated over the response he got
in Paris, and this will cause him to continue if we do not curb him. I will do some-
thing regarding Hugo." Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 827.
449. See, e.g., A & P Br. App., v. IV, pp. 49, 69, 240, 343.
450. A & P Tr., v. 77, p. 17,645.
451. Id. at 17.648.
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ment's objection to these offers as immaterial.452 The quotations from
the evidence set forth above reveal an intention which goes beyond the
mere minimizing of a sudden drop of business and contemplates, rather,
prevention or exclusion of competition. That this was the real goal
in other instances is shown by the following example: in April, 1939,
the Sales Manager of the Pittsburgh Unit advised his superintendent
that a competitor would move within a few days to a new location in
the immediate vicinity of an A & P store, and that all prices in the
latter store were to be lowered the day before the competitor
opened: 453 this A & P store had been a combination service store, but
the change put it into the super-market price classification . 54  This
could only mean that the store was placed in the red or near to it, since
combination service stores have higher gross profit and expense rates
than supermarkets. 5 5 These lower prices were put into effect without
definite knowledge as to the price structure of the competitor's
store; 4 hence, it could hardly be said that the lowering of prices was
merely a move to meet competition.
At about the same time a Pittsburgh law firm, on behalf of a small
local chain, wrote to Mr. John Hartford about an incident which they
described as follows:
"On Friday . . . Mr. King, Vice President of your com-
pany and head of the local unit, called on two executives of the
Streamline Markets in one of their new stores that had just been
opened and in a loud voice, publicly, before the employees and
customers, he threatened to commence a campaign to bring about
the financial ruin of Streamline Markets. He illustrated his threat
by calling attention to what had happened to P. H. Butler, Kroger
and the New Butler Company operating the Thorofare Markets.
In order to prove that he had vast resources with which to accom-
plish this unlawful purpose he made known the handsome profits
your company made last year, implying that your company could
stand a price cutting campaign whereas our clients could not.
Promptly upon leaving the store he began to make good his
threats. He advertised one price for all of his supermarkets in
the city, but has established different and exceedingly low prices
in the stores near a Streamline store .
Your customers at your Highland Super market on
Saturday May 13, 1939 were paying 49 cents a pound for tender-
loin while at your Homewood Supermarket (near Streamline)
452. Notes 450 and -451 supra. See also A & P Br., p. 342.
453. A & P Tr., v. 51, p. 11,579.
454. Testimony of the sales manager, id., v. 68, p. 16,181.
455. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 879.
456. Testimony of Pittsburgh Sales Manager upon cross-examination by Govern-
ment counsel, A & P Tr., v. 69, p. 16213-4.
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they were paying 27 cents. In the former store sirloin was being
sold for 39 cents, while at the latter it was being sold for 23 cents.
This is an example of what is taking place all along the line." 4
Here again the lowering of prices in all A & P stores situated near
Streamline was made without reference to Streamline's price structure;
the sales manager in Pittsburgh testified that "we picked the Stream-
line points regardless of whether he (Streamline) had in those particu-
lar stores sold below . . . us." "'
This incident caused such concern to Headquarters that Mr. King
was asked to resign. Mr. John Hartford testified that "later, Mr.
Ewing (A & P's counsel) came in to me and interceded for King, and
I thought maybe I had been a little harsh and I asked King to with-
draw his resignation, which he did, and I tore it up and shook hands
with him, and said good-bye, and I said, 'Now, Mr. King, don't you
ever go into another competitor's store, not even to look at a piece of
equipment.' A little later I had a very nice letter from the firm
(lawyers for Streamline), thanking us for the splendid way in which
we had handled the matter. . ..., 45" On several other occasions during
1939, Mr. Hartford expressed disapproval of the lowering of prices
simultaneously with or shortly after the opening of a competitor's
store; 46o yet, startling inconsistencies in the price levels of stores
located in the same area were discovered as late as December, 1940,461
and in June, 1941, a request for the reclassification of an A & P store
with respect to produce prices was made on the eve of a competitor's
opening in McKees Rocks, Pa.
462
Other deviations from the announced policy not to engage in lethal
business practices should be added. For instance, a former official of
A & P's Southern Division testified before the Grand Jury that the de-
fendant Black, general superintendent of the Dallas Unit, had promised
to buy him "the best hat" in the City of Birmingham if he and the
Birmingham sales manager "would see that they [meaning several
457. A & P Tr., v. 51, pp. 11,574-5. Mr. King had said: "I am going to start
out right now and contact the stores nearest you and cut meat and produce to cost.
I will cut enough prices so that you will feel it in a week from now and in a month
I expect Levy to come to me. I will put a store . . . in Butler right opposite your
store that will finish that store." He also said that he would "reduce his prices so
low that it would be impossible for the Streamline stores to make a sufficient profit
to stay in business." Id. at 11,581-2.
458. A & P Tr., v. 69, p. 16,296.
459. Id., v. 88, p. 20,454.
460. Id., v. 51, p. 11,611 and v. 67, pp. 16,014-5.
461. For instance, A & P had 2 supermarkets and 7 straight grocery stores in
McKeesport, Pa.; 4 of the straight grocery stores had a higher price level on groceries
than the other three. Id., v. 52, pp. 11,642-3.
462. Id., v. 51, p. 11,623. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 895.
FOOD DISTRIBUTION IN THE UNITED STATES
stores of a competitor] were not in business a year from that date." 463
The same Birmingham Sales Manager advised stores in his unit of a
special low price "Anniversary Sale" featured in March and April 1936
by a competitor during a period of five weeks. On some items A & P
personnel was authorized to meet the competitor's prices, but not with
respect to sugar and pure lard; as to these, the stores were requested to
"buy as many of these two items from your competitor as possible. I
am sure that you know how to handle this, writing same up on your
cash voucher." 464 This method of buying up merchandise from com-
petitors where A & P considered the competitor's prices too low was
frequently used in the Southern Division. For instance, in November,
1939, the Houston Unit was advised that a competitor was selling
Campbell's Soup at 5 cents per can, that A & P's cost was above 6 cents,
and that "we would profit by buying all that we could at that figure.
This would be a good opportunity to put a crew of boys to work buying
the limit on soup. . . . A few organized campaigns of this kind
would do a great deal to breaking up some of their below cost
sales." 465 The manager of the A & P store in Indianaola- Mississippi,
reported in May, 1940, on a similar mission as follows:
"Bought sugar and coffee from Jitney Jungle this week and
put it on cash voucher. By 2 P. M. he had stopped selling sugar
to anyone. He was tearing his hair--didn't know customer from
competitor." 466
He was complimented for his action "in organizing a 'buying brigade'
to purchase below cost specials." 467 In September, 1940, the technique
of "buying brigades" had been further improved; the New Orleans of-
fice requested superintendents to mail to it competitor's advertisements
each Friday morning; New Orleans would immediately advise the
units and stores by wire or air mail as to the items in these advertise-
463. A & P Tr., v. 50, p. 11,043.
464. Id., v. 48, pp. 10,600-1. The Government's Brief in the District Court, p.
781, comments "Black's grocery commandos knew perfectly well how to handle this.
They understood the system was to buy all the merchandise which the competitor
had to sell as specials. The scheme was aimed to have . . . ill effects upon compe-
tition: First, they would be deprived of the sale merchandise which they planned to
sell as specials to customers. Second, each item sold to A & P above the quantity
which he had anticipated selling at such prices constituted a loss transaction . . ."
465. Id., v. 47, pp. 10,447-8. Similar instructions were given by the New
Orleans purchasing department in February 1940: ". . . [W]e cannot possibly un-
derstand how this retailer can sell at this price, as it is considerably below our cost,
and we know that he cannot purchase on any lower basis than we. . . . We believe
either you or the manager can have several boys buy enough flour . . . from this
competitor, which in addition to giving us a slightly better price will also help dis-
courage him from selling below cost." Id., v. 48, pp. 10,520-1.
466. A & P Tr., v. 48, p. 10,644.
467. Id., v. 47, p. 10,343.
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ments which were below A & P's cost. The "buying crews" would then
be ready to go into action on Saturday in accordance with the following
instructions:
"We believe the best plan would be to give each purchaser
among the wives, sisters and other members of our clerks' fami-
lies, an amount say $5.00 with instructions to buy all of the par-
ticular specials that we want. To cause more confusion it is
suggested that they might converge on one store at about the same
hour but without trying to buy a set amount as we did last week
as this disclosed immediately what we were doing.
"If you can obtain sufficient merchandise for each store, you
could then use those items in the following week's ad as a red hot
special of our own, figuring our retail at 3 % above the amount we
paid for it." 48
The Government argued that this A & P plan to kill the practice of
loss-leader selling is "an illegal usurpation of power over the methods
of business employed by competitors and is a restraint upon trade." 469
Notwithstanding claims to the contrary, there is considerable evi-
dence that A & P's lowering of prices in one area to meet or forestall
competition was sometimes accompanied by raising of prices in other
areas where competition was weak. This was accomplished through a
system of price zones, which a former A & P employee described as
follows:
"Well, just in brief, I can tell you what the zone system means,
how it is operated; the unit would be five or six zones, like the
Rose Zone, the Pearl Zone, the Green Zone, the Grey Zone, the
Violet Zone; each of those representing a particular territory, some
of the prices were the same in those zones, but if there was a par-
ticular zone where the volume of the A & P was low, competition
was keen, and they would reduce certain items in that particular
zone so that it would not affect the general price change over the
entire system. That works both ways. They would advance
prices in certain zones where they felt competition was weak, and
468. Id., v. 48, p. 10,531-2. The Government commented (D.C. Brief, p. 756)
"Not only did these illegitimate customers succeed in emptying his [the competitor's]
store of the merchandise which the competitor had intended to sell to persons who
might become future legitimate customers, but defendants' activities of necessity would
cause the competitor to suffer tremendous losses. While his treasury might be able
to stand the loss of a few cents a pound on the amount of sugar which he might
expect to sell at such a sale, it cannot be presumed that the competitor would have
reckoned with the huge quantities of merchandise which these illegitimate customers
appearing in the guise of legitimate ones, would desire to purchase." Tactics similar
to those described in the text were also used in Dallas. A & P Tr., v. 46, p. 10,128.
469. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 827. In one case a store manager was asked to buy
from a competitor, "because it will be profitable for you to buy your requirements
for next week at this price." A & P Tr., v. 47, p. 10340. Here A & P encouraged
"wholesaling"; as noted in the text to notes 413 and 414 supra, A & P was anxious
to prevent this when competitors tried to purchase from A & P.
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they hadn't much competition, they would advance prices in that
particular locality. That is the way they adjusted the prices up
and down in those various zones, (that was the purpose of the
zones) to take care of a particular neighborhood." 470
This general statement is corroborated by evidence showing the
practical application of the zone system. For instance, in February,
1941, the retail prices in the Atlantic Division of products manufac-
tured by A & P subsidiaries were examined and it was found that the
gross profit over factory billing was below 18% in all of the units
except Scranton, Pa., where it was 19.3%. This was passed on with
the comment that "we might argue that Scranton is making too much
profit, but I know the attitude up there is that they enjoy a very large
distribution on our products and that there is not very much compe-
tition to interfere with them and, consequently, there is no real necessity
for bringing prices down lower." 471 The sales director of the Division
was "aware of the higher prices being charged at Scranton" but hesi-
tated "to force any reductions because of the bad situation at Phila-
delphia. By that I mean Scranton is a very profitable unit and it is
their profit which has been helping the Divisional situation." 472
Similarly, the Dallas Unit was advised in July, 1940, that Mr.
Hartford insisted on further reductions of the gross profit rate in Dallas
supermarkets. The president of the Southern Division, writing to the
Superintendent at Dallas, stated that he sympathized with the latter's
desire "to keep your loss as low as possible," but that Headquarters
was dissatisfied with the volume of sales in Dallas. The writer sug-
gested "that it might be possible for you to get a little more gross profit
in the Shreveport stores which would enable you to carry some parts
of the territory that are losing heavily at the present time, thereby re-
ducing your total unit loss." 473 Such taking of profits in one territory
to compensate for losses in other territories for the purpose of increas-
ing volume 474 appears repeatedly as an avowed policy.
4"
470. A & P Tr., v. 50, pp. 11,049, 11,050. The testimony quoted in the text was
originally given to the Grand Jury and read to the witness at the trial; the witness
said at the trial that he would repeat the same statement.
471. A & P Tr., v. 51, p. 11,542.
472. Id. at 11,545-6.
473. A & P Tr., v. 47, pp. 10,167-10,169.
474. Govt. Br. (D.C.), p. 794. The brief (p. 833) characterizes this practice
as "fattening the purse of the consumer in Texas with money extracted from the
pockets of the consumer in Lousiana, for the purpose of- eliminating competitors in
Texas."
475. In December, 1936, the Superintendent at Dallas wrote to the president of
the Southern Division: "We shall pursue a policy of taking a profit where our sales
are showing a good increase over a year ago and where competitors are less active.
In other parts of the territory where sales are showing some resistance and compe-
tition is active, we shall sacrifice some profit in order to develop sales over last year."
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There is considerable evidence that all of these activities had fatal
effects on a great number of competitors. Several illustrations may be
cited. On April 5, 1939 the sales department of the Eastern Division
advised its vice-president:
"[Yjou will be interested in learning that the Blue Circle,
last Wednesday, did not do more than $100 worth of business
in the whole store. We understand that this is typical of their
picture throughout the week and I think, in another few weeks,
with a special push of prices in Long Branch, we will have taken
care of this competition." 176
A report about an A & P store in Flushing, New York, stated that
the vegetable and meat departments in that store showed a loss because
of the very low price structure during the second quarter of 1939
adopted to meet competition; the writer added that an independent
market which had opened next door "is just about finished. The Meat
Department has been opened and closed twice and the vegetable de-
partment is on the verge of closing." 177 There were also numerous
reports from the units to divisional headquarters listing the closing of
competitors' stores located in the immediate vicinity of A & P stores.
Independent grocers also testified as to their business losses; 479 one
A & P Tr., v. 48, p. 10,670. In April 1939 the sales manager at New Orleans
wrote to his superintendents that "the idea . . . is to allow you to meet competition
at those points where flour is being used more as a loss leader and to try to make
up the loss in gross at your other points where we can obtain a higher retail than
that we have been setting from the office." rd., v. 47, p. 10,318. In September 1941
a sales manager in the Southern Division told all unit heads that "in most units there
are certain towns or territories where, because of competition or unsatisfactory sales
progress, lower than average gross profit rates can be beneficially used. In other
towns or territories it may be possible to get a little higher. . . . Where stores
need special attention because of unusually active competition or some other condition
beyond our control, we feel that the stores in those towns should be put into a special
zone and given the benefit of lower than average prices. In other towns, where the
conditions may not be quite as pressing, a little better gross profit rate can be ob-
tained with the result that the total for the unit will be in line with the program."
Id., v. 46, p. 9983.
476. Id., v. 52, p. 11,845.
477. Id. at 11,899. In November, 1940, the New Orleans Unit was warned
against too drastic reductions in its gross profit rate which "might disturb the local
situation and reflect unfavorably on our public relations program." Id., v. 47, p.
10,358.
478. A & P Tr., v. 52, pp. 11,702-11,707, referring to closings in the Pittsburgh
Unit where A & P enjoyed a virtual monopoly in some towns. See text at note 100
supra. See also id. at 11,910, 11,911, 11,940, 11,944, 11,946, 11,947, 12,003-12,010,
12,012-12,015, 12,046, 12,047, 12,050 as to stores in New York City, particularly
Brooklyn and Long Island. Many of these were in the same block as A & P stores
or in adjoining blocks. In one case an A & P sales manager reported that he had
learned a competitor had not been able to pay its rent for several months. Id. at
11,891. The closing of a Grand Union store in Scranton, Pa., in June 1940, next door
to an A & P store was accompanied by the comment that this was the last Grand
Union store in Scranton and that "the closing of it must have hurt their pride since
the Grand Union originated in Scranton." Id., v. 51, p. 11,418.
479. See summaries of testimony, Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 800, 849, 853.
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of these said that after the opening of his store in Birmingham, Ala-
bama, in May, 1938, Defendant Black talked to him "about buying us
out or we couldn't make it, we would have to be closed." 4s0 In the
light of the practices dscribed above, the inference seems almost ir-
resistible that A & P's "price wars" were at least in part responsible
for these closings and losses.
IX. CONCLUSION
The foregoing account of the food distribution industry reveals
a sprawling conglomeration of enterprises, large and small, which
despite their varied character assume places in two parallel systems
for getting goods from the producer to the consumer. One of these
is the traditional system, involving changes of ownership as different
functions are performed by successive business units, with frequent
representation of the principals to these purchase-and-sale transactions
by independent brokers who receive commissions for their service. The
other is the chain-store system, in which a single enterprise under uni-
fied ownership performs all of the functions of distribution, except some
of the transportation, through its own personnel and frequently reaches
back into food processing itself.
Competition is severe and frequently bitter at all levels of distribu-
tion and has been intensified by the advent of the chains.4 ' As a result
480. A & P Tr., v. 50, p. 10,991. This witness apparently survived. In many
cases competitors approached A & P with requests that A & P increase its prices.
Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 763, 768, 769.
481. Even the ancient specter of cheating the customer has not disappeared from
retailing as a result of large-scale corporate proprietorship. Indeed, additional in-
centives to practice it have persisted, despite such efforts as A & P Headquarters
made to discourage it. In the antitrust prosecution the Government heavily em-
phasized the practice of "stock gains." For instance in 1935 a customer wrote to
Mr. John Hartford complaining that "there was a great deal of overcharging and
short-weighing being practiced by our managers and clerks." The defendant Black
added that he had to call on this customer as a personal representative of Mr. Hart-
ford "and listen to the most pronounced and justified complaint directed on our
company and its men. It was one of the worst ordeals that I have ever been sub-
jected to. . . ." A & P Tr., v. 49, p. 10,894. On February 1, 1936 Black concluded
his instructions to store managers with the following statement: "We are going to
operate this business in the Birmingham Unit on a fair and honorable basis and
eliminate forever the fact that our business is operated to gyp the customer." Id.,
p. 10,906. Four years later Mr. Hartford still found stock gains in various stores
in the New Orleans Unit amounting to $1000 each in five stores and $2,487 in a store
in McComb, Mississippi. Id., v. 47, p. 10,325. The Divisional President realized
(July 1939) "that the operation of many stores is favorably affected by the stock
gains that are shown," but thought that "we should work toward eliminating those
that are higher than they should be legitimately." Id., p. 10,330. The record is re-
plete with evidence of stock gains. Govt. Br. (D.C.), pp. 207-215. As to Head-
quarters' efforts see A & P Co. Br., pp. 37, 38. Defendants describe stock gains as
the results of physical inventories showing more merchandise in stock than shown by
the records. When there is less, there is a stock loss. Judge Lindley felt that stock
gains "must be eliminated as a factor contributing in any way to violation of the
anti-trust laws." A & P case, 67 F. Supp. at 643.
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of this and other developments, notably the emergence of the super-
market, the size of the individual business units in the industry has
grown; but local enterprise, adapted to new circumstances, continues to
enjoy a preponderance of the business done.482 Several of the chains,
nevertheless, have grown to formidable size, covering the entire country
or large portions of it by their operations. Their economic power is
impressive and generally recognized. It has been maintained, with
significant but not critical fluctuations, since its rapid increase ended a
quarter of a century ago. No indication of collusion among the chains
has emerged. "Independents," on the other hand, have banded to-
gether regionally to improve their methods and secure cooperative per-
formance of services, and have organized both locally and nationally to
promote desired legislation.
With the interests of consumers and the maintenance of small
enterprise very largely at stake, governmental concern with the industry
has been continuous and varied since the chains began to arise. Fre-
quent investigation by Congressional committees and the Federal Trade
Commission, state legislation to aid the independents and hamper the
chains, the federal Robinson-Patman Act, and finally application of the
Sherman Act against the larger chains, have followed one another with
debatable wisdom and with doubtful effect except to deny repose to any
element in the industry. The food brokers, however, have clearly been
strengthened by strict enforcement of section 2(c) of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
The currently most controversial aspect of public policy toward
the industry relates to the application of the Sherman Act, especially
the Government's latest move to break up the A & P organization by
an equity suit. On the side of the Company and, by inference, of the
other chains is their downward pressure on prices.48 3 However, the
record of the A & P prosecution shows that that Company did not
attempt to bring down the general level of prices; its efforts were
directed in the opposite direction since it tried to have all of its com-
petitors pay higher prices. The regular price advantages over other
distributors resulting from this policy were in many instances obtained
without any specific quid pro quo484 and under threats. There was
482. A recent survey by the National Industrial Conference Board indicated that
the independents have been doing as well as the chains for more than a year and
that "the major national chains are losing ground, while the smaller regional chains
are gaining." New York Times, July 17, 1950, p. 26, col. 1. The Bureau of Trade
Practice Conferences of the FTC has been engaged since January, 1950, in the prepara-
tion of Trade Practice Rules for the Grocery Industry. The National Association
of Retail Grocers submitted a tentative draft on Jan. 10, 1950.
483. Note, 58 YAiE L. J. 969, 975 (1949).
484. Professor T. Beckman, author of the work quoted supra note 1, suggested
in a conversation with the writer that these were "unearned advantages," unearned
in the sense that no value was given in return.
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thus secured a war chest for the financing of attempts at forestalling
or eliminating competition, characterized by the Government as preda-
tory price wars. Perhaps, the power thus exercised affords a desirable
counterfoil to monopolistic competition by the producers of nationally
advertised food products. In any event, it is clear that the conviction of
A & P for violation of the Sherman Act in the criminal case was based
on the theory of abuse of power which threatens competition to a
limited extent. In view of the inherently competitive structure of the
food distribution industry and the stationary position of the chains as
compared to the independents described above 4 5 it would seem that
effectuation of the policy of the Sherman Act requires only the sup-
pression of unfair practices and that the break-up of the Company into
seven independent parts is not necessary to afford relief to the Govern-
ment. Indeed, the foregoing summary of the record suggests that
an injunction prohibiting further abuses might suffice to restore
a healthy state of affairs without sacrificing the efficiency of the present
large integrated organization, provided that the punishment meted out
in the criminal case should prove to be ineffective. Many of the prac-
tices condemned in the criminal case under the heading of "price wars"
could be abandoned, particularly through more effective supervision of
over-zealous local company officials and stricter enforcement of policy
directives issued by Headquarters." On the buying side, discon-
tinuance of the practice of exacting large sums of money from manu-
facturers as "advertising allowances," concededly an unjustifiable pro-
cedure, would be one effective corrective, 487 because it would eliminate
unfair advantages which facilitate the conduct of price wars. In any
event, break-up of the Company would seem to be excessive because the
present ratio of the division of business between chains and indepen-
dents in food distribution appears, generally, to be sufficient for the
maintenance of competitive opportunities; the criminal case does not
prove that preservation of such opportunities could be achieved only
by break-up. Since A & P's operations have been generally beneficial
485. See note, 482 and text following note 78 supra.
486. See, e.g., text at notes 441, 460, 466, 468 upra. Compare text at note 439
supra as to the distinction between "predatory" and "competitive" price cutting.
Compare EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 232, at 170, for an expression of doubt as
to the practicality of injunctions as a remedy against price wars. Mr. Edwards
concludes that "in many cases nothing more can be done than to punish the offender
for his past actions and stand ready to punish him again if they are repeated."
Id. at 171. This would be an argument against any civil suit in the A & P case.
487. See text at notes 171-176 supra. Observe also the disregard of counsel's
advice to abandon misleading quantity discount agreements, text at notes 340, 341
supra. See also text at notes 362-364 supra for an example of activities which could
be enjoined.
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to consumers, correction of abuses through punishment or injunctive
relief or, if necessary, both, appear as the appropriate remedies.488
Beyond this dramatic immediate issue lies the further question,
raised by Judge Lindley,48 0 whether the Robinson-Patman Act is really
needed or, if it is, whether it might not be revised to make clearer the
distinction between abusive discriminatory practices and legitimate
price competition."'
488. Compare United States v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 91 F. Supp. 333, 416
(S.D. N.Y. 1950), for an expression of reluctance to tamper unnecessarily with
economic forces from which the public has reaped benefits. See note 482 supra. In
one of their latest advertisements A & P referred to the fact that the Atlantic Com-
mission Company had abandoned its trade sales (text following note 400 supra)
and added, "We made additional changes in other methods of operation which Judge
Lindley had questioned. . . . We went down to Washington and asked the anti-
trust lawyers what else they thought we should do to conform to their new interpre-
tation of the vague anti-trust laws. The only answer we ever got was that we should
break up this Company." If this indicated a bona fide offer of correcting the practices
condemned in the criminal case, one may wonder why the enormous expense of time
and money required by the duplicating civil suit was deemed necessary. Perhaps
the advertisment leaves open the possibility of a consent decree.
489. Text at note 329 supra.
490. See Oppenheim, supra note 216; EDWARDS, op. cit. supra note 232, at 159-169.
A similar distinction was expressed in Adelman, Competition and Anti-Trust Laws,
61 HARv. L. RZxv. 1289, 1331, 1332 (1948), in terms of
"Sporadic, unsystematic discrimination" as a powerful force of competition, and
"precisely ordered systematic discrimination."
He urges the courts to adopt this distinction. See also text to notes 333-336 supra.
